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Introduction
“There are times when Europe can seem alarmingly big, and two people alarmingly
small.”1
It was fall 1938. George F. Kennan, a diplomat at the American legation in Prague, was
moving into a new apartment with his wife, Annelise. Europe was at a crossroads, mostly
because Adolf Hitler, chancellor of Germany, was snatching up territories he felt belonged to the
Reich. He had already gotten Austria, and he now wanted parts of Czechoslovakia.
Consequently, Prague, Czechoslovakia’s capital city, became the center of the world’s attention,
as chaos and war threatened to swallow central Europe whole. The United States, though having
a diplomatic presence in Czechoslovakia, made sure to stay out of Europe’s newest crisis. The
administration of President Franklin Roosevelt was intent on remaining neutral to a European
imbroglio. Thus, Kennan and his wife, along with all the other Americans working in Prague,
could only watch the events transpire, contemplating their relative smallness in light of Europe’s
big—immense—problems. Such feelings—that is, one’s smallness in the face of Europe’s sheer
complexity—would continue to figure prominently into America’s relationship with
Czechoslovakia over the next eleven months, and altogether, they aptly represent the
peculiarities of U.S.-Czechoslovak diplomacy in the year leading up to World War II.
It was from the Schonborn palace and its 127 rooms that America’s diplomats to
Czechoslovakia carried out their daily work. Located in Prague’s historic Mala Strana district,
the palace is situated just a few hundred meters west of the capital’s great waterway, the Vltava
River. The Schonborn’s initial buildings were constructed in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War,
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George F. Kennan, Unpublished Memoirs, “Part II: Prague—Munich to Occupation,” 1939, George
Kennan Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, 14.
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and by the twentieth century it held great historical value to the public.2 With vast rooms,
extensive gardens, and ornate architecture, it procured fond memories, and not the least bit of
awe, from its American inhabitants. And despite the tumultuous events of 1938 and 1939, the
palace’s terraced garden always offered “silence and serenity” to those who needed it. From the
Schonborn, one could catch sight of both the Hrad and the Charles Bridge, worthy reminders of
Prague’s enduring democracy and international flare. When the crises of September 1938 had
reached a frightening pitch, and after wives and children had been sent out of the country, the
American legation staff hunkered down in the palace together, outfitting a few of its rooms to
something akin to school dormitories.3 In the months following Munich, it was primarily from
the Schonborn that America’s diplomats observed Czechoslovakia’s neighbors, most of all
Hitler’s Germany, squeeze the life from the embattled state, and with it, the special bond that had
long personified U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.
From 1918 to 1938, the United States and Czechoslovakia shared unique, friendly
diplomatic relations, or what some even called “special” relations.4 Circumstances changed
drastically in 1938 as a result of the Munich Agreement and its aftermath, and more broadly
speaking as a result of Hitler’s foreign policy. While grounded in shared history and common
values, the U.S.-Czechoslovak connection that existed prior to World War II was often implicit

2
Richard Crane, the first American diplomat to Czechoslovakia, purchased the palace in 1919 and sold it to
the U.S. government in 1925. National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group
(hereafter RG) 59, 124.60F1/348; The Schonborn had even been classified as a national monument. In a 1930 report
on the palace, the American inspectors made sure to point out that the Schonborn was much more beautiful than the
British, French, and Italian legation buildings. NARA, RG 59, 124.60F/283.5.
3
Kennan, “Memoirs Part II,” 7. The Hrad, or Prague Castle, is the presidential castle in Prague. The
Charles Bridge is a major pedestrian thoroughfare and tourist epicenter.
4
This sentiment was expressed in a number of capacities, both official and unofficial, but a good example
is a message sent by Wilbur Carr, American minister to Czechoslovakia, just a few days before he closed the U.S.
embassy in March 1939. Wanting the United States to provide relief to Czech refuges, Carr cited the “special
situation” that existed between the two countries, noting Washington and Prague’s long history of reciprocal
friendliness, and how the United States even served as the model to which Czechoslovakia always looked. Carr to
Hull, March 19, 1939, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1939, General, Vol. I, 50.
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and exaggerated. During the twenty years of Czechoslovakia’s First Republic, though, it hardly
mattered whether the bond was perceived or tangible, as circumstances in the world held to a
state which, for all its hardships, allowed Washington and Prague to maintain normal relations
without having to question the actual value of their friendly relationship. It was not until fall
1938 that the efficacy of the two countries’ relations were put to the test, and they did not fare
well.
Where did the special bond come from? Much of it came as a result of Czechoslovakia’s
independence movement, and the role played by the United States therein. The notion that the
United States, and specifically President Woodrow Wilson, fought hard on behalf of
Czechoslovakia to secure the former’s independence is not true, or it is at last too simple of an
explanation. Wilson’s commitment to liberalism and ‘self-determination,’ which in itself is an
endlessly complex idea, did not necessarily extend to granting recognition to central Europe’s
various ethnic groups, and he preferred that Austria-Hungary outlive the war. It was only when
this possibility lost all tenability that Czechoslovakia and the successor states, essentially through
fait accompli, earned Wilson’s blessing.5 That being said, America’s eventual support of an
independent Czechoslovakia, which became formalized in November 1918, was crucial to the
Czechoslovak cause. As one of the tantamount figures of the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson,
and by extension the United States, was a necessary factor in legitimizing Czechoslovakia’s right
to exist and guaranteeing her borders.6

5
For a thorough unpacking of Wilson’s ideas of self-determination and his role in creating the postwar
order, see Trygve Throntveit, “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National SelfDetermination,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (2011): 445-481.
6
For an appraisal of Czechoslovakia’s drive toward independence, including American involvement, see
Vera Olivova, The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe, 1914-1938 (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1972), 52-100.
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As would become a trend in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, it was the efforts and eagerness
displayed by Czechoslovaks toward Americans that proved most important in establishing the
special bond. As mentioned, Wilson and most other leaders did not seriously consider the
national aspirations of Czechs and Slovaks until the end of the war when other options had
failed.7 On the other hand, Czech leaders, zealous for Habsburg dissolution and autonomy for
their people, actively campaigned for independence. The most central figure in the Czechoslovak
struggle for independence, and by extension the most important person to the development of a
U.S.-Czechoslovak bond, was Tomas Masaryk. Long an admirer of American democracy,
Masaryk’s ties to the United States turned personal when he married an American, Charlotte
Garrigue, in 1878. They moved to Prague, where Masaryk had taken a university professorship,
and while there Masaryk became an important voice in Czech politics. The couple made frequent
trips to the United States, allowing Masaryk to mingle with influential American circles and float
ideas of Czech autonomy.8
Toward the end of the war, Masaryk, who at that point was still drumming up support for
an independent state for Czechs and Slovaks, moved to the United States and established a base
of operations in Washington D.C. where he gained Wilson’s ear.9 In May 1918 in Pittsburgh,
delegations of expatriate Czechs and Slovaks drafted the Pittsburgh Agreement, which declared
the intent of the two groups to establish a unified Czechoslovakia. Five months later, on October
17, Masaryk provided the State Department with a draft of the Czechoslovak declaration of
independence. The following day, Czechoslovakia published its declaration of independence

7
Victor Mamatey, “The Establishment of the Republic,” in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 19181948, eds. Victor Mamatey & Radomir Luza (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 20-22.
8
Paul Selver, Masaryk: A Biography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 285-293.
9
For a thorough account of Masaryk’s efforts in America, see Josef Kalvoda, “Masaryk in America in
1918,” Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 27, no. 1 (1979): 85-99.
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from Paris, and just a short time later, Prague’s National Committee issued its first law declaring
that the Czechoslovak state “has come into being.”10
Efforts, however tempered or calculated, came from the American side, too. In early
October, Secretary of State Robert Lansing publically stated U.S. support of Czech and Slovak
independence.11 Later, in the midst of the Czechs preparing their declaration, Wilson indicated
that he no longer intended to ‘save’ the Habsburg monarchy and gave mention to Czechoslovak
autonomy. Wilson’s message was far from clear, but it roused the Czechs, and their declared
independence came a few weeks later.12
The simple fact that Masaryk carried out the penultimate efforts of his independence
campaign in America was more important to the emerging ‘special bond’ than the campaign’s
actual effectiveness.13 Most historians attribute the rapid development of Czechoslovak
independence first and foremost to the widely publicized successes of the Czech Legion, which
achieved fantastic victories against the Bolsheviks in summer 1918. U.S. officials, resolutely
hostile to the Bolshevik government, paid far more attention to the Legion’s campaign than to
Masaryk’s propaganda or his talks with Lansing and Wilson.14 The Legion’s victories, coupled
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Mamatey, “The Establishment of the Republic,” 26.
For Lansing’s role in Czechoslovakia’s independence movement, as well as an appraisal of the balance
between his and Wilson’s contributions, see George Barany, “Wilsonian Central Europe: Lansing’s Contribution,”
The Historian 28, no. 2 (1966): 224-251.
12
Olivova, The Doomed Democracy, 88-89. The Czechs working from Paris, as well as the legionnaires
serving in Russia, were especially excited about Wilson’s note, seeing it as a logical precursor to official
independence and the impending return to Prague. Carl Ackerman, “Czechs in Russia Acclaim Wilson’s Reply to
Austria,” New York Times, October 25, 1918, 1.
13
Beyond the Pittsburgh Agreement and Masaryk’s base of operations in Washington D.C., Masaryk and
other leaders representing central European nations met in Philadelphia from October 23-26 to discuss common
interests. Olivova writes that “[p]residing over the congress in the historic Independence Hall, Masaryk sat in the
same chair in which, in 1776, George Hancock and Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson signed the declaration
announcing the birth of the new American state.” Olivova, The Doomed Democracy, 89. American papers at the
time did not hesitate in noting the symbolic significance of the conference: “As the new bell pealed forth its chimes
of liberty for the Slav nations Professor Masaryk…read the declaration from the steps of America’s birthplace of
freedom.” “Independence Hall Sees Nations Born,” New York Times, October 27, 1918, 6.
14
Kalvoda, “Masaryk in America,” 98.
11
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with fear of Germany and the fall of Austria-Hungary, swirled together and opened the door for
Allied leaders to support a central Europe composed of small, independent states. Yet in
subsequent months and years, a certain mythology developed around Masaryk—who became
Czechoslovakia’s first president in November 1918—and the time he spent in America.
Masaryk’s admiration of Wilson, liberalism, and democracy, and his stated desire to establish the
same kind of polity in Czechoslovakia, only bolstered the symbolic significance of 1918 for
U.S.-Czech relations. Though it bore just fragments of truth, people saw the relationship between
Wilson and Masaryk as a powerful representation of America’s hand in helping bring about
Czechoslovakia.15
In the immediate years following 1918, Czechoslovakia quickly stabilized itself,
implementing democratic institutions and progressive laws. For the United States,
Czechoslovakia’s successful founding years increased her reputation significantly, especially
when compared to the instability coming from Austria, Poland, and Hungary.16 Having secured
independence, Masaryk and his closest aides—of which Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakia’s first
foreign minister, was most important—strove to reinforce Czechoslovakia’s international image:
that she was central Europe’s standard-bearer of liberalism and democracy. Known collectively
as the “castle group,” Masaryk, Benes, and other confidants maintained a well-oiled propaganda
machine, aimed primarily at spreading Czechoslovakia’s reputation of being the greatest friend
of Western ideals.17 Generally speaking the group’s efforts paid off, for it became common

15

Even fifty years after Masaryk’s death, the Library of Congress published a lengthy commemoration of
Masaryk’s time in America, calling it the “best embodiment” of the “zenith of ties between the peoples of
Czechoslovakia and America.” George Kovtun, Masaryk and America: Testimony of a Relationship (Washington
D.C., Library of Congress, 1988), v.
16
Martin Zuckert, “National Concepts of Freedom and Government Pacification Policies: The Case of
Czechoslovakia in the Transitional Period after 1918,” Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 (2008): 325.
17
For a detailed analysis of the “castle group” and its propaganda campaign, see Andrea Orzoff, Battle for
the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011). Orzoff
paints a fairly critical picture of Czechoslovakia, and she compellingly argues that Masaryk and his officials used
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among American academics and correspondents to view Czechoslovakia as a great bastion of
democracy in central Europe.18
By the 1930s, as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Hungary accepted varying
degrees of authoritarianism, Czechoslovakia the “bastion” became Czechoslovakia the
“island”—a lone outpost of liberalism in an increasingly illiberal region. When the Munich crisis
swelled perilously in 1938, American academics and correspondents—or “the liberals” in the
words of some State Department officials—spoke passionately about the plight of
Czechoslovakia, citing the country’s commitment to the ideals Americans held so dear. A
‘special bond,’ they said, compelled the United States to take greater cognizance of what was
really happening to Prague.19
It is important to note that the special bond between Washington and Prague did not
register with the United States as a whole. Rather, it manifested in primarily three spheres. First,
it was an idea that the American and Czechoslovak governments could point to in official
statements and interactions. Second, American foreign policy experts and correspondents,

undemocratic methods to bolster their democratic image abroad. Masaryk himself once admitted that “without a
certain degree of dictatorship a democracy is no more.” Quoted in Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern
Alliances 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 465-466. Scholars of Czech history, while agreeing with Orzoff’s
argument concerning the efforts of “castle group,” push back against her characterization of Czechoslovakia as a
total myth. For instance, in response to Orzoff’s thesis, Thomas Ort notes, “If Orzoff’s book explodes the Castle’s
myths about the perfectly democratic and egalitarian nature of the First Republic, then it also points, backhandedly
perhaps, to the ways in which the Castle was instrumental in preventing Czechoslovakia from veering off the
democratic course altogether and into the same authoritarianism and nationalist chauvinism that engulfed so much of
the rest of Europe. Whatever the weaknesses and shortcomings of its democracy, Czechoslovakia, by the mid-1930s,
was the only non-authoritarian state in Europe east of the Rhine. For all of its very real flaws, that remains a genuine
and remarkable achievement, not a myth.” Thomas Ort, “Review: Battle for Castle by Andrea Orzoff,” Journal of
Contemporary History 46, no. 4 (2011): 942.
18
These types of references are too numerous to count. For examples, see Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
“Armistice at Munich,” Foreign Affairs 17, no. 2 (1939): 280; Harry Schneiderman, “Czechoslovakia,” The
American Jewish Year Book 40 (1938): 222; “The Son of a Coachman,” New York Times, March 8, 1935, 19; and
Shepard Stone, “A Democracy Amid Dictatorships,” New York Times, December 12, 1937, 150.
19
On the tendencies of “liberals,” George Kennan wrote, “I found myself unable to share that enthusiasm
for democracy in Czechoslovakia that seemed almost an obsession to so many Anglo-Saxon liberals.” Kennan,
“Memoirs Part II,” 21.

7

particularly those with specific connections to Czechoslovakia, championed U.S.-Czechoslovak
relations. Interestingly, their discussions of the unique significance of U.S.-Czechoslovak
diplomacy began in earnest only when the crises of the 1930s came to the fore. It was then that
they tirelessly exposed the injustices the Czechoslovaks faced and implored the country to take
notice.20 Third, private citizens of Czech and Slovak heritage worked hard to raise awareness and
relief for Czechoslovakia amidst its crises.21 Apart from these three spheres, the vast majority of
the population exercised to varying degrees a spirit of isolationism, and specific views regarding
Czechoslovakia varied from sympathy to ignorance. 22
Before the crises of the 1930s erupted, however, the notion of a special bond was buried
underneath normalcy, as diplomatic relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia
assumed a traditional face in the aftermath of World War I.23 Questions of trade dominated their
interactions. Efforts by some individuals, such as Lewis Einstein, American diplomat to
Czechoslovakia from 1921 to 1930, worked toward building cultural and social exchange,
something which the Czechoslovaks approved of immensely, desiring closer ties to the United

20

During the climax of the Munich crisis, one Washington Post correspondent called the United States’
neutrality “contemptible,” and argued that such indifference ought not to completely “blind this country to
Czechoslovakia’s triumph in defeat.” “Triumphant in Defeat,” Washington Post, September 23, 1938, 12. For
similar views among academics and experts, see the work of correspondents Elizabeth Hawes, Dorothy Thompson,
and G.E.R. Gedye.
21
A good representation of the prolific efforts of Czechoslovak-Americans is found in the papers of
Edward Otto Tabor. Tabor, a Czech-American lawyer, worked tirelessly throughout the 1920s and 1930s to raise
awareness about Czechoslovakia, including the shared values undergirding U.S.-Czech relations. After Munich,
Tabor doubled-down on efforts to gather relief for the refugee crisis. See Edward Otto Tabor Papers, 1918-1948,
Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
22
A clear example of this is seen in a ‘Letter to the Editor’ published in the Washington Post in which the
author criticizes the prospect of U.S. involvement in any European crisis, concluding by saying, “If America wants
really to help European democracy and freedom, then let us try with all our might to put our own house so in order
that Europe will come to her senses and try to follow our example.” Julian Wilbanks, “America and the Czech
Crisis,” Washington Post, September 15, 1938, 10.
23
The most exhaustive treatment of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations during the interwar period is Elizabeth
Murphy’s “Initiative Help: United States-Czechoslovak Relations from Versailles to Munich,” PhD diss., Cornell
University, 1999. According to Murphy, “As the United States returned to normalcy and defined its interests,
commercial and financial matters dominated its view.”
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States by any means possible.24 To Prague’s dismay, however, Washington was careful to avoid
political ties. Fearful of being pulled into European crises, the State Department preferred to
foster just economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres, often through private means, and
responded with aloofness to Czechoslovakia’s geopolitical problems.25 Yet despite Washington’s
distance from political issues, the idea of a unique U.S.-Czechoslovak bond persisted into mid
and late-1930s. Though the Depression significantly hurt trade between the two countries,
positive cultural relations and a general tone of friendliness remained.
It was during this time, the late-1930s, when U.S.-Czechoslovak relations could be said
to have been coasting along in a manner neither hot nor cold, that crisis struck Prague as well as
the heart of the U.S.-Czechoslovak bond. As often is the case, the crisis emerged from slowburning problems, and unfortunately for Prague, it faced difficulties both inside and outside its
borders.26 The major issue externally was Hitler. Since his accession to power in 1933, he had
enacted an aggressive foreign policy and rearmament program. From Prague’s vantage point, if
the growing Nazi menace were not checked, it would only be a matter of time before it reared its

24

Ibid.
Murphy’s thesis lays a strong case for America’s focus on economic, not political, matters in its relations
with Czechoslovakia. That being said, two incidents bookending Czechoslovakia’s First Republic aptly demonstrate
the U.S. government’s unwillingness to involve itself in Prague’s geopolitical problems. First, in 1920,
Czechoslovakia and Poland disputed rights to a region called Teschen. The situation ballooned into a miniature
crisis, and the U.S. government, though privy to details and concerned with the outcome, did its best to encourage a
solution that placed zero “moral obligation” on the United States. Lansing to Wallace, August 27, 1920, FRUS,
1920, Vol. I, 66. Later, in 1938, when the Czechoslovak-German crisis reached a critical point, Sumner Welles,
undersecretary of state, explained to the Czechoslovak ambassador the U.S. government’s role in the matter: “…the
policy of the United States, which I was sure the Minister knew, as supported by the majority of the people of this
country, was to remain completely aloof from any involvement in European affairs.” Sumner Welles,
“Memorandum of Conversation,” March 14, 1938, FRUS, 1938, General, Vol. I, 485.
26
The best treatment of Czechoslovakia’s 1930s crises from the Czechoslovak point-of-view can be found
in Igor Lukes’ Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes in the 1930s (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996). See also Olivova, The Doomed Democracy, 162-257; and Keith Eubank, “Munich,”
in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 239-252.
25
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ugly head. With Hitler’s Anschluss in March 1938, this reality creeped frighteningly close to
Czechoslovakia.27
What made Hitler so problematic to Prague, though, was his interest in Czechoslovakia’s
internal crisis. This crisis revolved around a particular region of Czechoslovakia called the
Sudetenland. Comprising the outer rim of Bohemia and Moravia along the German-Austrian
frontier, the bow-shaped territory was home to over three million ethnic Germans. Upon the
Republic’s founding, the Prague government granted the Sudeten Germans full minority rights
and, considering the day and age, treated the Sudeten Germans quite equitably.28 This decent
treatment meant little to disgruntled elements within the Sudetenland, however, whose antiCzechoslovak agenda gained credence when the Czech-Germans suffered disproportionately
during the Depression.29 By the mid and late-1930s discontent within the Sudeten German Party,
led by Konrad Henlein, welled up, and the party began calling for increased autonomy and farreaching concessions from the central government.

27
For an acclaimed account of the Anschluss, see Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Anschluss: The Rape of Austria
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1963). G.E.R. Gedye, a New York Times correspondent who reported from both Austria and
Czechoslovakia during their respective crises, chronicles the Anschluss in Fallen Bastions: The Central European
Tragedy (New York: Gollancz, 1939). For the State Department’s handling of the Anschluss, see FRUS, 1938,
General, Vol. I, 399-492.
28
Recent historiography of Czechoslovakia’s First Republic (1918-1938) has argued for a more nuanced
understanding of the country during that time. Czechoslovakia, despite the collective mythology, was not a perfect
democracy, nor was it completely liberal and equitable in its treatment of minorities, including the Sudeten
Germans. Mary Heimann’s Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013)
is the most critical recent treatment of Czechoslovakia, as Heimann identifies Czech chauvinism as the chief reason
for Czechoslovakia’s historical struggles. Most scholars, including Igor Lukes, feel Heimann stretched her argument
thin, noting that all serious students of central Europe understand that Czechoslovakia’s democracy was far from
perfect, and that the First Republic made its fair share of mistakes, especially in the years leading up to Munich. For
careful, specific analyses of the First Republic’s complex identity, see Nancy Wingfield, Flag Wars and Stone
Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Tara Zahra,
Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2008); Eagle Glassheim, Noble Nationalists: The Transformation of the Bohemian
Aristocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Melissa Feinberg, Elusive Equality: Gender,
Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1950 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2006); and Orzoff, Battle for the Castle.
29
See Patrick Crowhurst, Hitler and Czechoslovakia in World War II: Domination and Retaliation (New
York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), introduction.
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With Austria having been absorbed, Hitler focused his attention on Czechoslovakia. By
this time, Henlein’s party had firmly aligned itself with Nazism and was sewing havoc through
anti-Czech propaganda campaigns. It was a convenient setup for Hitler, who saw the Sudeten
Germans as perfect and willing pawns to be used for the purposes of Nazi expansion, all under
the guise of ‘self-determination.’ In speeches to jeering Reichstag crowds, Hitler vehemently
denounced Prague’s oppressive rule over the Sudeten Germans, claiming the Czechoslovak
government desired to “annihilate” its German minority. Throughout the spring and summer,
Hitler threatened armed conflict unless Prague were to grant the Sudetenland its autonomy.30
Czechoslovakia, now led by Masaryk’s favorite son, Eduard Benes, who had assumed the
presidency in 1935, refused to give in to Sudeten pressure. Not only were Henlein’s demands
unconstitutional, but to relinquish jurisdiction over the Sudetenland, even if only partially, would
have risked the eventual loss of the region as a whole. The Sudetenland was industrially rich, and
many, including Benes, did not consider the Republic viable without it. Czechoslovakia had
reasons to be confident in its refusal, too. She boasted one of the best militaries and some of the
strongest defense fortifications in Europe. She also had defensive pacts with both France and the
Soviet Union, increasing her chances of surviving a German attack.31
Britain and France, however, had no desire to see what might come of a GermanCzechoslovak war. Britain was not prepared to enter a conflict, and France was equally
disinclined despite its pact with Prague. They began placing heavy pressure on Czechoslovakia
to resolve the dispute peacefully. Unfortunately for Prague, their efforts for a peaceful solution
30

“Hitler Said to Aim at Awing Czechs,” New York Times, April 28, 1938, 6; “Herr Hitler’s Speech of
September 12, 1938,” Bulletin of International News 15, no. 19 (September 1938): 8-11. Hitler first insinuated
intervening on behalf of the Sudeten Germans in a February 1938 Reichstag speech, which caught the attention of
not only Czechoslovaks but observers around the world. “Herr Hitler’s Speech of February 20,” Bulletin of
International News 15, no. 5 (March 1938): 23-27.
31
For detailed discussion of Czechoslovakia’s treaties with France and the Soviet Union—both their
origins and outplays—see Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler, 70-86.
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reflected hostility and disinterest toward Prague’s situation, primarily on Britain’s part.32 For
instance, in summer 1938, the British sent a nongovernmental representative, Lord Runciman, to
Prague to mediate between the Sudeten Germans and Czech government. Far from being a
balanced, nuanced investigation of the issues, Lord Runciman spent most his time enjoying the
company of Sudeten German leaders while concluding the Czechs to be stubborn trouble makers
who should part with the Sudetenland.
In September, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain intervened directly as a
mediator to the Czech-German crisis. After a meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Hitler’s
alpine retreat, Chamberlain, along with Prime Minister Edouard Daladier of France, pressured
Czechoslovakia to cede territory with a majority German population. With great misgiving,
Benes accepted the ‘Anglo-French proposal’ on September 21, but by that time Chamberlain was
already on his way to Godesberg for another meeting with Hitler. There, the Fuhrer increased his
demands considerably, infuriating Chamberlain, who was forced to reject the new terms. At that
point circumstances looked very grim, and the involved parties mobilized for war. An eleventhhour invitation from Hitler to Chamberlain, Daladier, and Premier Benito Mussolini of Italy on
September 29 delayed possible hostilities. Then, in the early hours of September 30, the four
powers, at the exclusion of Czechoslovakia, agreed to terms that granted Hitler the
Sudetenland.33

32
See Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler, 135. For an interesting counterargument, see
Jonathan Zorach, “The British View of the Czechs in the Era before the Munich Crisis,” The Slavonic and East
European Review 57, no. 1 (1979): 56-70.
33
Historian Robert Dallek adds that Mussolini dominated the discussions, as he was the only one who
could speak all four languages. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 166.
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The United States, quite naturally, refused serious involvement in the Czech-German
standoff.34 The 1930s, beginning particularly in 1933 with Roosevelt and Hitler’s assumptions of
leadership, saw Washington struggle in its efforts to balance its overseas interests, which were
primarily related to trade and disarmament, with its desire to be politically aloof.35 The extent of
American involvement came in the form of two messages Roosevelt sent where he encouraged
those involved—Prague, Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome—to vigorously pursue peaceful
mediation.36 Meanwhile, in Prague, the American legation, led by Minister Wilbur J. Carr,
represented the United States’ detached disposition. This did not have an adverse on relations
between Washington and Prague, however, as the Benes government did not expect the United
States to intervene in any major way—that expectation was reserved for France and England. For
the morsel of involvement Roosevelt did extend, his two messages, Benes was quite grateful.37
Still, when viewed from a distance, it was not a high point in time for U.S.-Czechoslovak
relations. The unwillingness, and for all intents and purposes the inability, of the United States to
actively support Prague in its political crisis was the opening death knell of their friendly bond.

34

The fullest analysis of the United States’ role in the crisis leading up to Munich is James Baker’s “The
United States and the Czechoslovak Crisis, 1938-1939,” PhD diss., Tulane University, 1971. Baker concludes that
during the Munich crisis, chief advisers to Roosevelt stood on both sides of the issue while the president himself,
though vacillating in his stance toward appeasement, remained steadfast in a policy of noninvolvement. Baker
argues that Munich served as an important turning point in U.S. policy as it quickly convinced Roosevelt, and
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The Munich crisis was the practical outworking of Washington’s longstanding policy of
remaining aloof. As a result, neither Roosevelt nor the State Department had any say in
Czechoslovakia’s loss of the Sudetenland.
Most treatments of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations end there. Perhaps in an epilogue or
concluding chapter Munich’s aftermath and Germany’s occupation of the Czech lands are
discussed, but if so only in brief.38 Studies that do consider at length American policy in the
months following Munich tend to do so from a broad view, usually from the Roosevelt
Administration’s or State Department’s perspective, and they do not offer much discussion on
the precise issue of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. That is what this study seeks to do, first and
foremost: to provide a thorough account of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations in the period between
Munich and the Nazi invasion of Poland. In those eleven months, the two countries experienced
a radical transformation in the nature of their relations, though it often occurred in a gradual,
unassuming manner. The consequences, though, really were radical. If Munich indicated that the
‘special bond’ between Prague and Washington—those mythicized ideas of Masaryk, Wilson,
and their shared values—was impractical, largely owing to U.S. isolationism, then the months
that came after proved, again and again, its complete impotence. The United States, due to its
unique position (it was an ocean away and dominated by public opinion which said ‘no’ to
European entanglement), was spared both Prague’s consternation and expectation of direct help.
The result was a situation in which American diplomats and officials retained friendly feelings
with Czechoslovakia as they watched it disappear before their eyes.
Though this study aims to provide a holistic view of the United States’ diplomatic
responses to Czechoslovakia’s post-Munich existence, its focus lies in Prague and the American
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officials working there, with particular attention paid to Wilbur Carr and George Kennan. There
are a few reasons for this. First, the American legation in Prague was on the frontlines of dealing
with post-Munich Czechoslovakia, observing and reporting its nuanced crises in real time. In
studying the efforts of those working from the Schonborn, one finds stark, active examples of the
special bond’s impotence. And since the days’ crises were taking placing in Czechoslovakia, the
legation’s observations, analyses, and opinions serve as the most complete and helpful depiction
of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations at play.
Second, Washington, though assuredly interested in what was happening in
Czechoslovakia, was not in a position to actively address the developments. Once peace,
however flimsy or temporary, had been secured at Munich, the Roosevelt Administration and
State Department had little role to play in its aftermath. As long as the European countries
haggled and agreed that ‘all was well,’ then there was no need to seriously interact with what
was happening in Prague. Thus, in the time between Munich and the March occupation,
Washington had little to say and even less to do in regard to Czechoslovakia. That is not to say
that Washington had nothing to say about the development of European geopolitics. Far from it.
Roosevelt and the State Department were very active in appraising the circumstances
surrounding Hitler, Chamberlain, and Mussolini.39 They did not, however, keep painstaking tabs
on the specifics of what was happening in Czechoslovakia. The American legation in Prague, on
the other hand, had no such luxury. Like officials back home, it had no part in the post-Munich
drama, other than to watch, listen, and report the circumstances as they came. But unlike
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, or others in Washington, Carr and his team were
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daily confronted by the realities of post-Munich Czechoslovakia. It was their responsibility to
watch Prague try to reorient itself and consolidate its rump state.
The study is divided into four parts, two of which center on what could be called crucial
moments, with the other two unpacking larger periods of time. The first chapter, “Realization,”
examines the ‘moment’ of Munich and its immediate aftermath, when both the American
legation and State Department attempted to respond to the crisis’s implications. During this time,
people everywhere learned the true extent of Munich’s provisions, which turned out to be far
more crippling for Czechoslovakia than what many had anticipated. Thus, very quickly the
universal sigh of relief that came from the avoidance of war turned to somber realization that
Germany now possessed nearly total leverage in Czechoslovakia’s future. Prague’s miserable
situation was made worse by territorial demands from other neighbors, internal discontent within
its eastern provinces, and the refugee and economic crises set aflame by Munich. The American
legation watched these events in rapid succession without any ability to lend meaningful support,
signaling the inherent impotence of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, despite their continuing
friendliness.
The second chapter, “Consolidation,” addresses a larger period of time, centering on the
legation’s reporting during the Second Republic. During this five-month period between Munich
and the March occupation, the Czech and Slovak state, now going by Czecho-Slovakia, struggled
to pull itself together and consolidate its revised frontiers. The chief difficulty lay in sufficiently
pleasing Hitler while maintaining a semblance of independence. Though descriptions of the
policy enacted by the Prague government’s leaders during this time range from “heroic” to
“traitorous,” the American legation’s dispatches indicate a country and government in utterly
pitiable circumstances. Furthermore, it was during this time that American observers also began
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differentiating Czechs from Slovaks and Ruthenes, undermining the idea of a Czechoslovak state
altogether. Much like what happened at Munich, the American legation remained a passive
observer throughout the Second Republic’s gradual disintegration, constituting an unavoidable
low-point in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.
The third chapter, “Occupation,” discusses another ‘moment’—the immediate context of
Hitler’s March 15 occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. It was arguably the most crystallized
depiction of the underlying impotence of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. Though sympathetic to
the Czechs’ embattled existence, neither the American legation nor Washington could do
anything to prevent Czecho-Slovakia’s complete destruction. The event also reinforced the
difficulties posed to those at the Schonborn in trying to analyze the currents of central Europe.
Though never confident in Czecho-Slovakia’s prospects at consolidation following Munich, the
American legation still found itself caught off guard by Hitler’s march into Prague. Ultimately,
the occupation proved to be a major turning point. In regard to the international situation, it fully
discredited Hitler and set Europe on a path to war. For U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, it signaled
the end of an era, for U.S.-Czechoslovak relations would not formally reemerge until after the
war, by which time the friendliness that typified pre-war U.S.-Czechoslovak relations failed to
resurface.
Finally, the fourth chapter, “Documentation,” traces the work done by the few American
officials who remained in Prague following the occupation. Like chapter two, it tackles a broader
period of time, the roughly five months between the March occupation and Germany’s invasion
of Poland. With Czecho-Slovakia officially removed from the map, American observers,
particularly George F. Kennan, wrestled with big questions about the region’s future. His
analyses, along with those completed by American consulates, demonstrate the ways in which
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the occupation fundamentally transformed the very idea of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.
Following the occupation, Hungary snatched Ruthenia; Slovakia secured its autonomy; and
Eduard Benes established a Czech government-in-exile, all while the Czech government in
Prague hunkered down under German rule with the sole goal of keeping the Czech national spirit
alive. Thus, the entire concept of a single, Czechoslovak state blurred to the maximum, and U.S.Czechoslovak relations became buried under looming war.
Together, the four sections show how in the final eleven months before World War II,
U.S.-Czechoslovak relations proved impotent in the face of external pressures and crises. The
notion of uniquely friendly or special relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia,
which had come to the forefront because of the crises at hand, did not translate into any
American ability to prevent Czechoslovakia’s ultimate destruction at the hands of Germany. At
its core, however, U.S.-Czechoslovak diplomacy is not a story of failure, but one of cold, hard
realities. The difficulties inherent to U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, despite their common values,
were very much rooted in America’s lack of influence and presence in central Europe as a whole.
Munich opened the Pandora’s box of central European power struggles, many of which had been
lying dormant since the Versailles Treaty. Once Hitler embarked on his insatiable foreign policy,
the door was opened for many more countries and peoples to pursue their own goals and pet
projects. Unfortunately for the Prague government, Czechoslovakia’s lands were often at the
center of other nations’ campaigns, and once irredentist and revisionist momentum began, it was
impossible to stop. Those at the Schonborn and those at the State Department lacked both the
ability and desire to exercise significant influence in the “dizzily rocking continent.”40 Thus, the
events that transpired between September 1938 and September 1939 tested the limits of U.S.-
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Czechoslovak relations, exposed their impotence, and set a pattern of passive “wait-and-see”
conduct toward central Europe that would have profound implications in the postwar world.

19

Chapter One: “Realization”
There, in the brightly lighted room, I came upon the minister sleeping peacefully in an
armchair. The servants stood respectfully behind the curtains of the dining room, not
daring to wake him. The sight of the old gentleman, thus peacefully at rest in the solitary
splendor of his heavily curtained salons while outside in the growing darkness a Europe
seething with fear and hatred and excitement danced its death dance all around us, struck
me as a symbolic enactment of the helplessness of all forces of order and decency, at that
moment, in the face of the demonic powers that history has now unleashed.1
George F. Kennan’s stirring memory of Wilbur J. Carr, the American minister in Prague,
and his cozy armchair nap, came just a couple days after the Munich Agreement had shocked the
world. In the months leading up to September 30, threats of war and destruction loomed over
Prague, and the primary question was whether the seemingly inevitable war would be local or
continent-wide.2 Munich ended such grim talk, at least for a time, but the relief that came from
war having been averted did not mean that all of the crisis’s aspects immediately dissipated.
Many details were not yet settled, and many questions remained unanswered. Would the transfer
of territory occur peacefully? Would the Czechoslovak government remain? Would Poland and
Hungary wait patiently for their scraps of land? Would Slovakia leave the Republic? They were
all vitally important questions, ones that could determine the future course of central Europe, but
as Kennan realized when looking upon his dozing boss, there was little the Americans could do.
The inability of the American legation to be anything but a ‘passive observer’ to the Munich
crisis and beyond was one of many realizations for those at the Schonborn, and one that signaled
the relative powerlessness of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, no matter how friendly they might be,
in a region overcome by ruthless external forces.
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If through Munich American observers discovered the general impotence of U.S.Czechoslovak relations, they also realized something about the region itself—its dizzying
complexity. Once, when describing central Europe, Kennan observed that it was a place where,
more than anything else, “jealousies run so high.”3 The American diplomat may have had a long
view of history in mind, but the twenty years that had come and gone since World War I were
sufficient to highlight the region’s ‘jealousies.’ Most of all, the central European states, not least
of which Czechoslovakia, were jealous of their borders. With the dissolution of the Habsburg
Empire came the successor states, and with the successor states came the redrawing of central
Europe’s map.4 Each country fought hard to attain the borders it felt it deserved, whether out of
historical consideration, racial homogeneity, or economic necessity. At the conclusion of the
Treaty of Versailles, no country achieved all it desired, though some had received a good portion
of their claims, particularly Czechoslovakia. Others emerged feeling bitter.5 Unfortunately, then,
Versailles left central Europe in a precarious, jealous state. It must be said that all the fault
cannot be laid at the feet of those who commissioned Versailles as the complexities of central
Europe were centuries deep and impossibly complex. But nonetheless, the decisions and treaties
that took place from 1918-1920 helped produce bitterness, insecurity, and envy over the region’s
new borders, so that in 1938 and 1939, and spurred on by the unprecedented aspirations of Adolf
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Hitler, American diplomats, officials, and correspondents witnessed the powerful outpouring of
these intense feelings.
For Kennan, Carr, and other American officials serving in Prague, the fervent attention
paid to national boundaries in central Europe was difficult to comprehend. The United States
enjoyed two friendly neighbors to the north and south, and two oceans to the east and west. Its
borders were settled. Czechoslovakia could hardly have been more different. Landlocked and
surrounded by nations that to various degrees disliked her, she was as vulnerable as the United
States was secure. Germany curled around Czechoslovakia’s western province, Bohemia. To the
south of Moravia, Czechoslovakia’s central province, lay Austria. Thus, after the Anschluss,
Bohemia had to confront the miserable prospect of being a Reich enclave. On the map, it looked
as though a great German pincer were clamping down on Prague. To the north of Moravia and
Slovakia stood Poland. The last of the hostile powers, Hungary, stretched across Slovakia’s
southern frontier. And finally, in Ruthenia, the eastern most province, Czechoslovakia shared a
border with Rumania. Though only eighty miles long, Prague’s connection to Bucharest was
important in that the two were allies—the lone friendly neighbor for the Czechs and Slovaks. In
the immediate days following Munich, the American legation observed as Czechoslovakia’s
three not-so-friendly neighbors pressed for territorial concessions.
When Carr arrived in Prague in fall 1937, he was already sixty-seven-years-old. He had
spent his entire career in the State Department, entering the service in the 1890s and working his
way up to an assistant secretary position. His responsibilities primarily lay in overseeing the
consular department, for which he would always maintain a special attachment.6 In the 1920s,
Carr was instrumental in the passage of the Rogers Act, which combined the consular and
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diplomatic services, making for a more streamlined foreign service. Over the next decade, one
would find Carr at congressional hearings haggling with senators for funds, or at his desk, where
he saw to it that America’s strict immigration quotas were followed, and he sorted out endless
administrative problems that sprung forth from U.S. embassies around the globe. Along the way,
her garnered the unofficial title, “Father of the Foreign Service.”
Roosevelt’s election in 1932 brought some drama to the State Department. Roosevelt was
never particularly fond of the foreign service, finding it conservative, stagnant, and in the way of
his own ideas on foreign policy.7 As a result, he tended to play officials off one another, knowing
that interdepartmental rivalries would make it easier for him to be his own secretary of state.
Some grew frustrated with Carr, who never seemed to manage the divisions well, and by the
mid-1930s the department had become a noxious mix of career men and partisan appointees, old
guard conservatives, and New Deal Democrats. Things came to a head in 1935 when
Undersecretary William Phillips became be minister in Rome, leaving his former position open.
It was hotly contested, and Carr may even have thrown his hat in the ring. It ended up going to
Sumner Welles, a close confidant of Roosevelt, and the appointment was followed by a major
reshuffling of the department to better align it with the administration’s guiding principles.
The department’s changing face made Carr persona non-grata in a mild form.8 The result
was a reassignment to Prague to serve as its head of mission. The State Department, led by the
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cautious and virtuous Cordell Hull, packaged the transfer as a way of honoring Carr, who had
devoted his whole life to the foreign service. There was probably a good measure of truth to this,
but there is little doubt that the decision to ‘honor’ Carr was made easier by the belief that he no
longer had a place in Washington. Carr, though ready for retirement, thought better of himself
than to turn down the president’s request. Prague also happened to be the one city where he had
an interest of serving.
Throughout his years as an assistant secretary of state, Carr came into contact with every
corner of the foreign service. Thus, when news got out that the ‘old man’ had received the title of
minister, everyone was extremely pleased. The only one who seemed to have reservations was
Carr himself, but his well-wishers were too excited to notice. “No one, however, seems to share
my views,” Carr wrote in a letter William Phillips, “and so I am going, and will give the best I
have to the work until such time as the President may feel I may retire.”9 Carr received hundreds
of letters from his colleagues, congratulating him on a well-earned capper to a distinguished
career and telling him that he would have a wonderful “sojourn” in Prague. Carr hoped so, too,
but he could not help but notice Central Europe’s volatile nature. Some, such as William Bullitt,
ambassador to Paris, tempered their congratulations with warnings of the difficulties posed by
the international climate. Beyond the unpredictable nature of European geopolitics, of which
Carr was admittedly ignorant, he worried about not knowing the language, customs, or history of
Czechoslovakia. Always a scrupulous student, he learned as much as he could before his
departure.10
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Carr arrived in Prague on September 9, 1937, and within two days he was “in love with
his legation.”11 He found the Schonborn Palace splendid, charming, and comfortable, and he
anticipated having a wonderful time as minister.12 Throughout the first few months, the minister
and his wife enjoyed sampling the best of Prague’s cultural scene, and they liked the Czech
people, too. One of his first official tasks was a somber and important event—Tomas Masaryk’s
funeral. Roosevelt had designated Carr as his personal representative, and as a result, Carr
walked directly behind the coffin during the funeral procession. The outpouring of grief from the
populace over its president-liberator’s death left an indelible impression on Carr, and he could
not help but reflect on its significance, as well as what made Czechoslovakia special: “This day
and the past 4 days have been the greatest manifestation of affection for a single human being
that I have ever known. A man who was born a peasant, but through dint of hard work and great
determination became a professor, and then a great patriot and statesman, the main factor in
setting up this free democratic government in the midst of dictatorships…”13
By early 1938, the Sudeten controversy had come to a head as a result of the Anschluss
and Konrad Henlein’s ‘eight-point program.’ Shoddy reconnaissance caused Czechoslovakia to
mobilize its army in late-May, and for a few days it looked as though war were imminent.14
Tensions remained high throughout the spring and summer. For Carr, then, his nice “sojourn”
was turning into an extremely taxing assignment, and the entire legation staff felt the weight of
the danger that might come. In Prague, Carr, embassy officials, and the consular staff worked
well together, and a certain measure of camaraderie developed due to the growing crisis.
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Secretaries of legation Raymond E. Cox and Vinton Chapin worked directly under Carr. Irving
Linnell ran the consular staff. There were others, of course, such as the legation’s
“indispensable” interpreters, Frank Novotny and Francis Hejno.15 In case of war, the Germans
would undoubtedly seek to execute quick air raids on Prague, and with the Schonborn being in
direct proximity to the Hrad, it was very likely that the palace would be an early casualty.
Shortly after arriving, Carr had learned from Cox that the British had long been constructing
bombproof shelters and cellars to protect embassy staff. Later in the spring, Carr cabled the
department, inquiring about the possibility of building a bombproof shelter near the Schonborn.
The department did not like the sound of the project, namely the expenses involved, and
wondered why a converted cellar in the Schonborn would not do the trick. When hearing that the
cellars were not workable, the department suggested an offsite location.16
In May Carr found a potentially suitable offsite location, the Zbraslav castle, located
about six miles from the city center. Unfortunately, it was lacking everything from heat to
electricity to “sanitary conveniences.”17 At last with the department’s blessing, Carr began
pursuing the construction of a bombproof shelter. Naturally a series of obstacles prevented much
progress from taking place, and by September, when the Czech-German crisis was looking
especially bleak, the shelter still only existed on paper. Frantically, as the crisis unfolded, the
legation got to work on preparing the Zbraslav for emergency habitation.
It was clear, however, that Zbraslav would be a less than satisfactory solution due to its
distance from the Schonborn. As Carr and others from legation stressed in dispatches to the
department, the Czechs were experts at blackouts. This was in part due to the fact that the
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Czechoslovak government issued the most “minute” instructions for the crisis, and the people
carried them out with precision. During air raid drills, then, Prague’s streets turned “dark as
pitch.” All automobiles were required to have blue coverings placed over their lights, resulting in
an earie glow resembling sinister “will-o-the-wisps.”18 In a September report to the State
Department, Carr explained the utter fiasco that would result in trying to move the entire
legation’s staff, by car, to the castle in the event of an air raid. With only a few minutes between
the start of the alarm and the dropping of bombs, it would be impossible for the staff to
effectively motor through Prague’s labyrinthine streets with people running frantically and the
city in full blackout. “Only a person who has had to travel the streets of a large city during a
blackout can have any appreciation of the difficulties involved,” mused Carr.19
Throughout September, as the legation scrambled to put together a safe plan for
emergency, it also reported day and night the progress of the Czech-German crisis. Tensions had
reached a boiling point, and the American legation witnessed the public become increasingly on
edge. Blackouts, gossip of imminent air raids, and the endless alarms brought about by looming
war kept the Schönborn in a worried state.20 Carr expressed concerns among the legation, as well
as “responsible” Czech circles, that civil war might soon breakout in the Sudetenland.21 The
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region was being overrun with German propaganda campaigns attempting to misrepresent and
provoke incidents. Czech officials worked hard to maintain order, and on the whole,
Czechoslovak citizens kept their composure. Carr and the legation were amazed by the national
display of order and calm.22 Still, as far as they could tell, Prague would fight if the Germans
moved to occupy. Military personnel were eager; the country’s defensive fortifications were
good; the people were loyal; and government officials from President Benes to Prime Minister
Milan Hodza to Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta indicated that, if forced to, Czechoslovakia
would defend herself.23
After the revelation of Hitler’s Godesberg memorandum on September 24, Benes told
Carr with somber fatalism that such proposals equaled the “assassination of the state,” and that
he and his people would rather die than accept Godesberg’s terms.24 Carr seemed genuinely
angered by reports of the memorandum. In his message to the department, he stressed Hitler’s
“uncompromising” tone, and he explicitly rejected Hitler’s cries of Czech maltreatment of the
Sudeten Germans. He cited investigations undertaken by the legation, supported by evidence
from “impartial sources,” that any ‘maltreatment’ was the deliberate invention of the German
press.25 Then, under heavy pressure from Britain and France, Czechoslovakia acquiesced to the
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so called ‘Anglo-French proposals’ on September 21 which, among other details, granted
Germany the Sudetenland. Chamberlain was in for a rude awakening at Godesberg, however,
where Hitler vehemently rejected the proposals and increased his demands significantly. Those
at the Schonborn reported the news in a foreboding manner, and the Czechs and Germans
mobilized for war. Then came Roosevelt’s pleas, Mussolini’s intercession, and the midnight
meeting of Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini, culminating in the Munich agreement.
Without an ally with which to fight, and in danger of becoming the international pariah,
Czechoslovakia bowed to pressure and accepted the terms.26 For at least a time, war had been
avoided.
In the final days leading up to Munich, Washington played only a small and mostly
insignificant role. The United States, an ocean away and protected from intervention by a public
opinion that wanted no such thing, remained neutral throughout 1938. The Roosevelt
Administration and State Department certainly did not want to see war, though, and as CzechGerman hostilities ramped up in late-September, Roosevelt grew inclined toward encouraging
peace. Alarming dispatches had been pouring onto the desks of Roosevelt and Hull during
August and September, with many urging the president to intervene in some way.27 Hull warned
Roosevelt against action, fearing that the president, and by extension the United States, would be
forever tied to whatever plan the British and French were hatching.28 Department officials in
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Washington agreed with Hull, concerned specifically with the possibility that a statement by
Roosevelt might associate the country with “selling the Czechs down the river.”29
After Chamberlain and the Czechs rejected Hitler’s Godesberg demands, a general war
looked inevitable. It was at this time, when Hitler was poised to strike and when Chamberlain
indicated he had reached the limits of ‘peace at all costs,’ that Roosevelt decided to intervene.30
On September 25, Carr telegraphed a plea from President Benes, in which the Czech president
asked that Roosevelt urge the British and French not to abandon Czechoslovakia. 31 The
repercussions of such appeasement would not only be Czechoslovakia’s destruction, said Benes,
but also a great conflict throughout the entire world. Whether Benes’s message had any import is
up for debate, but the following day Roosevelt sent a letter to Hitler and Benes.32 In it, Roosevelt
reminded his readers of how much was at stake: “The fabric of peace on the continent of Europe,
if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger.” He spoke of “shattered”
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economies and “wrecked” social structures before extending the moral weight of the “130
millions of people of the United States” who earnestly desired a “peaceful, fair, and constructive
settlement.”33
Roosevelt’s specification that he and his country longed to see a peaceful and fair
resolution to the crisis at hand was important to Benes. In his reply to the president, Benes
expressed being “deeply moved” by the eleventh-hour message, believing that Roosevelt’s words
could contribute to a “just solution.” He reiterated this point, sharing with Roosevelt his
contention that the crisis could still be resolved in “a spirit of equity.”34 Hitler was not so
understanding, and the crisis plunged forward unabated.35 On September 27, Roosevelt sent
another message, this one to Mussolini and asking for speedy mediation. Again, it is unclear as
to the significance of Roosevelt’s message, but two days later, the four leaders—Hitler,
Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini—met at Munich and ironed out the treaty.36
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On September 29, when the leaders of France, Britain, and Italy were still en route to
Munich, Vladimir Hurban, the Czechoslovak minister in Washington, delivered a message to the
State Department explaining that the Czechoslovak government had conceded to the majority of
Hitler’s demands. However, if further difficulties were to arise, it asked that the entire dispute be
submitted to Roosevelt for arbitration, “which Czechoslovakia pledges its adherence to in
advance.”37 A reply never came, and Hull explained in a press conference the following day that
events had so changed that none was merited. Still, the last-minute plea to place the whole crisis
at the feet of Roosevelt, however outlandish a request, demonstrates the faith and trust Prague
placed in Washington, but also Washington’s unwillingness to become entangled in Munich’s
mess.
As a result of working through the crisis together, the Schonborn staff had developed a
close camaraderie at September’s end. The fact that the legation was understaffed only fueled the
legation’s ‘all hands on deck’ environment.38 Carr wrote to Hull expressing his delight for those
with whom he served, personally extolling everyone from the consuls to the stenographers: “I
feel certain that nowhere in the service is to be found a more conscientious, loyal, and capable
staff than the group I have named.”39 It was into this tight-knit community at the Schonborn that
George Kennan began his service in Prague. Arriving on the morning of Munich, Kennan
reached the Schonborn’s front doors to begin what would ultimately become a year of invaluable
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service in Czechoslovakia. In the years following his time in Czechoslovakia, Kennan would
become an influential policymaker and household name, but upon his arrival in 1938, he was just
a little-known secretary of the legation. After a year’s time, Kennan would leave Czechoslovakia
as the legation’s most traveled and prolific reporter. Kennan authored or coauthored the vast
majority of the paper trail transmitted from Prague to Washington, copiously detailing the everchanging circumstances in post-Munich Czechoslovakia.
Kennan had entered the foreign service in the early 1920s. There, he developed a peculiar
mix of love for classic Russia and deep suspicion and scorn for the Soviet state. In 1934 he
helped establish the United States’ first legation in Moscow, and he remained there until 1937
when he was called home. Like Carr, the turn in Kennan’s career was at least partially the result
of Roosevelt’s shuffling of the department. The president did not appreciate the anti-Soviet
outlook of both the legation in Moscow and the department in Washington, so when Kennan
returned home he learned that he would be one of two officials manning the newly minted
“Russia desk.” After a miserable year working in Washington, Kennan requested a transfer
overseas for him and his family, which came in summer 1938.40
While working in D.C., Kennan kept a close eye on events in Central Europe. The
Czechoslovak crisis was “simmering,” and Kennan, always an astute follower of the day’s
geopolitics, did not want to miss the “climax” in Czechoslovakia. 41 With poetic timing, the
journey across the Atlantic was full of torrential rains and gales. Along the way the ship’s
passengers heard word of Godesberg, and later Chamberlain’s news of the upcoming meeting at
Munich. From Paris Kennan flew to Prague. When flying over Germany Kennan saw a line of
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military planes and wondered whether they would be taking off soon to bomb Prague. He arrived
at the Schonborn palace in late-morning, September 29. It was a “lovely” September day, but
more importantly “it was Prague’s day of destiny.”42
On September 30, Kennan, Chapin, and others spent the morning ruminating on how the
Czechs would respond to the supposed agreement. Prague’s government was in deliberation, but
reports were coming from London about what had been decided by the four powers. In the
afternoon following Munich, only rumors about the terms of the agreement had reached the
Prague’s streets. By one p.m. on Friday, still only speculations of the agreement’s details trickled
throughout Czechoslovakia, though citizens were waiting with “much anticipation.”43 News
correspondents worked feverishly from international hotels like “vultures,” and the people
rushed to newsstands to gather whatever details were becoming available.44 American officials
were only a few hours ahead. At one in the afternoon, Carr telegrammed the department the
basics of the agreement: 1) the progressive occupation of the first four zones by Germany by
October 10; 2) the creation of an international commission to determine the final borders and
plebiscites; 3) the inclusion of frontier guarantees from France and Britain immediately, and then
later from Germany and Italy provided that Czechoslovakia’s border disputes with Poland and
Hungary were satisfactorily settled. 45 Two hours later, the legation provided details of the
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occupation zones and soon after informed Washington that while the Czech government had
accepted Munich “with a heavy heart,” the people were still largely unaware of it, let alone the
details.46
America’s response to the Munich pact, at least on an official level, was one of relief.
American officials serving in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and in other parts of Europe, reported
happy responses on behalf of their host governments, but also themselves. In Washington, both
the Roosevelt administration and the State Department breathed somewhat freely for the first
time in weeks with a general war having been avoided. As tensions eased after the announcement
of Munich, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, head of the State Department’s Division of Western European
Affairs, noted that he and others in the department were prone to spending long periods at their
desks, doing nothing but “ruminating over the events of the past crisis…wondering what might
have been better.” He felt good about how the department handled the crisis: “The United States
has come through with its cards well played and no mistakes chalked up against it.”47 For an
official response, Roosevelt tasked Welles with deliving the department’s thoughts on Munich to
the public. Welles, along with Moffat, Hull, and others from the department worked together to
strike the correct tone.48 The statement, delivered on September 30, was necessarily muted: “…it
is unnecessary to say that [the agreement] afford a universal sense of relief.”49
At the Schonborn, Kennan, upon his arrival, found everyone relieved to know that war
had been avoided. The American public greeted the news of Chamberlain’s ‘peace in our time’

46

Carr to Hull, September 30, 1938, three p.m., NARA, RG 59, 760F.62/1367; Carr to Hull, September 30,
1938, four p.m., NARA, RG 59, 760F.62/1366. At 12:30 p.m. in Prague, foreign minister Krofta received the
ministers from Britain, France, and Italy and informed them of Prague’s acceptance of the Munich terms. See
Theodor Prochazka, The Second Republic: The Disintegration of Post-Munich Czechoslovakia, October 1938March 1939 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981), 9-12.
47
Moffat, diplomatic journal, October 1-2, 1938, 1. In March, Moffat would offer some criticisms for
Carr’s handling the crisis, but in regard to Munich, he was pleased with the legation’s work.
48
Moffat, diplomatic journal, October 1-2, 1938, 3.
49
“Statement Issued by the Department of State,” September 30, 1938, FRUS, 1938, General, Vol. I, 683.

35

with enthusiasm, and remained grateful that, even in September’s darkest days, their country
kept aloof from the European imbroglio.50 Only correspondents from particular newspapers and
academics of certain fields chided the agreement reached at Munich. To them, the last bastion of
democracy in central Europe had been utterly sold out, and the fascists had won the day. Dorothy
Thompon, a Washington Post correspondent and leading advocate of internationalist, pro-refugee
policies, cabled Hull directly on September 30, begging the secretary to formally protest the
agreement. “The agreement is in no sense a diplomatic document and any jurist cold tear it to
shreds,” wrote Thompson.51
Despite their sincere relief that war had been avoided on September 30, few in the
department saw any lasting peace in Munich.52 There were some officials, such as Hugh Wilson,
ambassador to Germany, and Joseph Kennedy, ambassador to Britain, who believed that Munich
would usher in a new era of “peace and prosperity." Most, however, were not so confident.
Within days, Roosevelt and Hull realized that Munich only delayed an inevitable conflict, and it
was difficult to say whether the price of Munich was worth the cost. Even those officials more
inclined toward harbor sympathy for the difficult positions of France and England, such as
William Bullitt, ambassador to France, were appalled by Munich’s terms. Bullitt himself had
long argued that the United States was in no position to criticize London and Paris when she
herself refused to fight.53 However, when he learned of Hitler’s Godesberg demands, he found
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them “totally unacceptable.” When speaking with the British ambassador in Paris, he had let it be
known that no Government could ever accept such a proposal with good conscience.54 Those at
the Schonborn, too, though grateful for no bombings and invasions, felt terribly for the
Czechoslovaks. Carr had made it clear to the department that fault for the Munich crisis lay
entirely with the Germans and Hitler—to see the Germans essentially rewarded for their
miserable behavior brought comfort to no one at the Schonborn.
Naturally it was a rainy evening, but amidst the depressing atmosphere, Carr was taken
by the “marvelous self-control” and “superb loyalty” demonstrated by the Czechoslovak
people.55 So much so, in fact, that despite the troubling future that lay ahead of the
Czechoslovaks, Carr did not foresee any serious trouble.56 At five in the evening, General Jan
Syrovy, Czechoslovakia’s Prime Minister, announced the Munich diktat to the people.57 The
miserable news emitted from the city’s loudspeakers, falling with a great thud on a populace that,
up to that point, had been ready for and expecting a fight.58 “It was a nation in bereavement but
momentarily numbed by the magnitude of the situation,” said Carr in a dispatch to the
department.59 Carr, Kennan, Chapin, and others from the embassy spent the evening visiting
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different parts of the city in an effort to observe the response. They expected at least some
demonstrations and riotous frustration, but mostly what they saw were “sad faces” and all they
heard were the “low tones” of dispirited conversation. At General Syrovy’s request, people
retired to their homes early, being warned that indulging the urge to fight back would only make
matters worse.60 There was the expressed belief that any major incident of protest, no matter its
nature, could result in Berlin determining that a full occupation would be necessary.61 Due to the
ongoing blackout, people were already disposed to stay home. The city’s bereavement was
perhaps most clearly demonstrated when the embassy staff walked to the Charles Bridge that
evening. Usually bustling and lively on a Friday night, the bridge was all but empty, and the
Americans mused that “the life of the city had died out.”62
So ended September. And as harsh of a month as it had been for Czechoslovakia, October
would prove in many ways to be worse. For the time being, though, Carr saw a number of
positives. First and foremost, war had been avoided. And despite the miserable pill they were
forced to swallow, Carr could not help but inform the department of the “marvelous self control”
and “superb loyalty” demonstrated by the Czech people, something he would continue to say for
the remainder of his tenure in Prague. Even though difficult times lay ahead, he did not see any
serious trouble in the near future due to Prague’s impressive calm.63 Kennan too was at least
partially optimistic. While acknowledging the bitter result of being abandoned by an “unjust and
unsympathetic Europe,” Munich kept the heart of the country intact and its young, industrious
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generations alive.64 In the coming month, however, both Carr and Kennan would see their notes
of promise largely snuffed out as the Munich pact was implemented.
The event that first shocked a broad swath of American observers, the one that for many
took the wind out of Munich’s sails, was the Czech-Polish dispute over Teschen. The rift, like
most others during this time, dated back to the aftermath of World War I when, soon after
coming into existence, both countries laid claim to the region. Teschen itself was a squareshaped industrial center in Silesia. Roughly 800 square miles (about two-thirds the size of Rhode
Island), it was located at the nexus of Moravia, Slovakia, Poland, and Germany, making it highly
contestable, at least geographically. Adding to the difficulties, both countries offered valid
arguments for possessing at least parts of Teschen, and the issue eventually came before a special
Versailles commission.65 The powers that be divided the region almost evenly, with
Czechoslovakia receiving the greater share, as well as the best of Teschen’s rich coal mines.66 It
was an important victory for Prague, as Teschen quickly became a crucial communications and
transportation link between the country’s western (Bohemia-Moravia) and eastern (Slovakia and
Ruthenia) provinces.
Josef Beck, Poland’s foreign minister during the Czech-German crises, was serious about
getting the whole of Teschen, a goal that Polish public opinion ardently supported. As the
Munich crisis turned especially grim in late-September, Beck sent notes to Kamil Krofta, Beck’s
counterpart in Prague, asking that the Teschen issue be addressed. According to Kennan and the
American legation, the talks between Warsaw and Prague up to that point had been “radical” but
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“correct” in diplomatic tone.67 Krofta and the Czechoslovak government responded
optimistically, assuring Beck that the situation would be handled, but that the talks must be
unhurried. In the midst of dealing with Godesberg and mobilization, Prague already had its hands
full.
Anthony Biddle, the American ambassador to Poland, feared the Polish-Czech dispute
might lead to armed conflict. On September 30, he messaged the department, asking that
Roosevelt suggest a conference to settle issues between the powers not present at Munich,
namely Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. It was a longshot, but, according to Biddle, “all
signs here point to this being a question of hours and not days.”68 Roosevelt and the department
wanted nothing to do with Teschen, noting that Czechoslovak-Polish and CzechoslovakHungarian disputes fell within Munich’s terms. Hull, on behalf of Roosevelt, did ask Biddle to
give Beck the “friendly” message that he, Roosevelt, “trusts that the Polish Government will
contribute to peace in Europe at this time by avoiding an armed clash and by solving the existing
difficulty through pacific negotiation.”69
Beck found Krofta’s assurances woefully unsatisfactory, and on September 30, five
minutes to midnight, Prague received an ultimatum from Warsaw, demanding that it concede a
Polish occupation of Teschen by noon of next day.70 From Beck’s point-of-view, by agreeing to
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Munich, Prague legitimized the notion that its minority problems needed to be dealt with, and
that included the Polish minority. Upset that Poland had been excluded from the Munich
proceedings and eager to act independently and forcefully, Beck sent the ultimatum with every
intention of seizing Teschen immediately.71 Utterly overwhelmed, and with no means to defend
Teschen from a Polish invasion, Prague accepted Warsaw’s demands on October 1.
The U.S. legation in Prague found Poland’s behavior during the dispute entirely
despicable. To them, the Poles, “brother-Slavs” of the Czechs, had played a ruthless,
opportunistic game that did nothing but beat an already beaten people. Carr, in a long dispatch
detailing the dispute, called Beck’s ultimatum “a brutal and indecent note as I have ever read.”
Kennan—who probably more than any other in the Schonborn understood the region’s history of
complex, contested borders—did not hold back his disdain when relaying what happened to
Washington: “the Polish Government suddenly presented in Prague a note which for its offensive
tone and for its cynical exploitation of the misfortunes of a friendly neighboring state can have
had few parallels in modern history.” Given the mostly cold manner in which Prague and
Warsaw treated one another in the time between Versailles and Munich, Kennan’s allusion to
“friendly neighboring” relations can only be understood as a reference to Prague’s desire to
achieve a peaceful concession of Teschen prior to the ultimatum.72
In their report, Carr and Kennan explained the helplessness of the Czech government in
the face of Poland’s ultimatum. The Czechs had little defensive fortifications in Teschen, and
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even if they had, the Czech army was in no position to defend against a Polish invasion. The
army was in the process of demobilizing from the German threat, and German troops were
pouring into Teschen’s surrounding areas. Krofta worried that a messy fight with the Poles
would give the Germans pretext to penetrate further into Czechoslovak territory. Thus, there was
no option but to capitulate, which, according to the American legation, the Czechoslovaks did
with “remarkable dignity and restraint.”73
Carr’s and Kennan’s reactions to the Teschen ultimatum were colored by the fact that
they personally knew the individuals involved, especially foreign minister Krofta. Biddle saw
Warsaw’s behavior with a greater measure of sympathy, viewing Czechoslovakia’s replies as
obvious attempts to procrastinate. He reported to Hull that the Polish government considered
Prague’s handling of the matter as typical “Benesison” behavior.74 Back in Washington,
department officials, like those in Prague, found Poland’s actions egregious, but being so far
from the issue, they had a more tempered outlook. Cordell Hull, in a conversation with the Polish
minister in Washington, doubted the minister’s claim that Poland emerged from the affair with
increased prestige, but the subject was quickly buried beneath more pressing issues.75 Moffat,
known within the foreign service for his straightforward fair-mindedness, did not relish seeing
Czechoslovakia so brutally kicked while she was down, but on the other hand it was not unlike
what she had done to Poland in 1920.76 News outlets, already critical of the “betrayal”
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committed by the democracies, by and large reported the Teschen transfer in a negative light—
the first consequence of failure at Munich.
The Czech-Polish crisis passed by swiftly. Interestingly, the Czechoslovak minister in
Washington, Vladimir Hurban, telephoned the department at two a.m. during the height of the
crisis. After asking to speak to the secretary of state, the operator informed Hurban that neither
the secretary of state nor anyone else was present at the office. “That is funny,” replied Hurban,
“I thought they would all be here now.”77 A few days later, at a party on October 2, Hurban took
Moffat aside and spoke with the “utmost bitterness.” Moffat felt for the minister, acknowledging
that “his country was abandoned by its friends and left to make the burden of the sacrifice to
Germany alone.” Still, thought Moffat, “his emotions were not well under control and he made
some remarks which in a calmer moment he will probably regret having given voice to.”78
The government in Prague, upset over Poland’s taking advantage of her embattled
circumstances, appealed to the United States through a diplomatic note. Prague explained that
Warsaw’s seizure of Teschen violated both the Kellogg-Briand and Munich pacts itself, giving
the Munich delimitations an arbitrary posture.79 It is unclear as to what Prague expected to come
of the note, as the United States had made its position of aloofness quite clear in its official
response to Munich. The Teschen affair was in France and Britain’s jurisdiction, and both
countries had condemned Poland’s behavior via the international commission.80 Of course, this
came after Bonnet and Halifax had pressured Prague to give in to Beck’s ultimatum.81 On
October 2, Polish troops occupied the city of Teschen. According to Carr, the Poles’ “drastic
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methods” procured the “utmost bitterness of the Czechs.”82 Talks dragged into late October, and
Polish demands creeped dangerously close to the important city of Mostravska Ostrava, where
the Germans had already encroached upon on the other side. Not wanting to lose the city, and
having “gotten beyond sentimentality,” the Czechs countered by offering Poland a region with
zero Polish population. The Czechs did not anticipate the Polish government being “disturbed”
by this fact.83 On October 14, Czechoslovakia agreed to cede a region around Teschen with
126,000 Czechs and 76,000 Poles. Poland then demanded another region which had 115,000
Czechs and a little over 1,000 Poles.84
“The ruthless action of the Polish Government,” wrote Kennan, had dashed the modest
hopes surrounding Munich, and the Teschen controversy had made a “profound and deplorable”
impression on the Czechoslovak people. In the words of Krofta, the whole affair was like a knife
thrust in the back.85 Unfortunately for Prague, there were more knives to come. During the same
time that the Teschen dispute was startling American observers, the Czech-Sudeten border was
being redefined according to Munich’s terms. And like Teschen, by the time the new CzechSudeten border was determined, those at the Schonborn held out little hope for lasting peace. As
stipulated in the agreement, the first four zones of the Sudetenland were to be occupied by the
German army in the period October 1-7. These four zones constituted areas of clear German
majorities and Czechoslovakia’s major defensive fortifications.
The delimitations of the ‘fifth zone’ were to be decided by an international commission,
consisting of representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and—shockingly so—
Czechoslovakia. Taking place in Berlin, the commission began its work at five p.m. on
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September 29, before Czechoslovakia’s representatives had even arrived.86 Sub-committees were
quickly established, each focusing on the technical issues of occupation, delimitation, and
plebiscites. From the onset, Carr was extremely concerned about the ongoing delimitations of the
‘fifth zone,’ particularly for how the Czechoslovak people would respond. In early October, the
American legation informed Washington on a number of occasions how the public, even those
living in Prague, were largely unaware of Munich’s details. During the afternoon of September
29, hours after the Benes government capitulated, only rumors and guesses bounced around the
capital. In less populated parts of the country citizens knew even less. When the official
announcement came that evening, and soon after the map showing the first four zones, it was
easy for the people to misjudge just how damaging Munich would be.87 As Carr noted, the first
four zones, as depicted on the official map, showed relatively small areas of the Sudetenland
bordered out with straight, black lines. The straight lines did nothing to convey the weaving,
irregular, and extensive boundaries to come, but simply showed the general areas to be occupied
at once. Carr worried that the people might fool themselves into thinking that the first four zones
were the worst of it. The people were already crushed by the news of Munich, as they had been
ready for and expecting a fight. Surrender and abandonment had destroyed the country’s morale.
How would they handle the brutal realities of the ‘fifth zone’?
On October 3, Carr rattled off a quick telegram to the department highlighting this
concern: “The people of Czechoslovakia do not realize how close to Prague the Munich
agreement may permit Germany to penetrate…through the decisions of the International
Commission now sitting in Berlin.”88 True to Carr’s concerns, Germany’s representatives, led by
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the indomitable Ernst von Weizsaker, controlled the commission’s proceedings from the start. So
much so, in fact, that even Hugh Wilson, U.S. ambassador to Berlin and oft German apologist,
admitted that the Germans would likely get whatever they demanded.89 Unfortunately for
Prague, they demanded a lot. Germany’s expectations for the ‘fifth zone’ mirrored the demands
made at Godesberg, demands which at the time had drawn definitive rejections from Britain and
France, and demands for which Prague was willing to fight against. In addition, Germany
pressed for the 1910 Austrian census to be the basis of population counts, a decision that would
overwhelmingly benefit the German cause. The Czechoslovaks pushed back and the commission
reached a deadlock on October 4.
Incensed by the stalled discussions, Hitler threatened the democracies, letting it be known
that the commission would either affirm Germany’s proposals or the Wehrmacht would occupy
the territory shown in the Godesberg map immediately. In an effort to buy time or earn good
grace, the Czechoslovak commission informed Hitler that Benes was to announce his resignation
in the coming days. This happened the following day, October 5. Far from being forced out,
Benes understood soon after capitulating at Munich that neither Hitler nor his own people would
be willing to tolerate his leadership any longer. The American legation, too, had expected the
Benes resignation. According to Carr, once Czecholovak officials realized the crippling nature of
Munich, it was known that someone’s “head would be demanded” by the people. In its report to
Washington on the resignation, the legation cited how Benes’s foreign policy had proven
injurious, and that the president enjoyed little popularity among the people, paling in comparison
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to his predecessor, Masaryk.90 In Carr’s words, Benes’s handling of the crisis had proven
“disastrous.”91
Even so, Benes’s resignation did not provide tangible comfort the country’s citizens, but
rather, according to the American legation, caused “a further feeling of agony.” In the eyes of the
people, Benes may have been terribly unsuccessful, but he pursued his course with morality and
loyalty.92 Likewise, Benes’s departure did little to appease Hitler, who dialed up his pressure on
the commission to accept Germany’s territorial claims and the 1910 census. Despite rejecting
similar demands at Godesberg, this time around Britain and France were unwilling to derail any
semblance of peace, and the two democracies conceded to Germany’s position.
Czechoslovakia’s representatives were powerless. It was either accept the ditkat or invite
Germany’s wrath over the remainder of the country. Though final details of the border still
needed working out, the essence of the ‘fifth zone’ was set.
On October 6, Carr cabled Washington, explaining that all the news he had heard about
the international commission suggested that decisions were “going badly against
[Czechoslovakia].” This was confirmed the next day when the commission agreed upon the
general limits of the ‘fifth zone.’ In a substantial telegram to the department, the American
legation stressed the devastating borders it imposed upon the Czechoslovaks. Carr was clear that
the four powers “forced” the terms upon the Czechs, a sort of reprise from the previous week. In
running through the details, Carr presented an especially bleak picture of Prague’s newfound
borders. Every large city would now lie in close proximity to the German border. All major
railways had been cut or lost. Most fortifications were now in German hands and many of its
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industries as well. What seemed to bother Carr most was the fact that the ‘fifth zone’ was
essentially the same as Hitler’s Godesberg demands, and in most areas by which it differed, it
was to the German’s benefit. It was a harsh result to say the least, but the government in Prague
intended to move forward and consolidate within its new boundaries. Carr, however, was not so
hopeful: “the new frontiers dictated by [Hitler] at Berlin indicate no intention on his part to
permit what remains of Czechoslovakia to continue to prosper as an independent state.”
Germany’s resounding victories through the international commission did not go
unnoticed at home. Correspondents called it “renewed Anglo-French betrayal,” and took the
commission to task for offering carte blanche for further occupations. One correspondent pointed
out the sad irony of the Czechs abandoning their “normally realistic” disposition for efforts of
appeasement, whether it be sending representatives to Berlin or the wholesale resignations of
Benes and his confidants.93
The United States was not able to sit entirely aloof from Czechoslovakia’s delimitation
nightmare. As the decisions of the international commission trickled out, the government in
Prague, essentially helpless in the face of Anglo-French-German pressure, fretted over losing key
territories. Areas of industry were important, but they most feared losing railways and
transportation hubs. Czechoslovakia had a limited number of railways connecting its western and
eastern provinces, and it had already lost a significant amount of track through the Teschen
transfer. With the Slovaks and Ruthenians dialing up their autonomy movements, Prague feared
that greater losses of railroad track could lead to an untenable political situation. With these fears
in mind, Krofta contacted Carr on October 3, inquiring whether the United States might pose
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demarches to Berlin, Rome, Paris, and London, pressing each nation’s representatives to give
careful consideration to Czechoslovakia’s frontier needs, particularly its desire to retain
Böhmisch Trübau and Zwittau, two towns necessary to secure a main railway that connected
Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia.94 Carr, who liked and respected Krofta, acknowledged
Krofta’s plea that day, assuring the foreign minister that he would contact the State Department
straight away, although he knew that the department would not get involved.
On October 5, Carr wrote to Krofta, explaining that the United States “greatly regrets”
not being able to be of assistance, but since the United States played no part in drawing up the
Munich Agreement, it could not appropriately intervene in the commission’s work.95 This was
all true “despite a desire on its part to give favorable consideration to any request received from
the Czechoslovak Government.” Trubau and Zwittau ultimately went to the Germans, and as if to
highlight the rapidity of the events taking place, Krofta, who had resigned with Benes, was no
longer the foreign minister by the time the department’s response was received in Prague.
Within a week of Munich, the Americans serving in Prague viewed the agreement as
hollow. On October 10, Edward Lawson, the American commercial attaché in Prague, submitted
a report on the consequences of the new borders. In addition to losing incredible amounts of its
industrial potential, Lawson explained that Czechoslovakia might face “strangulation” due to its
crippled transportation lines.96 Beyond such, Czechoslovakia lost control of its transportation
routes along the Elbe River. On October 20, the legation’s own research found that the Germans
occupied ten predominantly Czech towns with major railroad centers, with some towns being 40to-1 Czech. In Česká Trebová, the Germans occupied only the railway. In other places, the
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Germans occupied towns for their industries and factories, despite clear Czech majorities.97 In
Policka, for example, the Germans took ownership despite there being 5,891 Czechs to 149
Germans. These unfortunate decisions by the International Commission did not just result in net
economic losses for Czechoslovakia but produced a large swath of economic refugees. That is,
some Czechoslovaks still lived in the truncated state while the places where they worked went to
the Germans.98
Members of the American legation did extensive reporting from the Sudeten region
throughout October. Their reports paint an interesting picture. On the whole, the Sudeten transfer
was carried out without any terrible complications or violence. On the other hand, though, the
Sudeten frontiers were sites of constant confusion, skirmishes, and “incidents.” Sudeten Czechs,
anti-Nazi Germans, and especially Jews found themselves in limbo, being sent back and forth
with neither Prague nor Berlin wanting to take responsibility. Towns along the border squabbled
over where exactly the demarcation line fell. Sudeten Germans complained that the Czechs were
treating them poorly, while Sudeten Czechs spoke of the injustices suffered at the mercy of their
new, German overlords. When German troops occupied the Jilemice district, the Czech officers
protested, arguing that they had exceeded the demarcation line; the Germans read the map
differently. Wanting to settle the matter, the Czechs tried to get in contact with the International
Commission but could not locate its whereabouts. German overreach appeared constant, as the
legation received a report that 87 communities in northern Moravia with a purely Czech
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population had been occupied by the Germans.99 To make matters worse, frontier town leaders,
undoubtedly imbued with a sense of self-importance, took it upon themselves to visit German
and Hungarian delegations, begging for their districts to be occupied. Hungarians in
Czechoslovakia staged little attacks on Slovak cities. In mid-October, Lawson reported that a
group of fifty-or-so excited Hungarians attempted an attack on Uzhorod before fleeing across the
border, while another group ransacked a Czech customs house.100
To Carr and the embassy staff, the situation for Czechs and anti-Nazi Germans in the now
annexed Sudetenland appeared grim. Some weeks earlier, Carr spoke with a group of American
and British newspapermen coming from Vienna, who described the brutal behavior of the
Austrian Nazis. Austrians, and especially Jews, suffered lootings and even shootings. The
German army made little effort to prevent such “appalling” actions.101 Back in Washington,
Hurban worked to combat the crisis through American channels. Though it was a difficult pill to
swallow, Hurban recognized that the United States government could play no role in softening
the blow of Munich. Hull had made it clear that the State Department, being of no party to the
pact, could not even think of interjecting itself into the commission’s proceedings. Still, Hurban
hoped that the Czechs and Slovaks living in the United States, and potentially the public at large,
could provide humanitarian help. On October 3, Hurban approached Moffat about releasing a
statement to the American public calling for those concerned to stand with and support
Czechoslovakia.102 Moffat, who could not help but note Hurban’s bitterness and emotional
strain, brought the request to Hull. The ever-cautious Hull replied that inasmuch as the message
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contained nothing that would embarrass the United States, he would prefer to neither endorse or
reject the minister’s request.103 The following day, the New York Times reported Hurban’s call
for refugee aid.104
As the government in Prague dealt with the blows of German and Polish occupation, it
faced a third bout of demands from Hungary. This, however, came as no surprise. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia had maintained sour relations since Versailles, when Czechoslovakia came into
existence, partially at the expense of Hungary. Both Slovakia and Ruthenia had previously
existed in Hungary’s sphere of influence, and Budapest was eager to reacquire those lands.
Budapest became a locus of revisionist pressure, forever at odds with Benes’s efforts to see the
Versailles treaty defended. However, due to its weak army and lack of support from the RomeBerlin axis, Budapest, unlike Warsaw, could only watch as the four powers placed its demands in
Munich’s addenda. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Benes, while serving as foreign minister,
vented and fumed to all who would listen about Hungary’s dangerous revisionist talk. Many did
in fact look warily upon Budapest’s vitriolic attacks on the territorial decisions made at
Versailles. Far fewer, though, could deny outright Hungary’s demand that the 750,000
Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia be given self-determination. Of course, Budapest’s desires
always extended beyond Czechoslovakia’s Magyr minority, as they longed for a common
frontier with Poland.
Howard Travers, secretary of legation at Budapest, reported on the evening of Munich
that Hungary, though pleased that peace had been settled, also hoped that it would be just as
“jubilant” in three months’ time.105 On October 2, Carr reported a conversation with the
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Hungarian minister in Prague, who remained vague about Budapest’s plans. Krofta, worried that
Slovakia’s flakey allegiance would steer the region into the Hungarian sphere, proposed that a
commission of experts between the two nations discuss the entirety of the minority question in
an unhurried fashion.106 Bonnet sympathized with the Hungary’s demand for a settlement based
on the terms of Munich and offered to press the Czechs to concede.107
On October 3, the Hungarian minister handed a note demanding territorial revisions from
the Czechoslovak state. 108 Hungary stipulated that it “invites” Czechoslovakia to, among other
things, transfer to Hungary as a symbol of cession two or three Czech villages to the frontier.
Hungary also desired for the settlement conference to occur by October 6. In speaking to Carr,
Franticek Chvalkovsky, Czechoslovakia’s new foreign minister, shared that because the country
was facing pressure from so many sides, the Czechs would have to concede, though they would
push to have the negotiations delayed until mid-October. Overall, Chalkovsky stressed the
“relative friendliness” of the conversations with Hungary.109 By October 14, however, any
friendliness between Prague and Budapest wore off. Hungary, angered that the Slovak
representatives refused to cede territories such as Nitra and Bratislava, broke off the negotiations.
The two coutries eventually agreed to put the dispute before Italy and Germany, and the final
settlement would not come until early November.110 Throughout the remainder of October,
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Hungary maintained an “intensive” propaganda campaign on the border through radio, airdropped literature, “agitators,” and armed parties.111
While dealing with the territorial concession to Poland and Germany, as well as the
resignation of Benes, Prague also faced calls for greater autonomy from Slovakia and Ruthenia.
The two regions had long histories of autonomy movements, and the mayhem of October’s early
days catalyzed these talks. Taking advantage of the deep unrest inflicting the Czechoslovak state,
Slovakia’s autonomy movement pressed Prague for concessions straight away. At a conference
held in Zlinia on October 6, Slovak leaders declared their province’s autonomy, while also
deciding to “cast their lot with the Czechs,” preferring to remain within a federated state.112 This
came as a disappointment to the Hungarians and the Poles, who desperately wanted a shared
border.113 The autonomy granted to Slovakia was to be carried our progressively, and its main
features saw Slovak become the region’s national language, and the establishment of a Slovak
Diet and a Provincial Government to handle Slovakia’s internal matters. By October 8, a Slovak
cabinet was established with Josef Tiso assuming the role of Premier.
As October drew to a close, it was not just the legation in Prague which viewed Munich
as no lasting peace. On October 26, in a radio address, Roosevelt delivered a powerful, if not
totally specific, denouncement of Hitlerism. After alluding to how the Munich crisis had proven
that most of the world longed for peace, Roosevelt warned that “there can be no peace if the
reign of law is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force.” Later, and calling to
mind the desperate refugee crisis caused by the Anschluss and then Munich, he declared that
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“there can be no peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the dispersion all over
the world of millions of helpless and persecuted wanderers with no place to lay their heads.”114
The speech’s primary pitch was that in the face of such dangers, namely Germany’s uninhibited
rearmament and militaristic ventures, the United States could not sit idly by but needed to pursue
rearmament measures so that it could properly defend itself. Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia,
Roosevelt’s statement, however condemning of Munich, was too little too late.
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Chapter Two: “Consolidation”
There seem to be very few people here who are convinced that the present situation is
permanent and who do not fear that the outcome, sooner or later, will be a German
occupation.1
So said Wilbur J. Carr in a February report to the State Department. Four months had
passed since Munich, a period during which the emergent Czechoslovakia, now with a new name
“Czecho-Slovakia,” struggled mightily to consolidate its truncated territories and retain a
semblance of its former dignity. The obstacles were demoralizing. Its internal structure—what
was once a mostly stable relationship between Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia—was
now ramshackle and mutinous. More problematic, though, were the incessant demands coming
from Hitler, who was perpetually angry with Prague’s attitude and always wanting more. For
many, then, the signs pointed toward a dismal destination—German occupation.
Not yet, though. In the months following Munich, a theme of consolidation came to
typify the issues pertinent to U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. Most prominently, the Prague
government walked on eggshells as it tried to consolidate its position coming out of Munich and
the subsequent revelation of the delimitation committee’s ‘fifth zone.’ Germany, stuffed full of
territorial gains, embarked on a period of digestion, taking stock of its increased size and
international prestige. As a result of the Teschen dispute and Vienna Award, Poland and
Hungary, too, strove to consolidate their expanded frontiers, hoping to secure their permanency.
In Ruthenia, zealous leaders encouraged by Germany worked to consolidate a pan-Ukrainian
project. To the west, the Slovak government relished its newfound autonomy, consolidating itself
under a decidedly pro-Nazi banner. Meanwhile, in Washington, American officials scrambled to
consolidate U.S. foreign policy. The Roosevelt Administration, quickly dissatisfied with the
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implications of Munich, pivoted to make international affairs a primary concern.2 The State
Department, welcoming this change, grasped to find the right balance of paying attention to the
outside world and remaining free from foreign entanglements. Finally, at the Schonborn, after
getting over the shock and relief that accompanied the news of Munich, Carr, Kennan, and other
American observers worked to consolidate their understanding of what exactly had taken place
and to offer predictions for what was to come.
At the Schonborn, there was little substantive diplomatic work to do, especially when
compared to the day-and-night reporting of the Munich crisis. Each day centered on the smaller,
“innumerable details” that needed attention, whether it be the day to day reporting on Prague’s
government, or settling visa and customs problems. While such tasks were essential to complete,
the legation saw its greatest value in its ability to be an observer. The stakes, as dictated by
Munich, were great. If all parties adhered to the agreement’s terms, thought Kennan, and if they
marked the extent of Germany’s territorial aspirations, then there was a possibility that it would
truly come to represent “peace in our time.” If the opposite were true, however, and if Hitler
intended to drive further still into the heart of Europe, then the problems underlying Munich
would only resurface in more serious forms.3
In the time between Munich and the German occupation in March, the United States was
in a hapless position vis-à-vis Czecho-Slovakia. During the Second Republic, outside observers,
Washington among them, watched Germany twist the clamp on the Czech lands week by week.
The policies of Britain and France, particularly their reluctance to even discuss their promised
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3
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guarantees to Czecho-Slovakia’s borders, indicated that the two democracies intended to allow
German hegemony in central and southeastern Europe.4 Even though such matters were
thousands of miles away from Washington, the State Department did not like seeing Germany
tighten its hold on the region. There were many reasons for the department’s disapproval, and the
moral principles that accompanied previous U.S.-Czech relations were not entirely absent.5 Still,
the chief factors in determining Washington’s wariness of Berlin were economic in nature. As
the Reich extended its influence over Central Europe, its increasingly closed economy and
uncompromising posture would inevitably extend as well. Unfortunately, to push back against
Germany could have been construed as implicit criticism of Chamberlain and Daladier’s
handling of the region, so Washington preferred to remain quiet and neutral. Thus, for the United
States, alignment with the Czechs and Slovaks necessarily took a backseat to its broader policy
of keeping detached but cordial relations with Europe’s two largest democracies.
Still, the Schonborn was not oblivious to the Prague government’s dismal position. The
dysfunction of the eastern provinces, Slovakia and Ruthenia, was clear enough, but the
progressive erosion of Czech autonomy before the Germans was also hard to miss. The
American legation reported often of the impossible demands Berlin levied on the Czechs,
signaling to American observers that no matter Prague’s efforts, Czecho-Slovakia would likely
never be successful in consolidating its borders. Over time, one could not avoid the conclusion
that Hitler, for all his schemes, words, and plans, had any number of options at his disposal, all
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of which could be used as pretexts for further intervention in the state.6 As long as the legation
stayed within this line of thinking—the simple understanding that Hitler was not yet finished
with his expansionist policy—Carr, Kennan, and others were reasonably able to interpret the
“signs of the times.”7 For the most part, the men of Schonborn were never lulled into baseless
optimism regarding Czecho-Slovakia’s future. That, coupled with the full knowledge that they
were in no position to intervene, meant that Carr and his staff remained passive observers to a
most unfortunate period in Czech and Slovak history. The friendly, impotent relations that
manifested as a result of Munich now played out over a period of many months.
For the Second Republic, one of its first tasks to address was the economic nightmare
caused by Munich’s terms. 40% of her industrial capacity was gone. As Edward Lawson, the
commercial attaché, had shown in his post-Munich reports, hardly an industry or business sector
had emerged unscathed.8 The legation’s reports spoke of the fears among Czech circles that
Hermann Goering, minister of Germany’s Four Year Economic Plan, would put the wounded
economy out of its misery by imposing a customs union.9 Such a move would have given Berlin
complete control of Czech-Slovakia’s industry, trade, and finances. To the relief of basically
everyone, save the Germans, the customs union never materialized, but the American legation
acknowledged that the extent to which Germany would dominate Czech-Slovakia’s economy,
though still a matter of conjecture, looked major: “Germany is now in a position very nearly to
dictate Czechoslovakia’s economic policy, should it so desire.”10
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In Washington, the department was hardly eager to recognize Germany’s Munich bounty.
Smarting from Berlin’s perennially uncooperative attitude toward trade and refugees, the
department chose to put off granting de jure recognition of the Sudetenland’s transfer. This
course of action posed a problem, though, in that it allowed Berlin to take advantage of the
generous trade deal that existed between Washington and Prague. Moffat worked closely with
the Treasury Department in an effort to work out a solution in which the department could have
its cake and eat it too. That is, to impose stricter duties on goods coming from the Sudetenland
without extending de jure recognition to the Munich settlement. Hull, who harbored zero
sympathy for Berlin, still found the entire situation to be a vexing one, as he feared that any sort
of hardball could be interpreted as implicit criticism of the French and British, something which
he hoped to avoid at all costs.11
The Treasury pressed Moffat regarding the exact date of transfer, to which Moffat
explained the question’s basic discrepancy: “the Germans apparently claimed it took place upon
the acceptance of the Munich Agreement, whereas the Czechs were claiming that it would not
formally take place until the last formality connected with Munich was completed.” While the
State Department may have liked to side with the Czechs out of solidarity, practical
considerations held greater sway, and Moffat acknowledged that as far as the department was
concerned, “the territory has now been transferred.”12 Yet the department continued to pay acute
attention to the semantics of phrasing. When preparing the statement for imposing harsher
economic policies toward the Sudetenland, the Treasury preferred to say that the State

11
Moffat, diplomatic journal, November 7, 1938, 1-2. Roosevelt had recently argued that “peace by fear
has no higher or more enduring quality than peace by the sword.” “Roosevelt Warns Nation Must Arm in World of
Force,” New York Times, October 27, 1938, 1. According to Moffat, Hull considered this to be a serious blow to
Chamberlain; yet, Hull only briefly references Roosevelt’s address in his memoirs. Hull, Memoirs, 597.
12
Moffat, diplomatic journal, November 8, 1938, 1.

60

Department “recognize[s] the cession,” while Moffat was adamant that it say that the department
only “notified the Treasury of a transfer of jurisdiction.” After “considerable argument,” the two
sides settled on a compromise statement.13 When looking back, the issues at stake here seem
trivial, but the interaction between Moffat and the Treasury demonstrates the desire on the part of
the State Department to both tread carefully and, in the small areas of influence it did have, to
show partiality to the Czechs in the context of U.S.-German-Czech relations.
Vast movements of people only exasperated Czecho-Slovakia’s economic disarray.
While the International Commission ironed out Munich’s borders, Carr and the American
legation watched the disastrous refugee crisis that began at Munich continue unabated in the
ensuing weeks. A month after the Munich diktat, Mary Hawes, the Washington Post’s
correspondent in Czecho-Slovakia, called the refugee crisis a “fantastic endless nightmare.” Jews
and anti-Nazi Germans poured into the rump state penniless and jobless, and Czech authorities
implored them to return to their homes, already overwhelmed with the influx of Czechs in need
of help. “In the name of peace,” wrote Hawes, “human beings are sacrificed to the greed of other
nations for mines, factories, and railroads.” According to Hawes, “one poor school teacher
suddenly found her parents were now in Germany, her brother and sister in Poland, herself in
Czechoslovakia, and yet not one of them had moved.”14
The refugee situation was made worse by the amorphous borders that now separated
Czecho-Slovakia from the Reich. Even as late as mid-November, when the work of the
delimitation committee was just about finished, the border remained confused and contested.
Edward Lawson, the commercial attaché, took frequent trips to the new borderlands and sensed
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“constant apprehension” on the part of Czecho-Slovak citizens that the borders would soon
change. Throughout October and November, the Germans and Poles pressed for additional
delimitations in order to acquire useful patches of land here and there, prompting a sickened
Hawes to write that “[t]oday you may go to bed in Czech territory only to wake up on railroad
tracks, so it is impossible to travel from one part of the country to another without crossing them.
[The borders] creep up on industries and factories, swallowing much of the wealth of the
country. From all sides they are creeping in on Czechoslovakia.”15
The State Department was well aware of the chaotic movement of peoples between the
Sudetenland and the Czechoslovak lands, as well as those moving to and from Hungary and
Poland, but there was little the department could do to make it better. The Intergovernmental
Committee, a group established by Roosevelt and tasked with tackling the refugee crisis in the
wake of the Anschluss, was utterly bogged down by unending red tape and the unhelpfulness, or
more often the sabotage, of the Germans.16
It was not to the United States, however, that Prague looked for the bulk of its needed
assistance. Having been betrayed and beaten down by the European democracies, Prague hoped
that London and Paris would at least provide substantive assistance to help make the new state
viable. London initially promised ten million pounds, but the French balked. Later, when Prague
spoke of the urgent need for additional funds, the British and French were equally hesitant, both
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fearing that aid would eventually end up in German hands. Talk of loans dragged into November
and December.17
Though the U.S. government was in no position to offer loans, the United States was
home to significant private efforts, especially those spearheaded by Czech and Slovak emigres.18
They worked quickly to raise large sums, but they also, like the British and French, had
reservations about where the money was ending up. The American legation received numerous
inquiries from potential givers, who understandably wanted to ensure their contributions fell into
good hands. Unfortunately, the tendency to double-check delayed the arrival of relief to Prague
during its most critical hour. For instance, the American Committee for Relief in
Czechoslovakia, operating out of New York and gathering donations from cities across the
country, endeavored through a long exchange of letters with Carr and Kennan to ensure that its
charity would be allocated to responsible parties. It was not until after one-and-a-half months of
correspondence that the committee and the legation moved forward in transferring the money to
the Czech National Relief Board.19 From the legation’s viewpoint, despite all the trouble brewing
in Bohemia and Moravia, trustworthy relief organizations were continuing their work
unchallenged.20
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It is one thing for a country with a stable, functioning government to navigate statewide
crises, but it is an entirely different story when no such government exists. In Czecho-Slovakia’s
Second Republic, the Prague government, though never altogether absent, was in a serious state
of flux. With Benes gone, the presidency remained vacant for nearly two months. General
Syrovy continued to serve as the prime minister, which, given his background of military
discipline, proved helpful for maintaining law and order during the post-Munich confusion.
The American legation held out little hope for the new government. From what they
could gather, it appeared that Chvalkovsky, who had succeeded Krofta as foreign minister in
early October, would be chosen as the new president of Czecho-Slovakia. The legation took
special note of the miserable responsibilities that would be laid before Chvalkovsky in having to
haggle with Hitler for decent treatment. Carr reported that if he were to become president,
Chvalkovsky would need to visit Berlin and submit a desperate “personal plea” for leniency.21
Carr was not optimistic that such a request would be well-received by Hitler, who continued to
unearth new grievances toward the rump state. It was no secret that Berlin coveted more
territories, ones it deemed necessary for various infrastructure projects. For instance, Carr
expected that Hitler would demand the town of Devin, located near Bratislava, for the purposes
of a canal, and that this new demand would put Chvalkovsky in an impossible situation, for if
Chvalkovsky were to assume the presidency, it would be hardly encouraging to begin his service
with major concessions to Hitler.22 Not only would it be utterly disheartening to Chvalkovsky,
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but Carr feared the impact it would have on the people, “whose cup of discouragement is already
dangerously full.”23 The prospects were grim.
Chvalkovsky, however, refused the position. He felt himself to be too unpopular with the
people.24 Instead, the presidency went to someone far removed from politics, Dr. Emil Hacha, a
respected, cultured, though thoroughly colorless judge. The legation surmised that the sixtyseven-year-old Hacha was chosen, not for his positive qualities, but for the negative ones. He
was not associated with any political party; he possessed no foreign entanglements; and he had
no non-Aryan “twigs” in the family tree.25 In short, with anti-Benes feelings carrying the day in
Prague, Hacha appealed to the “various hues of the political right.”26 He was also a devout
Catholic, making him palatable to the Slovaks. From the Schonborn’s point-of-view, Hacha’s
election was “a more pathetic than joyous occasion.” Though the populace did not dislike Hacha
personally, it viewed him as a “figurehead set up by unseen powers.” Carr surmised that much of
the dissatisfaction could be attributed to the simple fact that it had still only been a short time
since Munich’s full delimitations became public, and the people remained “bitter and skeptical
concerning the possibilities for the future,” a future that would likely be bound to Germany.27
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However, while the legation doubted whether Hacha would come to represent a bulwark against
Berlin’s encroaching presence, it was not wholly pessimistic, noting that Hacha’s ascension did
help the country overcome a significant obstacle on what everyone in the Schonborn agreed
would be a “stony path” ahead.28
Soon after Hacha’s election, Syrovy’s government resigned and Rudolf Beran was
appointed prime minister. The Schonborn’s report emphasized Beran’s connections to
agriculture. He came from farming stock; he apprenticed under Czechoslovakia’s foremost
leader of the Agrarian Party; he represented agrarian interests in parliament, and his chief hobby,
apart from hunting, was the study of agricultural systems in foreign countries.29 The report
offered no predictions as to what a Beran premiership would look like, but it was widely
understood that the new government would adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Germany.
Indeed, with the Berman government at the helm, “appeasement under the duress of the situation
became the predominant line in Czechoslovak politics.”30 Later, when Beran gave his first
speech to parliament, the legation reported its moderate, unsurprising content. As expected,
Beran highlighted Czecho-Slovakia’s need for a strong friendship with Germany, but not
exclusively so. “We are not and shall not be protagonists of isolation or of confining ourselves to
our own geographical area,” said Beran, before telling parliament that his government would
strive for good relations with other states, specifically mentioning England, France, and the
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United States. Overall, the speech was straightforward, and it seemed to cause no
discouragement to the Schonborn.31
The establishment of Hacha and Beran’s government coincided with the formalizing of
Slovakia’s and Ruthenia’s increased autonomy. As a result of the Zilina meeting, as well as
legislation passed under Syrovy’s government, Slovakia and Ruthenia, though still part of the
federalized Czecho-Slovak state, gained tighter control over their respective domestic affairs in
addition to broader issues of trade and foreign policy, primarily through regional governments
headed by their own prime ministers. The provinces also secured greater representation in
Prague. Karol Sidor, who the legation considered the second “most ardent exponent of Slovak
autonomy,” became Beran’s deputy prime minister in Prague.32 Subsequent autonomy bills
increased Slovakia’s independence, and in mid-December the province held elections. The only
option for voters was a Tiso-Sidor ticket, and its ‘victory’ ushered in an era of one-party politics
in Slovakia. Meanwhile, in Ruthenia, Ukrainian nationalists with German support seized control
of the province’s rudimentary political structures.33
The weeks of late-November and early December, when distinct Czech, Slovak, and
Ruthenian governments emerged, constituted a watershed period in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.
Though the legation had long recognized the differences between the peoples that made up
Czechoslovakia, it was not until the end of 1938 that it began treating Bohemia-Moravia,
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Slovakia, and to a lesser extent Ruthenia, as separate states pursuing their own courses.34 Far
from just tacit recognition by the legation that Slovakia and Ruthenia had more political
autonomy, Carr, Kennan, their colleagues, and by extension officials in Washington, began
viewing the Czech, Slovak, and Ruthenian peoples as possessing fundamentally different traits
and inclinations. They were no longer parts of a whole, but separate groups altogether which, at
their cores, did not belong together in a unified state.
As the three provinces went their own ways, the legation reported the unique issues they
encountered. For the government in Prague—the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia—one thread
woven into its fabric was the futile struggle for secured borders. Guaranteed frontiers had been
an important addendum to the Munich Agreement, and Prague earnestly pursued these
guarantees from Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome. During the first few months of the Second
Republic, Czech officials spoke hopefully to their American listeners, predicating that once the
border guarantees had been finalized, then Czecho-Slovakia would be able to operate as an
independent, mostly healthy state. Unfortunately, when Chvalkovsky brought the issue of the
guarantees to Ribbentrop and Hitler’s attention during his visit to Berlin in mid-October, the two
responded negatively, arguing that it would be foolish for Prague to put any faith in guarantees
from Britain and France. London and Paris, like Hitler claimed, proved unreliable, lamely stating
that guarantees should only come into play if Czecho-Slovakia were threatened by new territorial
losses. Later, in mid-November, once all the border delimitations had been completely settled,
Chvalkovsky sent demarches to the four powers, explaining that the prerequisites of the
34
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guarantees had been met—that is, every country, including Poland and Hungary, expressed
contentment with the final borders—and therefore the guarantees ought to be confirmed.
Germany outright rejected Chvalkovsky’s notion, and the other three governments weaseled out
of responsibility with excuses of varying kinds.35
A few weeks later, Carr met with Chvalkovsky for a long interview, during which he
inquired about the status of the guarantees. Chvalkovsky explained to Carr the measures he had
taken up to that point. He expounded on the messages received from Britain and France after
sending the demarches to the four powers. Paris had replied that steps forward could be taken
only if the four powers did so in concert—no small task. Contrarily, London suggested that if she
were to act on the guarantees, she could only do so alone.36 For having helped draft the Munich
agreement, London demonstrated incredible unfamiliarity with its terms. Chvalkovsky had heard
nothing since. According to Carr, the foreign minister talked about the issue apathetically, saying
he had “no opinion” on the guarantees.37 In his report to the department, Carr suggested that
Prague had come to realize that guarantees from Britain and France were meaningless. Carr
anticipated that Chvalkovsky and his colleagues would rest content in the fact that all pertinent
parties had expressed satisfaction with the final delimitations. Chvalkovsky had made it clear to
Carr that “at present,” and Chvalkovsky made sure to emphasize that phrase, he did not fear
Hitler making another move on Czecho-Slovakia.38
Even if Chvalkovsly had given up on the idea of guaranteed borders, Berlin still found it
useful to dangle the idea of them in front of Prague. Later, during Chvalkovsky’s depressing visit
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to Berlin in January, Hitler would suggest that if Prague were to right the ship—that is, to adopt
hardline anti-Semitic policies and to reduce the military to a size similar to Denmark, essentially
nonexistent—then it would at last be agreeable for Germany to guarantee Czecho-Slovakia’s
new boundaries.39 It was an outright lie, and the guarantees never came.
As Prague grasped at straws for guarantees, the legation reported Bratislava’s own sets of
issues, particularly its prickly relations with Budapest. On November 2, Hungary finally had its
long-awaited moment. Meeting in Vienna, Germany and Italy agreed to Hungary’s territorial
demands, granting it significant chunks of Slovak land. The Vienna Award was in many ways a
measly rehash of what had taken place roughly a month earlier. This time it was just Italy and
Germany making the final decisions. Hungary was finally getting its slice of the pie. Coming
back into sight were all the familiar things that accompanied agreements of this type:
delimitation maps and occupation dates, evacuation stages, and commissions dealing with the
inevitable disputes that would arise in the days following the agreement. The American legation
in Budapest reported to the department that, naturally, it was not long before people in Hungary
found cause for complaint: Slovakia had unjustifiably kept Bratislava!40 It only took a couple
weeks before the popular favor that Hungarians had initially held toward the Vienna Award
faded completely. New ambitions swirled within the government and populace, demanding Bela
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Imredy, Hungary’s Prime Minister, to obtain Ruthenia, which Budapest’s papers were now
calling “a narrow strip of land temporarily remaining outside Hungary.”41
Before long, Slovakia too grew dissatisfied with its losses through the Vienna agreement,
beginning its own irredentist campaign. Fresh off its mid-month elections, Slovakia, brimming
with confidence and egged on by Germany, unleashed the agitation of irredentism, accusing
Budapest of mistreating its Slovak minority, calling the decisions of the Vienna accord into
question, and filling its papers with sensational claims of Hungarian atrocities.42 Considering
Prague and Bratislava had been making a point to avoid pressing territorial claims since
November, those at the Schonborn felt that Bratislava’s volte face must have meant that Berlin’s
influence, led by Franz Karmasin, had gotten the better of Bratislava.43 In his reporting, Kennan
found that the Czechs in Prague were watching the entire affair with both a lack of interest and a
shortage of information. They saw it as simply another case of the Slovaks expressing their
annoyance over how they had been treated. The American legation was still inclined to believe
that Berlin was at the root of the movement, but if they were not, then the Slovaks were playing
on dangerously “thin ice.”44
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Ruthenia, which the American legation viewed as a backward and impossibly confusing
place, wrestled with its own problems coming out of the Vienna Award. The altered borders
forced Ruthenia’s government officials to move from Koisce to Chust, a place which could
hardly accommodate the roving government.45 To Carr, the situation in Ruthenia looked
especially bleak. During the move to Chust, an official was dismissed for being too cozy with the
Hungarians, hardly the first instance of that happening.46 The true meddling force in Ruthenia
was Berlin, though. German forces had established prominent influence there soon after Munich,
and many assumed that Hitler was working to incite Ukrainians from Ruthenia, Rumania,
Poland, and the Soviet Union to form an independent state.47 When pressing Chvalkovsky on the
matter, Carr received a less than helpful response: “The Foreign Minister, however, pretends to
be well aware of the plans which Hitler has in store for next spring and he has assured me that
they envisage action in quite another direction concerning which he smilingly avoided being
explicit.” Reports from Biddle a week later suggested that Hitler allowed Prague to keep
Ruthenia precisely because a Czech-controlled Ruthenia would be easier to influence than a
Hungarian-controlled Ruthenia, and Hitler desired ease of access in his efforts to use the
Ukrainian minority against Poland.48
For all the disunity between Prague and the Slovaks and Ruthenians, a relationship that
Carr referred to as “obscure,” the central government located in Prague retained a level of
jurisdiction over the entire state. The Sudeten-Czech frontier was a different story, though, as
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disagreements led to permanently confused borders into the winter. Sudeten towns on the frontier
became miniature battlegrounds for Czech and German influence. Once, when dining at a
Sudeten hotel, Kennan and his wife observed the waiters and hostesses greet patrons with
uncertain utterances of “Heil Hitler.”49 In Czech cities that had become frontier towns as a result
of Munich, like Olmouc and Morvska Ostrava, German officials pressured Czech citizens to
declare themselves German, and in some instances the Gestapo exercised nearly limitless
influence.50 As the weeks and months passed, Czechoslovakia both faded and remained, truly a
state in flux and in between. When returning from a journey to northern Europe, Kennan recalled
how, after passing through all the military patrols and border gates in the Sudetenland, he
changed from driving on the right to driving on the left, “for Bohemia was still—in an unreal,
transitory sense—Czechoslovakia.51
Czecho-Slovakia’s internal duress was made worse by ever present external threats.
Ruthenia appeared to be easy prey, especially with rumors of German exploitation. Prague feared
the loss of Ruthenia, as it would likely mean a more powerful Germany, or a common border
between Poland and Hungary. When referring to Chvalkovsky’s assurance that all was well with
“loyal” Ruthenia, Carr could not help but notice “an air of whistling to keep up his courage.”52
Montgomery and Biddle’s reports indicated that Hungary and Poland generally supported one
another in each other’s efforts to secure a common border, which most often revolved around an
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occupation of Ruthenia. According to Biddle, by mid-November, Colonel Beck was firmly
supporting Hungary’s seizure of the little province.53
Beyond Hungary’s incessant testing of the waters in the Slovak and Ruthenian border
regions, there was also potential conflict with Poland. In December 1938, Biddle reported to the
department the large contingent in Warsaw that was pushing for a fight with Prague, a
disposition that was made more intense by the tendency of rogue Czech and Slovak bands to
cause trouble in the Teschen district.54 Charles Elbrick, a secretary at the Prague legation,
learned from a Czech informant that Berlin was playing around with the idea of using the
remnants of the Czech army against Poland. For that reason, Berlin was doing all it could to stir
up anti-Polish feeling in Czechoslovakia and vice versa.55
With so many external threats, at least one friend remained. Rumania, Czechoslovakia’s
ever-present but useless ally, came stoutly to Prague’s aid in the aftermath of the Vienna Award,
declaring Hungary’s pretensions “unreasonable, excessive, and unjust.” The American legation
in Bucharest was unimpressed, however, calling its reaction “ostrich-like” and naïve. To the
American observers, Rumania was oozing gullibility, acting as though “poor Czechoslovakia has
made all the sacrifices for peace; everything is now settled and there will never be any more of
those distressing problems.”56
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In the final weeks of December, as the new year crept closer, the legation’s work in
Prague settled down a bit. On the one hand, as a result of the December elections, the Vienna
Accord, and final Czech-German delimitations, some of Czecho-Slovakia’s most important loose
ends had been tied up. On December 16, Carr reported that the central government in Prague had
passed the Enabling Act, allowing it to rule by decree. While the legislation signaled further
erosion of the country’s democratic traditions, Carr put it in positive light to the department: “In
so far as it promises to assure internal stability for some time to come its passage may be said to
mark the end of the crucial phase of immediate post Munich adjustments in Czech political
life.”57 On the other hand, tensions between Czecho-Slovakia and Germany, Hungary, and
Poland remained high, and few expected the stability that came from new governments and
formalized borders to last forever. Still, things had at least settled down to a point where Carr felt
comfortable in finally asking the department to consider the restoration work he had long wanted
for the Schonborn.58 Beyond heating and electrical problems, Carr was most determined to
acquire furniture befitting of the old, Baroque palace and its nineteen-foot ceilings.59
At the end of December, Carr left for a much-needed vacation. About a week later,
Kennan happily reported to the minister that things were going well at the Schonborn: “peace
and quiet hover over our little establishment here—at least to such extend as it normally does.”
That is not to say circumstances had slowed down completely, however. The consulate, for
instance, received its record number of visitors, 950, just a couple days earlier. Adding to the
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troubles was that the flu had been making its way through the legation.60 Then, a few days before
Christmas, Kennan’s children arrived in Prague. “[C]onditions in Czechoslovakia are now being
observed by two pairs of eyes much sharper and more intelligent than my own,” Kennan wrote
the minister.61 Christmastime in Prague that year was, as it always was, beautiful. Yet even the
Kennan’s Christmas tree, all decorated and lit up for the kids, could not dispel the feeling that
“clouds of war and desolation moved steadily closer” and an “uneasy lightning played on the
horizons of Europe.”62
“Today, —the first of the new year at the office, —was an extraordinarily quiet one. I
wish it were symbolic of what is to come.”63 Moffat’s hope for peace in the coming year, written
on January 3, did not last long. There was never much question as to whether Hitler would
reverse course and become calm and satisfied, but peace and quiet eluded Central Europe apart
from German involvement, too.
Toward the end of the first week of January, Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians got into a
border skirmish with Hungarian forces in the city of Munkacs, a city just over the Ruthenian
border, and one that had formally belonged to Czechoslovakia before becoming a Hungarian
possession as a result of the Vienna Award. Both sides predictably blamed each other, and the
American correspondent on site, G.E.R. Gedye, doubted whether a satisfactory account of the
conflict would ever materialize.64 “Although it has become clear to the world at large—as from
the first moment it was evident here would be the case—that Munich meant neither peace nor
settlement, the fighting on the Czecho-Hungarian frontier at Munkacs...[has] usefully underlined
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the lesson,” wrote Gedye.65 The incident made front page news in the United States, and it was
followed by more skirmishes, most of which led to at least a few deaths of soldiers and civilians
alike.
The fighting over Munkacs highlighted so many of the region’s problems: Hungary’s
belief that Slovakia and Ruthenia were unnatural states; the anger of Czecho-Slovak “terrorists”
over their country’s unending concessions; Slovakia’s longing to back up its autonomy with
security and respect. Amusingly, while Budapest levelled dramatic claims of Czech-Slovakia’s
devilish behavior, Raymond Cox, secretary at the American legation, reported how Prague
dismissed the incidents with bored apathy, calling them the unplanned results of “emotional
tension between small groups of soldiers on either side.”66 Most importantly, though, in the
minds of American observers, the situation pointed toward Germany’s overarching control, as
reports zipped through the department dissecting Berlin’s web of intervention: how it supported
Czecho-Slovakia’s resistance to Hungary and Poland while fueling Hungary’s and Poland’s
resistance toward Czecho-Slovakia; how it continued to incite Ruthenia’s Ukrainian population;
and how its steadfast efforts to trigger chaos in Slovak-Hungarian-Polish border disputes
perpetuated a confused and weak Danubian region. In Prague, the American legation saw the
skirmishes as a reflection of Czecho-Slovakia’s severe dysfunction, while Washington listened to
the Hungarian minister’s fevered protests with nothing to do but acknowledge that the situation
was a messy omen for 1939.67
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In January, with Carr still away on vacation, Kennan took a short trip to Slovakia and
Ruthenia for reporting purposes. “I am looking forward very keenly to this trip—from the
standpoint of interest, not comfort,” he said to the minister.68 His reports from the eastern
provinces during this time stand as the most crystallized pictures of American perspectives on
quasi-independent Slovakia and Ruthenia. They demonstrate the prevailing view of Schonborn
that the two regions’ people, both the leaders and general populaces, differed greatly from the
Czechs.
First came Kennan’s excursion into Slovakia. Though American reportage from the
region was sparse, a few months earlier New York Times correspondent G.E.R. Gedye had tried
to capture the travails of Slovakia’s post-Munich venture into independence: “The outside world
believes that a united Slovakia has now been freed of all outside interference and enjoys full
liberty,” he wrote, before concluding that “Nothing could be further from the truth.”69 Kennan
believed that Slovakia’s desire to wrench itself free from Czech rule was sourced in the region’s
natural affiliations with Hungary. On the face of it, Prague had done wonders for Slovakia,
modernizing the region with such effectiveness that, when the time came for Slovakia’s southern
frontier to pass into Hungarian hands, its cities became “models of progressiveness” to Budapest.
The problem, argued Kennan, was that the very characteristics that typified Prague—liberalism,
modernization, efficiency—pushed coarsely against the grain of Slovakia’s national character:
Rooted in centuries of Hungarian rule, the average Slovak is accustomed to have
someone far more dashing, more romantic, more aristocratic, at once more cruel and
more generous, to take orders from. Compared to the Hungarians, the Czech officials
appear to the Slovaks timid, colorless, and pedantic. It is, I am afraid, not modern
industrial “progress” that Slovakia wants. It is the atmosphere which radiates from
Budapest. 70
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Czecho-Slovakia, then, and more specifically the ruling officials in Prague, fit Slovakia
like “an oversized shoe.” After achieving independence in the wake of World War I, the Czechs
worked to build up Slovakia’s intelligentsia, doing so with “more zeal than tact,” and their
“schoolmasterish” approach antagonized the Slovaks.71 The Czechs’ off putting disposition
provided fertile soil for the Slovak autonomous movements of Andrej Hlinka and Vojtech Tuka,
as well as external disruption from the Germans and Poles.72 By 1939, Czech sentiments toward
their compatriots in the east had become downright cold. Carr recorded that prominent Czechs
saw the Slovaks as “children with new toys,” wanting to play with them for the time being.
Prague figured that after a few years of ‘fun,’ the Slovaks would realize and appreciate how
much they depended on the Czechs, particularly for financial support.73
Kennan’s theory about Slovak affinity for Hungary, though maybe accurate in a macro
sense, was not the view universally expressed by Slovaks. Kennan acknowledged that for the
vast majority of Slovak citizens, the best solution was to remain united with the Czechs. Munich,
however, had discredited the moderates, allowing extremist circles to seize the reigns. There did
remain some Slovak leaders in Bratislava who continued to oppose autonomy. For instance,
Baron Beck, a Slovak elite who lived for a long time in Vienna, informed Carr in December that
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Slovakia had no desire to turn its back on Prague precisely because Budapest had rendered it so
backwards. Beck further argued that Slovakia had no natural affinity for Berlin, and that
Bratislava only wanted German money and investments.74 Beck’s views carried very little
weight by 1939, however.
“The Slovaks have continued in general to have a riotous time playing at fascism,”
remarked Kennan in a personal letter in January 1939. The comment cut at the heart of what
American officials perceived to be one of the Second Republic’s most pressing problems. With
the radical elements having taken control of Slovakia’s political system, the province strained to
exercise its newfound autonomy. American observers were unimpressed. Slovak leaders seemed
to have no definite plan for the future, relying on enthusiasm and “vague hopes” of economic
development. With their tendency to move about in Nazi-style uniforms, Kennan commented,
quite literally, that Slovakia’s leaders were “all dressed up, and have no definite place to go.”75
During his visit, Kennan met with the region’s three main leaders: Tiso, Tuka, and Mach.76
Coming away from those conversations, Kennan was convinced that their dispositions reflected
either “intense naivety” or “blind selfishness.” Regardless of which it was, Kennan thought it
unfortunate, for it moved the Slovaks to “let themselves be used as pawns against other small
peoples, merely in return for glittering promises of sudden favor and prosperity at the hands of
some great power.”77
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Kennan felt that the most critical aspect of Slovakia’s problems was her relationship with
Germany. Bratislava’s Hotel Carlton had become a petri dish of unofficial Austrian and German
envoys, and Slovak representatives had a hard time concealing their senses of personal
importance. It was the “comic-opera center of Central European intrigue and diplomacy,”
Kennan recalled.78 Ultimately, Kennan found the Slovaks to be sincere but woefully unaware of
Germany’s control over them. They believed they were exploiting the Reich for their advantage,
when in reality they were “completely in German power and such autonomy as they enjoy exists
only through the grace of Hitler.”79
When Slovakia did manage to sleuth away from its German leash, Berlin would promptly
scold her and reattach the leash. Carr and Kennan noted a few examples of this, such as
Slovakia’s attempt to establish a state-wide labor union and its unannounced December census.
According to Kennan, the census fiasco especially infuriated the Germans because its spur-ofthe-moment style left Berlin no time “to import Germans into Slovakia from all directions for the
event.” Kennan offered tongue-in-cheek sympathy for the “poor Slovaks” who would probably
never be able to publish the results of their labors. The affair was further proof that Germany
owned the region and therefore Slovakia had to play by its rules: “In general, there is something
deeply shocking to the popular mind in this part of the world about the idea of an impartial and
unprepared census, and there is a general feeling that the Slovaks have not observed the rules of
the game.”80
Part of the problem for Slovakia was that as much as she wanted to test the limits of her
autonomy, she was still financially dependent upon Bohemia-Moravia. To American observers,
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this resulted in a shameless hypocrisy whereby Bratislava tried to continue its hostility toward
the Czechs while luring Czech tourism and capital inside its borders. On this issue, the
Schonborn’s sympathies lay squarely with the Czechs. Ever since Munich, the Slovaks had
exploited their position vis-à-vis the Czechs “ruthlessly,” yet the Czechs responded with
“remarkable equanimity.”81 German influences pounded Czechoslovakia’s eastern provinces,
proving especially successful in luring the “irresponsible” anti-Czech Hlinka Guards further
away from Prague. Even while Prague itself felt the burden of servicing Berlin’s wishes, it still
did not like financing Slovakia if the funds were just being rerouted to the Nazi purse.82
After Slovakia, Kennan made his way to Ruthenia. Lured there by the “fantastic tales” he
had heard of the backwards province. Its mid-winter’s frigid, unforgiving weather matched the
experience to come.83 Due to Munich, one had to travel through Hungary in order to reach
Ruthenia. Once in Chust, the new capital, Kennan found Ruthenian “stooges” who, along with
Ukrainian emigres, were preparing to establish and rule Greater Ukraine. Kennan found the
whole display diluted and embarrassing: “So they went boisterously on, marching their miniature
militia up and down, squabbling among themselves as to who would be the Fuhrer of greater
Ukraine, demanding food and money from the Czechs, spending a good part of the funds they
got on political propaganda of a purely Nazi color, and howling with indignation at the insistence
of the Czechs that they have a voice in the expenditure of the funds.”
Ruthenia, virtually cut off from the rest of the country after Munich, was also dependent
on forces outside the regional government. The Germans, who had established political control
in the province, had no desire to sink funds into the poverty-stricken place. Yet, not wanting to
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see Ruthenia sink into inexistence, which would necessarily mean the end of the Ukrainian
project, the Germans pressured Prague to pump money into Chust. The Czechs obliged, a
decision which Kennan thought was the result of Prague’s lingering concern over prestige.84
Thus, it was the Czechs who transported the government to Chust, kept the people fed, and
fought back skirmishers from Poland and Hungary.
In contrast to Ruthenia’s vain leaders, the Czech presence in Chust, like the one in
Bratislava, deepened the legation’s esteem for the Czech side of things. First and foremost, in
Ruthenia the Czechs were “long-suffering,” for day after day Czech army trucks motored food
into the province, providing daily bread to a place ruled by leaders too busy celebrating their
moment of glory. Beyond sustenance, Prague maintained Ruthenia financially through a constant
influx of funds. Wanting to have a say in how such funds were spent, Prague placed General Lev
Prchala, a Czech military officer, in Ruthenia’s regional government.85 Chust’s leaders resented
both Prague and Prchala for this, throwing “tantrums” in response, and Kennan guessed that
Prchala, who hardly felt comfortable leaving his apartment, was the most miserable potentate he
ever encountered.86
Like with Slovakia, Kennan and other American observers distinguished between
Ruthenia’s leaders and its populace. “They were neither Ukrainians nor Russians nor Czechs nor
Hungarians. They were simply themselves, Ruthenians—an ignorant, poverty-stricken, disease-
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ridden bunch of hill-people…they wished for nothing except that people should leave them
alone,” wrote Kennan. Of its future, Kennan guessed that “the unwieldly remnant of what was
once Ruthenia will find its way back to the economic and political unit in which it most natural
belongs, which is Hungary.”87
Naturally, after two days of “poking around,” it was a kindly Czech general who offered
Kennan a ride back to Prague. As if no man during this time should have been able to travel to
Ruthenia without repercussions, Kennan’s return trip consisted of days without eating, cars
breaking down, freezing drives through sinuous, icy mountain roads, and a bout with some
strong drink which, after keeping him in bed for two days, left Kennan with a “humble deference
to the powers of Serbian liquor.”88
By mid-January, both Kennan and Carr had returned to the legation in Prague. Soon after,
on January 19, the legation reported that Chvalkovsky’s long-awaited visit to Berlin had at last
been determined for a few days later. Hitler had delayed the meeting for months, presumably
because Prague had not aligned its policies to those of Berlin on a number of issues.89 One of
them was the military, something that left a stark impression on American observers. Already
beaten down and demoralized from its capitulation at Munich, the Czech Army, at least from the
legation’s point of view, posed zero threat to its German neighbor. Still, the Germans insisted
that Prague reduce the military further, which would have meant disposing of thousands of
Czech officers, throwing them out on the street without regard for how they would earn a living.
“No responsible Czech government could do this,” thought Kennan.90 As Carr explained to the
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department, most Czech officers and generals were faithful to Masaryk’s legacy, political
moderates, and distrustful of the Germans. When news got around that Berlin planned to use
Czech soldiers in foreign exploits, as well as its intention to post German military personnel in
the Czech lands indefinitely, alarm among the Czech military rose dramatically.91 Carr, Kennan,
and Cox believed that Germany would view the Czech military as sabotaging their plans for
Bohemia and Moravia. Their muted, concluding statement, which suggested that Chvalkovsky’s
upcoming visit to Berlin might “possibly” provide clarification, indicated very little optimism for
the situation ending well. Few Czech officials held high hopes for the meeting, either. In a
discussion with Minister of Agriculture, Ladislav Fierabend, Carr inquired whether Chvalkovsky
would ask Hitler for concessions on territory the Germans had taken from the Czechs. Fierabend
smiled, shook his head, and reminded Carr that the Germans were not ones to give up what they
come to possess.92
As anticipated, the meeting did not go well. Hitler gave one of his brutal venting sessions,
full of demands, complaints, and diatribes. On January 25, Carr discussed the meeting with
Chvalkovsky, the latter having just returned from Berlin. According to Carr, Chvalkovsky
looked “worn and dispirited.”93 The fever he had been fighting was partly to blame, wrote Carr,
but close contact with Hitler and his incessant pressure did no favors, either. During the HitlerChvalkovsky meeting, the Fuhrer managed to deride Prague’s handling of “the Jews, the press,
the army, and the German minority,” but he was most consumed with the Jewish problem. He
wanted all removed from Czecho-Slovakia. Chvalkovsky countered that such a request was
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impossible, to which Hitler explained that “if the Jewish question were not settled to Germany’s
satisfaction Czechoslovakia would have to abide by the consequences.”94 Carr finished his report
noting, with interest, that upon Chvalkovsky’s return, noticeable changes in the government’s
approach took place immediately. Communist labor unions were suppressed and newspapers
with tinges of pro-Benes leanings were heavily censored.
The most contentious issue arising out of the Hitler-Chvalkovsky meeting was that of the
Jews, and no issue more fully demonstrated the difficulties inherent to Czecho-Slovakia, CzechGerman relations, and Czech-American relations in the months leading up to the occupation. In
Bohemia and Moravia, state-sponsored anti-Semitism did not flourish in the months following
Munich. (That being said, the diktat, along with the resignation of the Benes government, did
lead to “Jew baiting, gutter demagogy, and petty chauvinism” among portions of the populace
and press.95) Though Hitler demanded that Prague unleash harsh anti-Semitic measures, the
Czechs responded with “stubborn resistance.”96 Even when laws and legislation levied burdens
on the Jewish population, such as Syrovy’s refusal to allow Sudeten Jews to migrate to the heart
of the state following Munich, they were carried out with leniency, and Czech officials, for the
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most part, made sure to implement them only when doing so caused no immediate danger to the
Jews in question.97
After Chvalkovsky and Beran took over, both of whom who were far less devoted to
Masaryk’s legacy of equity and far more devoted to German rapprochement given the times, the
Prague government continued to oppose wholesale anti-Semitism, although it did enact laws to
make it increasingly difficult for Jewish refugees to stay and work in the Czech lands.98
Practically speaking, Chvalkovsky, Beran, and Hacha were in an untenable position.99 While
promising Hitler to destroy Jewish influence without delay, they simultaneously promised the
United States and Britain that they would protect its Jews. Chvalkovsky confidently told Kennan
that Prague would never be able to treat its Jews as Berlin. Most Czech Jews lived in bigger
cities where intermarriage was common and where many Jews held prominent positions in
business and industry.100
Prague’s desire to not give-in to German pressure on Jews was an important pillar in the
maintenance of sturdy relations between America and the Czech lands. Throughout the 1930s,
public opinion in the United States had gradually became more attuned to the plights of Jews in
Germany, and after Nuremberg, put more pressure on elected officials to respond. Germany’s
massive anti-Jew pogrom of November 9 and 10, Kristallnacht, marked a significant uptick in
America’s perception of Germany and the Jewish problem: “The wholesale confiscations, the
atrocities, the increasing attacks…have aroused opinion here to a point where if something is not
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done there will be combustion,” said Moffat.101 On November 15, Roosevelt issued a statement
in which he expressed the deep shock of the American people at what had taken place in
Germany. He added one line purely his own, saying, “I myself could scarcely believe that such
things could occur in a twentieth-century civilization.” The papers lauded the response for its
forcefulness and clear condemnation.102 After much discussion, the department also decided to
call home Hugh Wilson, ambassador to Berlin, for “consultation.” “No one has any illusions that
it will stop the Germans in their tracks,” wrote Moffat, “but it is a gesture that enables us to save
our self-respect.”103
American efforts to execute a significant response to Europe’s Jewish problem failed.
The Intergovernmental Committee had slammed into a concrete wall in trying to secure safe
emigration for Germany’s Jews, preventing it from addressing Czech Jews, or the Jews of any
other country for that matter. Because of this, Poland’s minister in Washington, George Potocki,
had a perpetual bad temper, voicing his frustrations over the department’s refugee policy with
anyone who dared to listen. Potocki and the Poles were upset that the Intergovernmental
Committee spent all its time try to resettle German Jews even though the Germans were
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behaving so despicably. This was unfair, argued Potocki, because the Poles also wanted to get rid
of their Jews, but they at least treated their them decently.104
Another effort by the government was the nascent Wagner-Rogers Bill, which would
have raised America’s immigration quotas to allow 20,000 children, mostly Jews, into the
country. The bill was doomed from the start, though, as most officials, whether from Congress,
the department, or the administration, feared setting a precedent of changing immigration quotas.
Interestingly, one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Edith Rogers, admitted to Moffat that she
only introduced the bill because she feared that something more extreme might find its way into
committee. Moffat flatly opposed the Wagner-Rogers Bill, feeling it would open the Pandora’s
box on immigration.105
Despite Washington’s failures in specifically addressing the Jewish refugee crisis in
Cecho-Slovakia, it remained an important point in U.S.-Czech relations. A few weeks after
Kristallnacht, Carr brought up the Jewish question with Chvalkovsky. Carr, Kennan, and others
at the Schonborn had dealt personally with the Jewish refugee problem. During a two-week
stretch in November, the U.S. Consulate General received over 5,000 visitors requesting visas,
the vast majority from Jews.106 Carr informed the foreign minister of his personal apprehension
over the Prague government’s future plans for the Jewish population. Germany’s laws, clauses,
and pogroms had “aroused intense felling” in the United States, said Carr, and if Prague were to
do likewise, the consequences would be regrettable.107 Carr reminded Chvalkovsky that
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Americans, both the citizenry and the government, had great sympathy and “a very friendly
feeling” toward Czecho-Slovakia. Anti-Semitic measures handed down by Prague would
severely impair that goodwill. Chvalkovsky agreed with Carr’s statements, adding that he
intended to avoid taking harsh measures at almost any cost, and that only by “virtual orders of
Berlin” would such measures ever come about.108
Chvalkovsky’s assurances aside, not all word coming from Czech circles indicated the
same level of commitment to just treatment of the Jews. For instance, John C. Wiley, minister to
the Baltic states, reported in January conversations he had had with the Czechoslovak minister in
Riga, Pavel Baracek. According to Wiley, Bracek, who had no trouble saying that the Poles and
Hungarians were behaving quite “stupidly,” felt that the Germans were acting in a very
conciliatory manner, and he did not sense any great amount of persecution coming. Wiley
brought up the increasingly anti-Semitic disposition that both the government and populace had
taken, a thought which Baracek did not feel passed muster. “The Jews had a disproportionately
large share of the learned professions,” argued Baracek, who continued by saying that “antiSemitism was an old state of affairs in Czechoslovakia.”109
The period following Chvalkovsky’s January visit with Hitler marked an important
juncture. The Czech government, surprisingly, did not make any great changes to its policy
toward Jews. In mid-February, Kennan produced a long report for the department, claiming that
“very little has happened in Prague thus far to justify the panicky atmosphere which has
prevailed in Jewish circles.” While the government did pass two pieces of legislation negatively
impacting Jews’ naturalization rights, officials carried out the laws with a generous disposition,
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and Kennan anticipated that it would not affect more than 20,000 or 30,000 individuals.
Furthermore, the Czechs had taken steps to provide great assistance to emigrating Jews, namely
because French and British aid depended on it. Overall, Kennan reiterated the difficult position
Prague found itself in, “torn between the conflicting desires of the Germans and the Western
powers, with their own instincts inclining them toward moderation.”110 What made the period
crucial was Germany’s explicit dissatisfaction with Prague, which it expressed by becming
increasingly active in the Czech lands. For one thing, propaganda increased to a fever pitch, as
Ernst Kundt, the leader of the German minority in Bohemia and Moravia, rallied willing listeners
with anti-Jew manifestos.111
Jews fared much worse in Slovakia, and as a result, the province received much less
favorable consideration from American observers and officials.112 In Kennan’s words, Slovak
anti-Semitism was “deep-seated.” Jews in Slovakia were generally more successful than their
Slovak neighbors, which Kennan attributed to superior intelligence, but the Slovaks saw it as
proof that the Jews sided with Bratislava’s enemies: Poland and Hungary. After achieving
progressive levels of autonomy following Munich, Slovakia’s leaders, Tiso, Tuka, and Mach,
launched strong attacks against the Jews.113 Later, while Nazis and Germans ravaged Jewish
communities during Kristallnacht, Gedye reported similar behaviors in Slovakia: “How many

110

Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 46.
Ernst Kundt was a Sudeten German who worked alongside Henlein during the Munich crisis. Berlin
considered him an expert on Czechoslovak affairs, so Kundt remained in Prague after the diktat to lead the German
remnant. Prochazka, The Second Republic, 67. Kennan recorded one of Kundt’s publications to the department,
which in part railed, “An unusual characteristic of Czechoslovakia is that the Jews have interfered after a fashion in
the political issues between Germany and Czechoslovakia and steered Czech policy to a point where the situation
became intolerable.” Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 46.
112
While America’s cool attitude toward the Slovaks was more clearly borne out during spring and summer
1939, it began manifesting during the Second Republic. Beyond the legation’s less-than-favorable depictions of the
Slovak leaders, there were other, more tangible actions. For instance, Slovakia’s regional government invited
Kennan to Bratislava for the opening session of Parliament, to which Kennan replied with a formal ‘no.’ Kennan to
Urad Propagandy Slovenskej Krajiny, January 16, 1938, NARA, RG 84, Correspondence File, Prague, 1939, 800.
113
Kennan recalled one Slovak minister promise that in various professions, “there would be no numerus
clausus: there would be a numerus nullus.” Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 13.
111

91

Jews actually have been rounded up, with their property seized and they themselves dumped
penniless…surely will run into the thousands.”114
After Slovakia’s mid-December elections, the regional government pursued harsher antiSemitic measures into the new year, coated in a “vehement campaign in the press.”115 When
travelling through Bratislava in January, Kennan had a personal conversation with Tiso, in which
the prime minister stressed that his government would take whatever steps necessary in order to
eliminate Jewish influences from Slovakia’s political and economic life. Kennan added that Tiso
gave assurances that the Slovak government would avoid irresponsible excesses and physical
cruelty, but Kennan took the remarks with a grain of salt: “I suspect that…the Slovak
government will be governed primarily by considerations of expediency.”116 Worse yet, the
Catholic church, which Carr and Kennan had anticipated would serve as a limiting factor to
Slovakia’s anti-Jew viciousness, became sharply negative toward Jews, and by February, Kennan
sensed that it no longer posed any hindrance to government policy. Interestingly, the only real
factor necessitating a tinge of caution in Slovakia’s Jew policy was that of financial aid from the
United States. Slovakia, ever poor, relied in part on capital that flowed from American-Slovak
emigres, as well as general American business endeavors, and if Bratislava pushed too hard and
too eagerly into Jew-baiting, their already precarious economic framework would suffer
irreparably.117
Lastly, there was Ruthenia. Carr and Kennan often referred to the province as being,
above all else, “obscure.” True to form, Ruthenia’s handling of its Jews was muddled and
inconsistent. In their new year report on the Jewish situation, Carr and Kennan noted that the
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circumstances of Jews in Ruthenia was, of course, obscure. Though only twelve-percent of the
population, Ruthenian Jews controlled ninety-five-percent of the region’s economic output.
Thus, between their small number and oversized influence, Ruthenian officials, who like the
Slovaks distrusted the Jewish community, considered Jews “in some respects too much and in
others too little of a problem” to tackle.118
One thread tying the Czech and eastern provinces together was that in both places, the
Jewish question was largely “the football of foreign influences.”119 It was primarily Berlin
kicking the question around, using it to put pressure on the Czechs while luring the Slovaks
further into a German orbit. In each their own ways, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia
attempted to consolidate their Jewish populations and anti-Semitic policies. Their distinct
approaches had direct impact on their relations with the United States, for American public
opinion, in addition to the consciences of State Department officials, expected fair treatment of
the Jews. As shown, the Schonborn reported with sympathy the Czech position—one of being
caught between a rock and a hard place—and even attempted to encourage moderation. With the
Slovaks, the legation merely reported the troubling trends. There is no indication that Carr,
Kennan, or others attempted to reason or dialogue about the issue. Lastly, Rutehnia remained an
obscure, far-off, pitiable province, whose position toward the Jews was relegated to the question
of when, not if, the Germans would determine its fate.
As the legation fleshed out the Jewish question in Czecho-Slovakia, America received
Eduard Benes, former president of the former Czechoslovakia, in New York on February 10. A
few days prior, the New York Times ran a lengthy, glowing article on Benes—his character,
career, and trials. “Of all the creators of Czecho-Slovakia, Benes was in Western eyes the
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greatest after Masaryk himself,” wrote Clair Price. With “dignity and an unflinching
fortitude…[an] iron nerve and an iron physique,” Benes had served Czechoslovakia, a “robust
young democracy” for twenty years, and he was now being welcomed in America as both a
“pillar of the League” and “the most tragic figure of the grim Munich drama.120 Fiorello La
Guardia, New York City’s mayor, greeted Benes with stirring words, reminding his audience that
Four representatives of two decadent democracies and two violent dictatorships meeting
at Munich decided that instead of politics they would perform common butchery. They
laid a small, fettered State on their operating table and then with merciless treachery
began to cut it up. Today we welcome the President of this State in New York. We assure
him that we have not forgotten this act of butchery by the European Great Powers, that
we value him according to his merits and that therefore here in the United States we will
always assist his brave nation.121
Benes returned praise for the United States, calling it a “great and powerful bulwark,” and a
place that represented “the perfect fighter who knows that life is sometimes difficult, but who
knows also that in human life there should be no room for despair or pessimism.”122
Before departing for America, Benes had determined to remain apolitical for the
indefinite future. He figured it would do no good to his people, nor Hacha’s government, nor the
United States, if he used his time in America to villainize the international situation. Until
circumstances changed, which he anticipated would be sooner rather than later, he decided to
keep quiet.123 Thus, in light of La Guardia’s kind words, Benes limited his statements to further
exaltations of his host country: “Personally, I have always been no only an admirer of your
country and its history, but I have tried to follow your ideas and principles…The United States,
with all its development, has been to me an example…for the whole world.”124
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It was not long, however, before Benes realized that, even if he were to remain quiet on
what transpired at Munich, and even if he were to hold his tongue on the conciliatory efforts of
the new government in Prague, he could still use his time in America to buildup goodwill for a
future Czechoslovak state. Like Masaryk of 1918, Benes sought to capture the magic of a U.S.Czech ‘special bond’:
My wife and I visited the birthplaces or graves of George Washington, Jefferson,
Lincoln, Wilson, and wherever we went there were huge meetings and demonstrations at
which not seldom ten, fifteen, even twenty thousand people took part. It was an immense
work of propaganda for peace, democracy, and Czechoslovakia; against what had
happened in Munich. Only then did I fully understand how great were the moral assets
which the Republic had built up during the twenty years of our existence and during our
fight for democracy in 1938 by our faith and fidelity to Masaryk’s democracy, our
endeavor to save peace, our dignified attitude toward Germany and Nazism. I confess to
have made the fullest use of these moral and political assets during my six months in
North America.125
Benes made headway in courting State Department officials, too. In mid-February,
George Messersmith, assistant secretary of state, attended a dinner at which Benes spoke and
answered questions. According to Messersmith, while the guests were already inclined to be
sympathetic toward Benes personally, the former president still managed to make a “very deep
impression.” “I think everyone was struck with the objectivity which he displayed, the apparent
complete frankness of his replies and with extraordinarily lucid analyses he gave of the various
aspects of the European problem,” recorded Messersmith.126 What Messersmith found most
interesting was Benes’ claim that he nor his Czechoslovak colleagues could have done anything
to prevent Germany’s seizure of the Sudetenland, as it was truly not a matter of minorities, but
the simple fact that Czechoslovakia was in Germany’s way. Now, Benes’ appeal to Messersmith
is not surprising, considering Messersmith had long wanted to take a strong stand against
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Germany.127 Yet Benes’ ability to use his time in the United States before the occupation—a
time when he technically remained apolitical—to consolidate his standing in the eyes of the
American public and government would prove important after the occupation. During the spring
and summer, once Hitler had thrown of the charade of a limited foreign policy, Benes would
begin establishing his government-in-exile in earnest. His efforts would further split America’s
understanding of who or what represented the Czechoslovak people, and further complicate the
nature of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.
In February and early March, the Schonborn watched Czecho-Slovakia make its final
attempts at consolidation before the occupation. The period reflected Central Europe’s chaos, or
what Kennan called the “powerful national and ideological currents” swirling around the Czechs,
Slovaks, and Ruthenes.128 The legation remained doubtful of the country’s prospects. The Prague
government, still without guarantees or international support, did its best to placate the Germans
without alienating the West, but the Germans were driving a hard bargain, surprising no one. As
March approached, Kundt was basically demanding that the Germans living in Czechoslovakia,
who Berlin had prevented from moving to the Reich, receive a state within a state. According to
an American correspondent, Chvalkovsky was displaying “skillful dilatory tactics,” but sooner or
later push would come to shove and the Czechs would either have to completely bend to Berlin’s
will or face the music of lost independence. Carr, Cox, and Kennan had been saying as much
since the time of Chvalkovsky’s visit.129
In many instances, what worried Carr and Kennan was the lack of practical consolidation.
During trips to border towns, both in Czechoslovakia and the Sudetenland, American observers
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could not help but notice the lack of permanency. All the types of projects that redrawn borders
necessitated—such as custom houses and railway stations—were entirely absent. Kennan found
that when he inquired to German officials about the missing effort to solidify the new borders, he
received “knowing smiles” coupled with cryptic explanations that things would soon be
changing.130 In the east, Slovakia continued its border skirmishes with Hungary while remaining
firmly entrenched in its self-delusion vis-à-vis Germany. What they did not know, though, was
that by the end of January, Germany, after failing to secure concessions from Poland, had already
determined his future course. Hitler was planning ignite Slovak autonomy as a means to
neutralize Czecho-Slovakia and, ultimately, prepare a springboard for Blitzkrieg into Poland.
That meant Ruthenia was expendable altogether. As Chust’s Ukrainians continued in their
fantastic plans, Hitler prepared to heave the province to its two hungry neighbors, Budapest and
Warsaw. The department was not unaware, for in mid-February, Biddle reported to the
department information he had regarding Ribbentrop’s meeting with Beck. Among the crumbs of
the conversation he gleaned was that, in Hitler’s eyes, the Czecho-Slovakia issue was far from
settled and her boundaries were by no means definite.131 As mid-March approached, Central
Europe trembled with uncertainty, caused in large part by the unshakable feeling that Hitler’s
plans for Czechoslovakia were coming to a head.132
Indicative of the department’s approach to Czecho-Slovakia during the Second Republic
was the situation revolving around Hugh Wilson’s ambassadorial position in Berlin. As
mentioned, Wilson had returned to Washington in the wake of Kristallnacht for “consultation,”
but there was not set plan of action for the future of his post. By February, the department began
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having discussions about whether or not he should return to his post. Wilson was eager to resume
his position. Messersmith was adamant that he not. That left Hull, Welles, Moffat, and others
stuck in the middle. They saw benefits to both sides of the argument but felt it best to “let matters
wait.”133 Such was the approach of the department and the Schonborn toward the Second
Republic on the whole. Without the desire or ability to be anything but a passive observer,
American officials harbored a wait-and-see attitude, though a decidedly pessimistic one. By midMarch, the waiting would be over, and their pessimism would be justified. Hitler was coming.
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Chapter Three: “Occupation”
The occupation of Prague was the real beginning of the second world war…the world
could not remain silent anymore.1
The first surprise to greet Prague on March 15, 1939 was an unseasonable blizzard. Dark
sky, icy temperatures, and gusts of large snowflakes engulfed the early morning hours. As the
populace slept, snow and ice covered the ancient city’s streets, and with spring being just around
the corner, it was an unwelcome turn in the weather.
Yet if a storm had been the only surprise in the capital that morning, few of Prague’s
citizens would have had much cause for complaint. Czecho-Slovakia had been teetering on the
brink of inexistence for almost half-a-year, so its people certainly could have handled one more
bout of bad, wintery weather. It did not take long, though, for the emergence of a second
surprise, and one fully more miserable than the first. It came in the form of a giant “iron
caterpillar” crawling powerfully toward the Hrad—a German invasion.2 It was a shocking
development for both the people and the government.3 By midday, Prague had completely
succumbed to Nazi control. The rest of the Czech lands realized the same fate before the day was
through. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist.4
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For U.S.-Czech relations, the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia was a final, crystalized
picture of just how impotent their underlying friendliness had become. Throughout the Second
Republic, the legation, as well as Washington, watched and reported passively as CzechoSlovakia’s central government struggled, and ultimately failed, to consolidate its post-Munich
position. Yet for all the difficulties it faced between Munich and March 1939, Czecho-Slovakia
remained. “If this is the death struggle of democracy,” wrote Kennan to a friend in early 1939, “it
can at least be said that democracy is dying hard.”5 And as Prague attempted to navigate the
absurdly thin line between appeasing Hitler and satisfying the democracies (as well as its own
conscience), the Schonborn and State Department watched sympathetically, expressing
admiration and goodwill for the Czechs, while acknowledging the mutinous movements taking
place in Slovakia and Ruthenia.
Thus, for all that had happened in the five months after Munich, Washington and Prague
remained on friendly terms. Consequently, when Czecho-Slovakia heaved its dying breaths in
March 1939, the Schonborn retained its unique position as a wholly sympathetic, wholly
friendly, but wholly impotent listening post.6 The chaos that had been unleashed at Munich, and
which had ebbed and flowed in the months after, came to a screeching climax in Hitler’s
invasion, and the American legation could do little but make its best effort to keep pace with the
details. Given the chaos, the Schonborn performed its responsibilities quite well. Still, the utter
complexity and convolution of the crisis prevented Carr and his team from developing proactive,

instead viewing the occupation as the tragic end to the ‘Czechoslovakia’ of old. For consistency’s sake, the
hyphenated ‘Czecho-Slovakia’ is used throughout the remainder of the chapter.
5
Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 10.
6
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the continent’s “most vital listening posts.” At the time, the Czechs took this comment to heart, but it began to ring
hallow as the region’s crises grew. “Carr Transferred in Hull ‘Shake-Up,’” July 3, 1937, New York Times, 13.
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penetrating analysis, and when the crisis finally came to its dramatic peak—a full German
occupation—nearly everyone was caught by surprise.
In this way, then, Carr and his staff proved unable to leverage America’s unique position
vis-à-vis Czecho-Slovakia into something practically beneficial. What was its unique position?
First, unlike the other major democracies, Britain and France, America had no fear of being
engulfed in a European conflict. While it is true that Roosevelt and the State Department were
looking for ways to strengthen the country’s international position, especially its ability to aid
friendly powers in the event of war, public opinion remained firmly opposed to serious
involvement in any European conflict.7 Second, it had emerged from Munich’s aftermath as the
last democracy of sizable power still on good terms with Prague. During the difficult months
following Munich, America remained a trustworthy and sympathetic, if aloof, friend to the
Czechs. But precisely because its aloofness was justifiable, Prague did not expect Washington to
underwrite its security. For that Prague still looked to the Munich powers and their unfulfilled
promises of guaranteed frontiers.8 In light of such facts, the American legation had every
freedom to recognize the cold, hard realities of the enveloping crisis but it proved unable to
move beyond standard reporting of events, or beyond reiterating the bewildered, distressed, and
apathetic thoughts from officials in Prague, London, Paris, and elsewhere. For those working
from the department, then, Carr and the legation staff had been “caught napping.”9
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While Prague’s circumstances had been deteriorating ever since the new year, and
particularly since Chvalkovsky’s January trip to Berlin, the immediate crisis that led to Hitler’s
decision for a March 15 occupation unfolded in the preceding week. It was a fast-paced,
muddled, and sensational week. Within those few days there were many signs pointing to the
fact that Czechoslovakia’s independence was in grave danger, and such signs did not go
unnoticed by interested observers in the West. Even so, the full occupation came as a surprise to
the democracies, and next to nothing was done as it happened. In the case of France and
England, it was for largely understandable, though awfully unheroic, reasons that they indulged
in what could be called willful naivety.10 Paris and London had the most to lose if a continental
war were to break out, and thus recognizing the roiling crisis for what it was—Hitler’s effort to
eliminate Czechoslovakia—would have forced them to play a bigger role in the Czech-German
issue than they felt they capable. Instead they remained as removed as possible, granting Hitler
de facto control over the region.11 As during the Second Republic, those at the Schonborn as well
as in Washington were not happy seeing Germany dig its heels into central Europe, but they also
did not want to sour relations with Paris and London.12 The result was a tendency among
American officials to view France and Britain’s willful negligence with great understanding.
Close analysis of America’s efforts during the March crisis thus becomes an interesting
and instructive case study, and one that has not yet been fully explored. 13 A detailed account of
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the narrative shows the manner in which America’s diplomats in Prague struggled to navigate the
complexities of central Europe during the lingering Czech-German crises. Confronted with
confusion, false hope, and misinformation coming from all directions—Prague, Berlin,
Bratislava, Budapest, Rome, Warsaw, London, and Paris—American officials could do little but
watch as Germany made a mockery of Czechoslovakia before eliminating her altogether. It was a
pitiful period for the government in Prague, and America’s inability to do anything but observe
serves as a useful reflection of prewar U.S.-Czech relations. That being said, it would incorrect
to call this a U.S. failure. The events were too big, and with too much of their own momentum,
for any substantial blame to be mounted against America’s passivity and ignorance. Rather, the
period showcases the reality that shared values and friendly relations can only go so far,
especially when confronted with much stronger external threats. If Hitler made a mockery of
Czecho-Slovakia through his occupation, he also exposed the standard impotence of U.S.Czechoslovak relations.
Lastly, the March crisis turned out to be the very end of Carr’s diplomatic service. Within
a week of the occupation, Carr would begin the process of shutting down the embassy, one final
task before his long-earned retirement. Interestingly, Carr’s last few dispatches to the
Department signaled a break in his typically formal, official, and straightforward reporting.14
With his time in Prague nearing its end, he at last felt able to shake the confines of protocol and
express his deep seeded concerns for the Czech people, and his hope that the U.S. government
would take specific, humanitarian actions in the lands belonging to the former Czechoslovak
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Republic. Similarly, the department itself was able to take more proactive measures in
expressing support for the Czech people and its ousted officials. After the occupation, Hitler had
lost all credibility, and it was finally safe for the United States to show partiality without the
repercussions that came from ‘getting involved.’ From a similar but broader perspective, the
occupation proved to be a great turning point for international foreign policy, for it exposed
Hitler as being an untrustworthy ‘Napoleon,’ convincing even the most stubborn man that a new
war was indeed coming.15
The immediate crisis surrounding the March 15 occupation hinged on the precarious state
of Czech-Slovak-German relations. Ever since the Zilina meeting of October 6, separatists
exercised substantial sway within Slovak political circles. Sensing an opportunity to create
havoc, Ribbentrop began luring these extremists into Germany’s orbit in February 1939.16 Like
flies to a zapper, Bratislava eagerly sent representatives to meet with German emissaries in
Berlin and Vienna. Though the meetings were presumably centered on financial matters, Kennan
and Carr suspected that ulterior motives were at play, and that Slovakia probably hoped to
impress upon Prague that it had “powerful friends” elsewhere.17 The legation had less to say
about what Berlin’s ulterior motives might be. Little clarity came a few days later when Carr
spoke at length with Chvalkovsky. Their conversation revealed the foreign minister’s confidence
that Hitler had no intention of prodding Slovakia’s independence movement.18 For the time
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being, the American legation found no reason to seriously question the faith Chvalkovsky was
placing in Germany, suggesting in its March 9 report that Berlin and Bratislava were probably
both bluffing.19 The real question was whether the central government in Prague would call their
bluffs by taking direct action against its mutinous eastern province.
To those at the Schonborn, the growing wariness of Czech officials toward Bratislava
indicated that Prague, if pushed far enough, might intervene in Slovakia. Then, in the first week
of March, the American legation reported that Czech-Slovak relations, already tenuous, were
strained to the utmost when regional officials met to discuss the state’s finances. Slovakia,
woefully poor and utterly dependent on the Czechs to maintain its precious autonomy, defied the
limits of shame and demanded that Prague reduce its share of the federal budget while allowing
it to use Czech funds with “no strings attached.”20 Over the next few days, the standoff ebbed
and flowed, with moderate and extreme elements within the Slovak delegation vying for
control.21
The situation reached a tipping point when Prague learned that top Slovak officials,
particularly Premier Tiso, had orchestrated double dealings with Reich officials. Prague, wanting
to put Slovakia in its place, tried to sound out Berlin, desperate to know whether Hitler would
allow it to take decisive action against Slovakia. By March 9, Kennan, aided by word he had
received from the Polish legation, was reporting that forces within Berlin were pressuring
Slovakia to pursue secession, yet Chvalkovsky remained optimistic that this was not the case.22
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Naturally, Berlin put up a façade of ambivalence, and on March 9 Prague chose to gamble and
dismiss Premier Tiso and top Slovak officials in one fell swoop. On March 10, the legation’s
press reports, as well as its cable to the Department, emphasized the orderliness with which
Prague took action, and that “the changes have eliminated most of the people who were actively
furthering a separatist movement.”23
As the Czech-German-Slovak political drama progressed, the American legation
struggled to ascertain Hitler’s intentions toward the Czechs in relation to broader foreign policy
goals. Press reports and offhand rumors presented an endless number conjectures, making it
difficult for the Department to sift through all of the hot air to locate substance.24 In the days just
prior to March 15, Carr sent word to the Department that increasing numbers of clashes between
Czechs and Germans were taking place, especially in cities which had retained mixed
populations after Munich, such as Brno. 25 He called the reaction of the German government
“uncertain,” but telegrams coming from Berlin pointed to Goebbels’ propaganda machine and its
“unbridled violence” against the Czechs, suggesting that German aggression was just around the
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corner.26 Kennan and Major Riley, who were away on a ski trip in the Sudetenland, knew
problems were brewing in Prague after seeing newspaper headlines with statements like,
“Czechoslovakia in Uproar—Unprecedented Persecution of Germans.”27 Considering the fact
that the Germans still residing in Czech lands now lived “off the fat of the land,” the headlines
were clearly masking Germany’s ulterior motives, so Kennan and Riley raced back to Prague.
When reentering the city, the two received a rude surprise: “For the first time,” Kennan later
recalled, “swastika flags were flying from some of the Prague windows.”28
Throughout the Second Republic, American officials had a difficult time deciding
whether Czechoslovakia’s two ongoing crises—the Slovak independence movement and
Germany’s vehement press campaign—intersected. By the second week of March, connections
between Berlin and Bratislava had become quite clear. For instance, upon being sacked by the
central government, some of the Slovak separatists escaped to Vienna where they continued their
campaign for independence with the help of Austrian Nazis.29 The knowledge that Slovakia’s
ousted radical elements were meeting with radical Nazis was bad enough, but the situation
worsened in the ensuing days when the Wehrmacht began moving troops into strategic positions.
On March 11 and 12, Major Riley, along with the military attachés from other governments,
reported German troop concentrations on the frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. Both
the German and Czech governments claimed they were celebratory measures since March 12
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marked the one-year anniversary of the Anschluss, but Riley noted the pessimistic outlook
among Czech military officers.30
By March 13, some American officials saw the growing imbroglio as potential pretext for
Nazi intervention in the rump state. What exactly this ‘intervention’ would look like was
anybody’s guess. That evening, Raymond Geist, the American chargé in Berlin, reported that
Tiso, who had been ousted on March 9, was having meetings with Ribbentrop in the German
capital.31 Within his report, Geist made it clear that, from his point-of-view, the Germans looked
ready to intervene in a serious manner. Tiso’s visit to the Reich chancellery confused the
American legation in Prague, which found the developments wholly “disconcerting.” Yet while
the signs pointed toward Germany’s active role in creating a Czech internal crisis, the legation
retained its wait-and-see mindset. Kennan later recalled that “no one understood at that time that
a trap was being prepared which was designed to bring about the end of Czechoslovakia.”32
Carr, despite his concerns about Czecho-Slovakia’s internal turmoil, and having
recognized the fact that Germany was actively “sympathetic” toward Slovakia’s separatist
movement, still felt correct in assuaging the department that the situation held no probability of
serious trouble on the afternoon of March 13.33 Carr spoke again of Chvalkovsky’s optimistic
outlook, feeling that with the new Slovak government having been established, order and calm
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would prevail. The Czechoslovak minister was admittedly still preoccupied with Germany’s
attitude toward the developments, however.34
The Kennans hosted a dinner party on the night of the 13th, and the evening’s discussion
centered on Slovakia, which everyone agreed would declare independence, and Ruthenia, which
had become almost an afterthought. Late into the party Carr, who was not present, phoned
Kennan to tell him that Hacha was planning to convene the Slovak Diet the following day.35
Once his guests had departed, Kennan headed to the Schonborn to help with the telegramming.
In the early morning of March 14, a few hours after midnight, the staff cabled Washington the
news.36 It was expected that Slovakia would declare its independence.37 Major Riley added that,
since the Czechs had no mind to offer any resistance, German military operations, though not out
of the question, were expected to be minimal. All this was happening behind the scenes of a
populace largely unaware of the rapid developments: “Entire quiet prevails here,” wrote Carr,
adding that “the public is ignorant of what is going on.”38
Unfortunately, Prague’s government was not faring much better than its ignorant
citizenry, as they willingly admitted to the foreign offices of the democracies that they “simply
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had no idea what to do.”39 After sending all the necessary telegrams to the department, Kennan
and Charles Elbrick, a secretary at the legation, walked home with feelings of “extreme
uneasiness.”40 Later, at noon, Carr informed the department that Germany had levied new
demands on Prague, calling most notably for an independent Ruthenia and a Slovakia under
German protection. The Slovak Diet was still in session, but their independence had become a
forgone conclusion.41 Sure enough, the Slovak Diet declared its independence just prior to 12:30
p.m.
In the early afternoon, the Brazilian legation hosted a luncheon with Chvalkovksy as the
guest of honor. Considering Prague’s position of dire straits, everyone was shocked to find
Chvalkovsky arriving in a perfectly punctual manner, only to be further surprised as the foreign
minister made his rounds with complete composure. Kennan considered it a “remarkable
performance” for a man whose country had just lost one-half of itself.42 Chvalkovsky only
stayed for the first course, however, and before evening he was on his way to meet with Hitler in
Berlin where one needed all the composure in the world.
An hour later, the Prague legation relayed ominous signs to the Department. Hlinka
guards were looting Czechs as they tried to leave Slovakia. German troops were mobilizing near
Bratislava, only miles outside the Slovak border. Perhaps most troubling were the German troops
mobilizing just north of Moravia. The legation staff thought it possible that Hitler intended to
occupy German language enclaves in Brno, Jihlava, and Olomouc, thereby granting the Reich a
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“fat corridor” between Austria and Silesia while using the “mutilated remnants of BohemiaMoravia to preserve the fiction of an independent Czechoslovakia.”43 At 2:00 p.m., Carr reported
that the Czech General Staff, who by this time were “most pessimistic,” had resorted to saying
things like “anything can happen, even a German march into Moravia and Bohemia.” Kennan,
with his usual literary touch, wrote that Germany’s “propaganda table is being lavishly set,
probably for another Czech meal.”44 Worse yet, Bullitt’s sources in Paris informed him that
Poland and Hungary would take Slovakia’s decision for independence as a signal to snatch
Ruthenia, which would be securing its ‘independence’ along with Bratislava.45 Skirmishes in
Ruthene border towns were already being reported, and if Germany remained deferent, Warsaw
and Budapest would at last have the common border they had long been pining for.
At three p.m. in Prague, Carr reported Slovakia’s declared independence with Tiso
becoming both president and prime minister. Although Carr had received no word from the
Czech cabinet, the tone of the radio broadcast suggested that no resistance was forthcoming.46 As
the dazed Czech cabinet scrambled to figure out what to do next, Geist reported on Germany’s
heightened press campaign which, according to Geist, had become an unmistakable and
deliberate buildup for “far reaching” intervention in Bohemia-Moravia. German editorials
lamented the supposed chaos, persecution, and terror that Czech-Germans were subjected to, all
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because the Prague government refused to accept the terms of Munich. The Bolkischer
Beobachter made sure to note that the problem went far deeper than Prague’s government,
arguing instead that “the poison comes from deep roots and has contaminated the whole Czech
body. This means that Central Europe is faced by a great immediate danger. The situation has
become untenable.”
The German press’s lies notwithstanding, some incidents of violence were in fact taking
place, but mostly in Ruthenia. There, Czech troops, clashed with Ukrainian paramilitary groups
in efforts to retain control over the region. Their control would be short-lived, however, as
Hungarian troops entered Ruthenia on the morning of the 14th.47 Not long after, the department
received word from James Montgomery, American minister to Hungary, that Budapest had
delivered an ultimatum to the Prague government demanding that the Czechs evacuate Ruthenia
within twenty-four hours.48 Carr informed the department of the same ultimatum soon after.49
Though Hungary’s army was incredibly weak, it had received blessing from both Rome and
Berlin, with the latter all but demanding that Budapest take care of its Ruthene business
immediately and quickly.50 Poland, though eager for a common border with Hungary, was upset
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by the fact that Berlin had purposefully kept them in the dark. Rumania, Prague’s impotent ally,
watched warily as no one, particularly France and Britain, stood up to face the growing threats.51
At five p.m., Carr reported that Hacha and Chvalkovsky had left for Berlin at four.
Details for the purpose of the visit were still murky, but what was clear was that Berlin had
initiated its timing.52 By seven p.m., the crisis had devolved into an unmitigated disaster. Hacha
and Chvalkovsky were en route to Berlin with the dismal task of pleading with Ribbentrop and
Hitler for mercy, assuming they would get the chance to say anything. German troops were
stacking up outside the Czech border.53 Slovakia, the newly independent state, was expressing its
gratitude toward Hitler. Hungary was occupying Ruthenia. In London and Paris, no one knew
what to do, and no one could say with confidence what Hitler’s plans were for the coming days,
let alone hours. Bullitt reported conflicting views in Paris, with half saying Germany would
invade Bohemia and the other half thinking not. Daladier and Bonnet tasked their minister in
Berlin with giving a demarche to the German foreign office, informing them that France would
regard “most seriously” any march of German troops into Czech lands as a violation of
Munich.54 Bullitt asked Bonnet what the French would do if Hitler entered Bohemia anyway, and
Bonnet responded that he had “no idea.” Bullitt made sure to point out to the department that
Bonnet’s admission was “quite true.”55 The British had no intention of sending a demarche to
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Berlin. Herschel Johnson, American chargé in London, offered his impression to Washington
that the British foreign office was not alarmed or surprised as these types of events were to be
expected as long as Hitler’s regime was in power.56
By nightfall, howling winds and icy temperatures overcame Prague’s streets. The Carrs
and the Kennans went to the opera that night, and as they made their way against the frigid cold
rumors of Chvalkovsky and Hacha’s departure coursed through the city “like wildfire.” Later, as
the performers gave their best rendition of “Rusalka,” Kennan could not help but dwell on the
“equally fantastic but grimly real” performance Hitler was surely giving to the president and
foreign minister.57 After the show, the legation staff burned the midnight oil at the Schonborn
before taking a drive around the city for curiosity’s sake. Apart from a few jeering adolescents,
all was quiet. On the whole, the staff found it difficult to guess what was coming Prague’s way.
Little could be known until the substance of the Chvalkovsky and Hacha’s talks with Hitler were
made public, but it seemed to them that a partial occupation was most likely with a complete one
not being out of the question.58
In Berlin, Hacha and Chvalkovsky fared terribly.59 Arriving well after ten p.m.,
Chvalkovsky’s request to postpone the meeting to the following day was tossed aside by
Ribbentrop, who assured the two Czechs that the meeting would not take long. Hitler, angered
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that his visitors had arrived later than expected, made them wait until 1:10 a.m. before calling
them into the Reich Chancellery. Going into the meeting, Hacha and Chvalkovsky expected the
primary topic of discussion to be Slovakia’s independence and its constitutional implications, but
when Hacha began speaking on the subject, an irate Hitler launched into an anti-Czech harangue,
culminating with a pronouncement that Germany would be entering Bohemia and Moravia at six
that morning. He handed the stunned officials the terms of the ultimatum and suggested that they
consult with their advisors in Prague. As if to emphasize the need for a quick decision, Goering
commented that, as unfortunate as it would be, his Luftwaffe would bomb and destroy the
beautiful city if necessary, prompting Hacha to faint.
Soon after, Ribbentrop presented Hacha with a draft of a declaration, for his signature,
stating he was placing the fate of the Czech people and country in Hitler’s hands. Goering,
Ribbentrop, and Keitel cried “sign, sign!” until the broken, exhausted, and bewildered Hacha put
his name to the document—without authorization from Prague—just before four a.m.60 Though
the U.S. legation picked up bits and pieces of what happened during the visit the following day,
it would not be until the 18th that it reported the pitiful details to the department.61
The Prague radio service began announcing the imminent Nazi invasion at four a.m. All
military personnel and civilians were admonished to offer no resistance of any kind. At 4:30,
Kennan awoke to a phone call, and the voice on the other end, “shaky and terrified,” informed
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him of the full occupation to come.62 Kennan immediately called Riley and others, but declined
to call Carr out of concern for the great amount of stress the minister had been under in addition
to his old age. Kennan’s concern turned out to be moot, however, as an “over-zealous” consular
colleague, John Bruins, had already decided to wake Carr.63 It was not long before the American
staff began gathering at the legation. Kennan, “determined that the German army should not have
the satisfaction of giving the American Legation a harried appearance,” shaved meticulously
before walking to the Schonborn through the howling wind and falling snow.
On March 15, Czecho-Slovakia was “snuffed out.”64 At six a.m., the staff cabled
Washington that Germany’s military occupation of “CS” would begin right then, six a.m.65 As
Major Riley would later inform the department, German soldiers had been moving into Moravia
from Silesia during the night, well before Hacha had signed his capitulation.66 Thus, the German
invasion proceeded with steady progress, and within an hour, cities like Brno and Olomouc were
under German control. It was not yet ten a.m. when German forces arrived in Prague and
General von Goblenz established himself in the Hrad. 67 Despite the ice and snow, the German
invasion force, utilizing the main roads, occupied the entire county before the day was through.
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Throughout the day the Americans observed Prague’s citizens as they reacted to the
miserable news unfolding before them. Kennan, while walking home for breakfast at around
seven a.m., watched as people made frantic, last-minute preparations, many rushing to banks to
withdraw as much money as possible. On the streets, apathy mixed with heartbreak with some
people walking to work as normal while others wept into their handkerchiefs.68 News of when
the Germans would arrive in the capital occupied the people’s minds all morning. By nine a.m.,
such news took on a tangible form as German armored cars and tanks, that “winding iron
caterpillar,” rode authoritatively through the streets, battling the forty-mile gusts and windswept
snow. According to Riley, the weather was so poor that Germany’s mechanized divisions
proceeded unevenly throughout the country, resulting in high numbers of stragglers and
significant gaps in organized troop movements.69 Regardless, to onlookers, the German soldiers
looked like robots, who together comprised one giant “iron machine” programmed to take
possession of the city. Alice Masaryk, daughter of the former president, listened mournfully from
her apartment near the Hrad: “the windows shook, the massive walls vibrated…It seemed a real
doomsday.”70 It had only been six hours since the Czechs had learned that their city was to
become a Reich possession, and between the snowy conditions, the shock of a German invasion,
and the requests of their government to forsake resistance, Carr could report that,
notwithstanding the rumblings of Wehrmacht machinery, all of Prague was quiet.71
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As the day progressed, order prevailed and Czecho-Slovakia’s dissolution took on
concrete form. While the Wehrmacht overran Bohemia and Moravia, Hungarian troops inched
closer to the Polish border—albeit without the same success as achieved by the Germans—
thereby eliminating Ruthenia from the map as they marched.72 Slovakia’s independence gained
credence that afternoon when Warsaw granted Bratislava diplomatic recognition.73 In Prague, the
blizzard continued raging and the Czechs in the streets milled about in “stony silence,” tears, or
nonchalance.74 Apathy, borne out of the years of crisis and the looming German threat, was also
widespread, allowing a level of amiability to develop between Czechs and the well-behaved
German soldiers in some instances. Czechs, examining the Wehrmacht’s machinery, teased their
occupiers about the “old stuff” they had used to seize the city. Others informed the soldiers of
which stamps to buy or where to find the cheapest beer.75
Hitler came to Prague in the evening, arriving about an hour before Hacha and
Chvalkovsky. Wanting to spend the evening in the castle, Hitler and his entourage had raced
through the icy roads.76 From his kitchen window Kennan watched Hitler motor by, “looking at
once pleased and bewildered to find himself master of this city.”77 That night, many from the
legation drove around Prague. The eight-p.m. curfew left the city empty, quiet, and “dead.”78
Kennan observed that “it was so strange to see these Prague streets, usually so animated, now
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completely empty and deserted. Tomorrow, to be sure, they would fill with life again, but it
would not be the same life that had filled them before; and we were all acutely conscious that in
this case the curfew had indeed tolled the knell of a long and distinctly tragic day.”79
The city retained its mixture of apathy and sadness the following day. The Gestapo had
made hundreds of arrests during the night and instilled a great amount of fear in the populace.80
Czech spies, German Social Democrats, and outspoken critics of Nazism were, in the words of
the U.S. legation, “no more than hunted animals.”81 It was the Jewish community that had the
most to fear, though.82 On the afternoon of the 16th, Carr cabled the Department that Ribbentrop
had officially declared the protectorate from the Hrad balcony at one p.m.83 Within his
pronouncement he made sure to note that henceforth the Nuremberg anti-Jewish laws would be
applied. The American legation had already been confronted with the plight of Jews, as dozens
showed up at the Schonborn on the day of the occupation, pleading for a way out of the city.
Overwhelmed by the numbers of asylum seekers, they had to post a consul at the entrance to turn
away those who the staff did not know.84 The legation could do little for even those they did
know. All Kennan could tell one Jewish acquaintance was that he was free to remain at the
palace until he nerves calmed: “He paced wretchedly up and down the anteroom, through the
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long morning hours. In the afternoon, he decided to face the music and went home.”85 Kennan
even had Jewish acquaintances coming to his home in search of asylum, though little to nothing
could be done.86
Much like the aftermath of Munich, the legation received pleas and requests of support
from Czech and Jewish communities. Not all asked for specific things to be done, though, and
some simply pointed to the important bond the two countries shared. One letter, signed
anonymously as “The Czech Sentry,” asked the legation to understand that even if Hacha had
surrendered, many of the people had not, and that for “their future as a nation, the Czechs depend
on their quenchless determination to be absolutely free, a spirit not broken in their history by no
defeat…For support they look to their American friends again, and for encouragement to the
great democracy of the United States and to the human understanding of these States’ people and
representatives.”87
Pleas for solidarity did not go completely unsatisfied. On March 17, Welles delivered the
department’s response to the occupation, which said in part that
This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of
democracy cannot refrain from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts
which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and
independent people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia
attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close
and friendly relations…It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary
force are threatening world peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The
imperative need for the observance of the principles advocated by this Government has
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been clearly demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past
three days.88
Though its impact was little more than symbolic, it was an important message on Washington’s
part, particularly for its clarity. Not only did it make special note of the friendship that existed
between the United States and Czechoslovakia, but it also pulled no punches in calling out Berlin
for its “wanton lawlessness and arbitrary force.”
Naturally, the department wanted its message circulated widely among the Czechs.
Welles cabled Carr instructing the minister to make the department’s statement available to the
Czechoslovak press in the hopes that it would receive ample publicity throughout the country.89
The request highlighted Washington’s ignorance of what had become of Bohemia and Moravia
in the few days since its occupation. They should have had an idea, considering that in a March
16 dispatch, Carr and Major Riley referred to Prague as an “armed camp,” describing how
German soldiers took residence in schools and public buildings around the city, and how
censorship, which had been tight even before the occupation, had gotten much worse.90 Carr
answered Welles with a grim reality check, educating the department on just how badly things
had gotten in the Czech lands. The Germans had complete control of the press and the Gestapo
was everywhere. Thus, in regard to the American message of condemnation, “it would be virtual
suicide for anyone to publish [it].”91
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The refugee problem worsened in the ensuing days, and it became more difficult for the
legation to sit idly by. This was especially true of Carr. Having received instructions from the
department on the 17th to begin the process of closing the legation, Carr’s time in Prague was
nearing an end. In the twenty months Carr spent as minister to Prague, he had come to hold the
country and its people in special regard. Together, the Carrs had entered “wholeheartedly” into
Czechoslovakia’s cultural scene. They traveled the country extensively and made many friends
and acquaintances along the way. Throughout his decades in Washington, Carr pressed for
consuls and diplomats to pursue deep understandings of the countries in which they served, and
in Prague, Carr heeded his own advice fully. To his delight, “he enjoyed Czechoslovakia, and he
was able to make the Czechoslovaks enjoy him.”92 It was thus with sincere pain that the old
minister reported how thousands of Social Democrats, Jews, and political refugees fled for their
lives, and how many women and children spent days and nights hiding in the snow-covered
woods surrounding Prague.
Carr was an important point of contact for local refugee relief agencies working to
convince foreign governments to increase visa quotas.93 Carr was a seasoned veteran of this line
of work, having been at the forefront of the country’s immigration and visa policy for many
years. Beyond knowing how restrictive U.S. policies had been, Carr remained doubtful that
Germany would cooperate in any meaningful way. Meanwhile the Gestapo escalated its arrests
into the thousands— “the Jewish population is terrified.” “Consequently,” wrote Carr, “if action
can be taken it should be done speedily.”94
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An hour later, Carr cabled Washington a most fascinating message. Seemingly unable to
contain his concerns any longer, the minister pressed his own government to take decisive action
on behalf of Czech refugees. Though “fully aware of and in full sympathy with the later reports
and policy of the United States in regard to immigration,” Carr felt that a “special situation”
existed in the former Czechoslovak state, and that it demanded the attention of both the president
and Congress. As a basis for the United States getting involved, Carr cited the fact that the
Czechoslovak state was in part the creation of the United States of America upon whose
form of government the Czechoslovaks were proud to model their own. There are many
here who gave their best efforts over a period of years with the encouragement and
strengthened support of the United States…to preserve in Central Europe an independent
state devoted to the principles of liberty for which the United States stands…They may
justly be proud of their contribution to progressive and enlightened government. Through
no real fault of theirs their independence has ended.95
Carr’s appeal to the countries’ shared values is interesting. The minister was not one to toss
around these types of platitudes, not having done so in the aftermaths of previous refugee crises,
such as those caused by the Anschluss and Munich. Rather, it was others who brought such
appeals to him, begging his legation and his government to do something in the name of U.S.Czech solidarity. Each time, Carr and his staff could only express gratitude for the sender’s
concern, tacitly admitting that the goodwill inherent to U.S-Czech relations could not manifest in
practical relief. Thus, March 19 saw an interesting role reversal as Carr asked his government to
act.
He went on to point out that without international pressure, Germany would not allow
refugees to leave the country. Carr continued that
by law they are effectually shut out of the one country whose policies and principles they
have sought most earnestly to emulate. It seems to me that by not opening our doors to a
reasonable number of these distressed people the United States is likely to appear to the
people here who depended upon its friendship to the end and to democratic people
everywhere as lacking in sincerity and humane interest in the very people who have tried
95
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to mold their institutions upon its model. I think this should not be viewed as an
emigration matter but one of the protection of innocent human beings from the effect of a
catastrophe.96
As mentioned, Carr was no stranger to the complexities and inertia sewn into immigration law.
In fact, in the 1920s he had helped craft and enforce America’s exclusionary immigration policy.
Historian Irwin Gellman argues that Carr believed that restrictive immigration policies went
hand-in-hand with being a respected member of the “diplomatic club.”97 In borderline cases for
visas, then, Carr typically applied the law to an applicant’s disadvantage. Undoubtedly the
circumstances were extremely difficult, and it would be wrong to assume that Carr relished
keeping people out of the country.98 But nonetheless Carr spent years rigorously applying the
United States exacting visa protocol, having to decline, however painfully, all sorts of ‘special
cases,’ distressed people, and innocent human beings in unfortunate situations. Thus, his plea for
Washington to invest itself into helping Czech refugees is noteworthy, not because of any
profound impact it had, but because it shows the compassion and helplessness Carr felt for the
Czechs as he prepared to leave his post.
Carr’s desire for Washington to intervene on a very practical and humanitarian level held
weak precedent. Throughout the crisis, Washington and the department maintained a posture of
inactivity, preferring to keep tabs but stay aloof. Though the rapidity of the new Czech crisis
demanded attention, officials expected it to be “short-lived and settled from Berlin.”99 England
and France’s unwillingness to get involved only bolstered America’s neutral, detached approach
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to the March crisis. Munich itself had been England and France’s prerogative, at least when
considering the world’s leading democracies, and in the department’s eyes, Czech-German
relations had remained their issue into 1939. Even as prospects for a German occupation of
Bohemia-Moravia became likely—an action which the democracies knew would constitute a
gross breach of international conduct—France and England had no intention of interfering with
Berlin’s policy in the region. In fact, the two governments feared that any statement of
condemnation directed against Hitler would only fuel his passion to prove that Germany, and
Germany alone, had anything to say in east and central Europe.100 The expectation that Hungary
and Poland would occupy Ruthenia in conjunction with Berlin’s de facto control of Bratislava
added a further measure of futility to any notion of France or England trying to mediate.101
By the evening of March 14, Paris, but especially London, had arguably resorted to selfinflicted, purposeful naiveté. While French officials acknowledged to American circles that the
Germans had clearly manufactured circumstances to bring about the end of Czecho-Slovakia,
British circles clung to the notion that there was “no proof” of Berlin inciting the Slovaks.
Within both governments there was a preponderant number who believed that the Slovaks had
sold themselves out, that the current crisis confirmed that Czechoslovakia had always been
“nonviable,” and for these reasons the crisis should be treated as purely an internal Czech-Slovak
matter.102
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American reports suggested further contrasts between Prague’s Munich and March crises.
Throughout Munich, the British and French presses served as the locus of ideas, heated debates,
and opinions of all stripes on what the governments should do. In March, the presses, almost
mirroring their government’s nonplussed state, remained largely mute on ideas, instead
conceding that little to nothing could be done—as upsetting as it may have been to admit,
Parisians and Londoners considered it too late to aid Czecho-Slovakia.103 Thus, in the face of this
mixture of confusion, apathy, and helplessness from London and Paris, Washington had no
means to enter the fray, even indirectly.104
As the crisis came to a head, American officials in Washington witnessed the Czechs
respond with a peculiar mix of ignorance and ambivalence. It was a stark contrast to Munich,
when the Prague government vowed to fight to the end and only capitulated with heavy hearts
and courage for the future. Months of German pressure had taken its toll. Just hours before
Germany announced its intent to occupy the Czech lands, Moffat met with the counselor of the
Czech legation, and he could not help but notice that “the attitude of Dr. Brejska, whom I saw
nearly every day during the crisis last summer, has completely changed. He seemed apathetic
and defeatist. Formerly he had always emphasized the innate power of resistance of the Czechs;
today he shrugged his shoulders.”105 The department received messages from its diplomats in
Europe indicating similar attitudes among the Czech ministers. Alexander Kirk, the American
chargé d’affaires in Moscow, reported on the evening of the 14th the Czech minister’s fatalistic
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and hopeless state of mind.106 From Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane shared the bitter remarks of the
Czech minister there, who concluded that Hacha must either be senile or a traitor.107
American officials immediately attached importance to the occupation because of how it
shocked the nations, particularly France and Britain, into a realistic appraisement of Hitler, and
convinced them of the need to rearm. On the evening of the 14th, before the occupation had
become inevitable, Bullitt reported that general thought in London and Paris had largely
dismissed any more talk of world conferences and arms limitations, instead holding to the view
they must “stand side by side and pursue their rearmament programs.”108 This view took on a
whole new vigor the next day. The Manchester Guardian argued on March 15 that the
occupation was the inevitable result of Munich, and that if Britain could not fight then, she could
also not fight now. Rather, Hitler’s occupation of Prague afforded Britain an opportunity to
“reflect with shame on the past and to prepare with energy for the future.”109 When iterating the
views of his French contact that same day, Bullitt cabled the department that the occupation had
proven the “worthlessness of Hitler’s signature.” March 15, then, wrote Bullitt, had served a
purpose, albeit an unfortunate one, in that it set the democracies on a course of rearmament.110
American officials in Washington likewise lost no time in reflecting on how Hitler’s
decision to occupy Bohemia and Moravia meant a new era of foreign policy on the continent.
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Moffat, who spent the 15th in meetings with Welles, Messersmith, Berle, and others, concluded
that the occupation made a number of truths self-evident. First, Hitler had clearly violated his
solemn pledges of not wanting to absorb non-Germans. Second, he had blatantly destroyed the
settlement reached at Munich. Third, his move into Bohemia and Moravia went against the
principle of self-determination, the very principle he had used to justify his demands the previous
fall.111 Bullitt relayed thoughts that same day, stating that Hitler’s excursion into Prague
shattered any pretense that his aggressive behavior was tied to a desire to incorporate Germans
into the Reich. Now, said Bullitt, even a blind man could see that Hitler, like a new Napoleon,
aimed for nothing short of European hegemony.112
“What to do is the question,” wrote Moffat before retiring to bed on March 15. Officials
in Washington were divided. Everyone was angered by Berlin’s aggression, but no one could say
for sure what would be the best course of action. Moffat and the others debated the implications
of severing ties with Berlin altogether. Messersmith, the staunchest anti-Nazi in the department,
pushed for a harsh response as he paced with his eyes “aglow.”113 Ultimately, though deciding
not to completely sever relations with Berlin, officials in Washington did gear U.S. policy
toward taking a harder stance against Germany. The department also took advantage of
opportunities to express solidarity with Prague and to be more forthcoming in its sympathy. It
helped Miss Alice Masaryk get out of Prague safely, and in addition to its March 17 statement,
the department went out of its way to withhold formal recognition of Germany’s seizure of the
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Czech lands. However, this solidarity was limited in its influence and did not stretch into the
realms of what Carr had hoped for regarding refugee relief.
From a bird’s eye view, the efforts of the Americans in Prague during the March
occupation serve as a sure sign of just how impotent the symbolic relationship between the two
countries had become. The Schonborn was nothing more than a listening post, and the legation
was never in a position to engage the crisis proactively. It could only report the constant influx of
rumors from inside the city and from other posts around Europe. Carr and other American
ministers flooded Washington with updates, but even at the end of March 14 no one was
expecting a complete occupation. Moffat expressed views within the department that Carr had,
again, been unfortunately “caught napping,” but in reality, the diplomatic corps of Prague,
London, Paris, and Rome were caught napping, too.114 Geist had come the closest to recognizing
the possible extremity of German action on March 13, but even then, he was not aware of Nazi
influence in Slovakia, and how it served as a prelude to the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.
When the occupation did in fact come to pass, the immediate response was similar to what
happened during Munich. Those at the Schonborn spent much of the crisis traveling about the
city and observing the populace’s response. Once again, they witnessed the quiet, the shock, the
tears, and the unsettling realization that Germany’s solemn claims could not to be trusted, and
that Hitler was probably not yet finished.
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Chapter Four: “Documentation”
The morning of March 15, 1939, when the German motorized divisions pushed their way
through blinding snow-storms into the cities of Bohemia and Moravia, marked a turning
point in the history of these provinces no less revolutionary than the Battle of the White
Mountain in 1620 or the establishment of the Czechoslovak state in the fall of 1918…The
events which followed have been observed by few outsiders and understood by less. The
experiences of these unhappy provinces…[have] become one of Germany’s most
important internal problems.1
Following the occupation, as well as Carr’s departure and the closing of the American
legation, U.S.-Czech relations entered a unique, new phase. Only Kennan and the Prague
Consulate General remained to represent American interests in the occupied lands. The consulate
continued to function for logistical purposes—to help American citizens in Bohemia and
Moravia, or to mitigate problems pertaining to U.S. interests in the region. Kennan, on the other
hand, stayed for purely reportorial reasons. The department, almost at a loss for what to do with
Kennan, instructed him to observe the region now under German occupation or influence, and to
send back reports analyzing the political situation. Kennan, always an astute observer and eager
writer, went above and beyond with this loose job description. After five months of investigative
reporting, Kennan’s documentation of the Czech lands under German control, also called the
Protectorate, as well as the quasi-independent Slovakia, constituted the most in-depth
descriptions of the Czech and Slovak lands in the months leading up to World War II from an
American perspective, if not altogether.
Indications that U.S.-Czech relations were entering a new phase came just a few days
after the occupation, when Benes sent telegrams to Paris, London, Moscow, and to Washington
as well, in which he reiterated the laundry list of injustices Czechoslovakia had absorbed and
asked the receiving governments to see the German threat for what it was. In his message, he
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pointed out that Hitler was not just a menace to Central Europe, but also Western Europe, the
British Isles, the United States, and the entire world.2 While Benes bristled at the response he
received from Chamberlain, only a “short” message referring him to the Birmingham speech,
Benes was grateful for Roosevelt’s reply.3 In it, the president noted that the United States had
only afforded Germany de facto recognition of its seizure of Bohemia and Moravia, and he
finished by saying, “I need hardly add that I deeply sympathize with the Czechoslovak people in
the unfortunate circumstances in which for the time being they find themselves.”4 Beyond
putting great stock in Roosevelt’s expression of sympathy, Benes felt that Washington had led
the charge in condemning Germany’s occupation of the Czech lands, and that France and Britain
had only vocalized their disgust over Hitler’s behavior after the United States had taken the first
step.5 Whether that was true or not, the occupation allowed Benes to come out from his apolitical
professorship to begin establishing his government-in-exile. Meanwhile, the United States began
aligning itself more closely with partiality for the Czechs, both because of Germany’s descent
into outright aggression and Slovakia’s descent into the German orbit.
Back in Washington, department officials were in consistent contact with ministers of
various central and eastern European states. Their conversations inspired little hope in the idea
that Czechoslovakia’s sacrifice, which began at Munich and reached finality on March 15,
yielded any real benefits. Rumania, Czechoslovakia’s weak but faithful ally of the Little Entente,
claimed that Hitler’s march on Prague proved that nothing was to be gained from succumbing to
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Berlin’s threats.6 Unfortunately, Slovakia’s willingness to come under German wings extended
the Reich’s influence to Rumania’s frontiers. The two reached an economic deal within a week
of the occupation, and Rumania, despite its gutsy talk, joined the club of German satellites.
Hungary, which had lustfully ripped pieces off the Czechoslovak carcass thanks to German
support, was now reporting to the department that anti-German sentiment in Hungary was
growing by leaps and bounds, but nothing could be made of it because they feared upsetting
Berlin.7 Poland, the strongest of the three, found itself in the most precarious position, for once
Hitler had secured Memel on March 20, he fixed his eyes on Danzig. In a conversation with
Moffat that same day, Poland’s minister spoke resolutely about his government’s intention to
fight if need be.8 In less than a week, then, Moffat heard straight from the Rumanian, Hungarian,
and Polish ministers their acquiescence to Hitler, their fear of German retribution, and their
irreconcilable differences with German foreign policy.9 The region was collapsing; war seemed
certain; and Czechoslovakia’s sacrifice appeared useless.
Both the State Department and Roosevelt Administration interacted with the splinters of
Czecho-Slovakia’s dissolution in a number of ways. Like during the preceding six months,
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Washington was perfectly clear that its sympathies lay with peoples of the former Czech lands.
However, with Slovakia going its own way and with the Protectorate’s officials complying with
Hitler, supporting Czechoslovakia became a somewhat amorphous idea. The occupation itself
had put the United States into international quandary: as Europe sunk deeper into crisis,
expectations grew among many that the United States, in some fashion, would get involved. The
Rumanian minister, in speaking with Moffat, said as much when he argued that Hitler’s
occupation of Prague had proven that Berlin alone was the world’s arbiter of force, and that only
one moral counterforce remained—the United States.10 The United States was not ready or
willing to become involved. Thus, its ability to actively help the Czechoslovak cause was
limited, and Washington settled for low-hanging fruit. It was another peculiar time in U.S.-Czech
relations, the final period before World War II, in which Washington and Prague’s relationship,
though still friendly, became nondescript and peripheral. There were more positive feelings in
Washington with Hurban and Benes, but even these feelings were ultimately hollow at the
center, not because of any lack of sincerity, but because the external factors of the times
prevented substantive interaction.
Distinguishing between Germany’s de facto takeover of the Czech lands from its legality
was an important point for Washington. For instance, in the aftermath of the invasion, the
department wanted to punish Berlin through economic penalties, including on its newly acquired
territories: Bohemia, Moravia, and the puppet state Slovakia. In doing so, though, the department
wanted to make sure that its imposition of sanctions on the Czechoslovak lands—designed to
prevent Germany from benefitting in those areas in its trade with the United States—would in no
way suggest that the department or administration had given Hitler’s conquest legal merit.
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Moffat and Green Hackworth, legal advisor to the department, worked closely with the Treasury
to navigate this tight rope.11 More issues came up regarding the matter due to the intricacies of
the 1938 trade agreement between Czechoslovakia and the United States, and the department
eventually had to rescind the treaty altogether. Still, “the most important thing,” said Moffat, was
to “maintain our position that Czechoslovakia was in reality an existing entity, whose liberties
had been temporarily extinguished.”12
The unwillingness of the United States to move beyond de facto recognition of
Germany’s occupation of Bohemia and Moravia caused its fair share of practical issues, but the
department remained firm in its decision and entertained long discussions on the matter.13
Problems arose, however, when Germany demanded that all foreign countries close their
Czechoslovak legations, since no diplomacy was going to be exercised from the Protectorate,
and that a country should request an exequatur from Berlin if it wished to maintain a consulate in
Prague. While Britain complied, the French, not wanting to extend de facto or de jure recognition
to Hitler, refused to ask for an exequatur. Hurban wanted to know what Washington planned to
do, and Moffat expressed confidence that the department would ask for the exequatur, but that
such an action would signal “no change in our attitude vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia.” The
department wanted a consulate in Prague for purely practical reasons which would also prove
convenient for Czechoslovak officials, said Moffat, and it in no way considered Berlin’s control
of the region to be legal. “Personally,” he added, “it must be a comfort to the residents of Prague
to see that the American Flag was still flying there.”14
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It was not until the end of May that Washington asked Berlin for the exequatur. In doing
this, though, the department wanted to make sure that Germany understood that its views toward
the occupation had not changed. Thus, Hull had Alexander Kirk, the American chargé in Berlin,
submit a request for the exequatur along with an oral statement saying that the United States had
undergone no change in its position with regard to Czechoslovakia.15 Germany did not reply to
Kirk’s request and statement for a month, and when they did, they saw things differently: “In the
opinion of the German Government the granting of the exequatur to a foreign consul for a given
district is a formal act of sovereignty over that district…It is an evident self-contradiction to ask
a government to perform an act in exercise of its sovereignty and at the same time to contest the
right of that government to exercise such sovereignty.”16 Unwilling to look past the selfcontradiction, Berlin denied granting an exequatur to Linnell.
A minor issue as it was, the department refused to diverge from its marked position. Hull
instructed Kirk to secure an interview at the German Foreign Office, where he was to reiterate
the U.S. stance—that it was “constrained by force of circumstances to regard [Bohemia and
Moravia] as under de facto administration of German authorities”—and to stress to his audience
the manifold difficulties that would befall the Germans if the American consulate in Prague were
to be closed.17 Weizsaecker, the German secretary of state, received Kirk on July 11, and the two
discussed the disagreement in a “prolonged and thoroughly outspoken manner.” By meeting’s
end, neither had budged, and Weizsaecker warned Kirk that Linnell would not be allowed to
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continue his role as consulate. Weizaecker was especially upset that the department seemed to be
acting in concert with the British and French. This was not at all the case. In fact, with neutrality
revisions hanging in the balance, the department had no mind of being associated with London
and Paris on the matter.18 Thus, Hull tasked Kirk with “emphatically” rejecting Weizaecker’s
hunch.19 Kirk did, and he continued to meet with representatives of the German Foreign Office
throughout July, but Hull and the department had grown weary of the exequatur issue, preferring
to let the situation stand as it was. The Germans, completely enveloped in war plans, never acted
on their threats of shutting down Linnell’s consulate, which continued to function until
September 1940.20
Berlin’s demand that unnecessary legations close in light of the occupation worked the
other way, too. That is, they expected Czecho-Slovak legations to shut their doors, or to place
their responsibilities in the hands of corresponding German legations. Hacha and Chvalkovsky,
now in full retreat, sent telegrams to their foreign offices around the globe, instructing ministers
to comply with Berlin’s order. Vladimir Hurban, the minister in Washington, felt that such action
was unwarranted, especially since Hacha had acted unconstitutionally when signing away
Czechoslovakia’s independence.21
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The State Department, which only accorded Hitler’s occupation de facto recognition, not
legal legitimacy, had no problem allowing Hurban to continue running his legation as
representative of the temporarily extinguished Czechoslovakia Republic.22 Hurban’s presence in
the Washington throughout the spring and summer served as a tangible sign of where the United
States stood in regard to Germany’s occupation of the Czech lands, with the press running stories
on Hurban often.23 Moffat, always the one to whom Hurban brought his concerns, conveyed the
department’s sympathy to the distressed minister, informing him that his remaining in
Washington caused no embarrassment to the United States, and that if circumstances were to
change, he, Moffat, would be sure to inform the minister in an informal manner.24
Hurban continued to call on Moffat, almost daily. He inquired about how to protect the
legation’s assets, potential visits from Benes, the refugee crisis, and his own staffing problems.
Sometimes, his requests bordered on the ridiculous. At one point, when fretting over his inability
to transfer the legation’s gold reserves so as to keep them out of Berlin’s reach, he presented a
tenuous line-of-thinking in which he argued that, due to all that had happened in Europe, he was
the Czechoslovak government. Moffat disagreed. Later, toward the end of March, he informed
Moffat of his wishes to dismiss Konstantin Culen, the Slovak attaché, because he did not trust
him, and wanted to know whether Moffat thought it possible to have Culen deported. Moffat,
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unfazed, promised Hurban that he would look into the feasibility of such a project. “My
conclusion from the conversation,” recorded Moffat that evening, “is that instead of desiring to
be of the least embarrassment to us [Hurban] will henceforth cause us no end of difficulties.”25
As Moffat dealt with the fallout of the German occupation in Washington, Kennan began
his reporting duties in Bohemia and Moravia. Though essentially left alone as the sole diplomatic
presence in the Protectorate, Kennan found a lot of significance in the task ahead of him. As this
was Hitler’s first attempt to occupy a large swath of non-German territory, it marked a new era
of Nazi foreign policy, and Kennan, to his delight, was set loose by the department to report from
the front lines. “I was effectively my own boss,” he later recalled.26 Since no one seriously
expected Hitler to be finished with his continental crawl, Kennan held that Germany’s handling
of the Protectorate would constitute a sort of prototype which, if successful, might later be
applied to other conquered regions and peoples.27 It was a subtly historic opportunity, and
Kennan dove headlong into his documenting responsibilities. Decades later he would consider
his reports and analyses from this time to be some of his career’s best work.28
Though Kennan loved the opportunity to roam free and produce long-form reports, these
responsibilities did not come easy in the Protectorate. For Irving Linnell, the American consulate
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general in Prague, relations with Protectorate officials, whether Czech or German, were good and
straightforward (apart from the exequatur fiasco). Kennan, on the other hand, encountered
frustrating obstacles. Whenever he requested meetings or interviews with German officials,
which he framed to them as an opportunity to understand the Reich point-of-view, they
responded vaguely, saying that nothing like that could be done for the time being, but that the
situation might change in a few months.29 Czech officials, too, were eager to keep their distance.
For example, once when Linnell had a meeting with Hacha, the latter requested that Kennan not
come along, fearing that Kennan’s former status as a diplomatic officer would complicate CzechGerman relations. On other occasions, Czech officials cancelled meetings and dinners with
Kennan, likely on account of his diplomatic ties. Such difficulties eventually prompted Kennan
to wonder whether someone else, one without his unique baggage, could better report from the
Protectorate. The department, however, never considered making a change.30
In late-March, in one of his first reports from the Protectorate, Kennan sent a long
message to the department outlining the new form government and administration that the
Germans were establishing in Bohemia and Moravia. While the Wehrmacht retained control for
the time being, the Czechs eventually formed their own autonomous government, albeit with no
parliament. Hacha remained president, and the Germans continued to afford him the honor and
dignity associated thereof, at least on paper. Yet while the Czech Protectorate government was to
be nominally in charge of domestic concerns, it had no jurisdiction in more significant matters,
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particularly foreign affairs and economic planning, which were to be handled from Berlin.
Meanwhile, in conjunction with the autonomous government, Germany also established the
Reichsprotektor’s office, which was to be led by two men who could hardly have been more
different. At the helm was Constantin von Neurath, an old, dignified statesman better suited for
the pre-Nazi era. His number two was to be Karl Frank, a vicious Sudeten Nazi, of whom
Kennan could not tell whether “his ruthless zeal is the result of political ambition or of a selfrighteous belief in the innate sinfulness of the Czechs.”31 The job of Neurath’s administration
was to oversee and supervise the autonomous Czech government while serving as the Reich’s
official outpost. Despite this limited job description, there was never any question as to where
final authority lay in the Protectorate.
The announcement that Neurath was to serve as the Protectorate’s Reich Protector came a
few weeks after the occupation. The State Department considered the appointment to be a
“polite” move on Hitler’s part.32 Neurath, who had served as Germany’s foreign minister from
1933-1938, had built for himself a respectable reputation among foreign observers and
governments, as noted by Kennan. While he carried a profound sense of duty to his homeland, he
was at the same time averse to fanaticism, thought Ribbentrop to be a dangerous idiot, and saw
himself as a limiting factor to Hitler’s aggressive policy.33 After carrying out the occupation,
Hitler favored Neurath’s conciliatory style over anything that could be deemed fanatical or
aggressive, as he hoped to secure peace and quiet in Bohemia and Moravia, and then the
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subsequent integration of Czechs into the German Empire.34 To achieve this, Hitler considered
Neurath the best possible option.35 Hitler hoped that providing the Czech’s a measure of
autonomy would prompt places like Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to lean into the German
orbit themselves, or even become willing satellites.36
Neurath was initially optimistic about his job in the Protectorate. He spoke about
restraining anti-Czech and anti-German elements in Bohemia and Moravia, and he reinforced the
notion that Germany’s role in the Protectorate was not one of conquest and that the Czechs were
to be treated firmly but fairly.37 While he saw it as his purpose to destroy Czech will for national
self-determination, he considered it crucial to encourage Czechs to retain their culture and
heritage. The result, Neurath hoped, would be the successful integration of the Czech lands into
the Reich. While Neurath personally sympathized with the sufferings of minorities, he stood firm
in the belief that national identifications, such as those of Czechs and Slovaks, must be overcome
if lasting peace were to be achieved in Europe, and especially Central Europe.38
Interestingly, Kennan’s views on the Protectorate mirrored in some ways the “dignified”
outlook of Neurath.39 Kennan was hardly inclined to long for the return of the pre-Munich,
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democratic Czechoslovakia. That experiment, regardless of Czech successes and French
betrayals, had ultimately proven unworkable. Both the Slovaks and “backwards” Ruthenes
naturally belonged to Hungary, and it would be foolish, argued Kennan, to again imbed them
under Czech rule, however egalitarian that rule might be. Yet Kennan did not think that an
independent Czech state was the answer, either. What he really thought best, and what he
believed would bring lasting stability to Central Europe, was a genuine coexistence of Germans
and Czechs and the reemergence of a strong, Danubian empire. Much like Neurath, Kennan
believed that a German occupation executed in the correct way could solicit benefits for all
involved. It should be noted, however, that for Kennan, and even for Neurath, this hypothetical
‘correct’ occupation could probably not be under the auspices of the Nazi regime’s fanatical
fringes. Rather, calmer and wiser forces in the Nazi party would need to prevail. It seemed like a
tall order, but Neurath’s appointment lent some hope that if the German occupation was “firm in
its purpose, conscious of its responsibilities, integrated in its activities, and incorruptible in the
performance of its duties, there would be less cause for misgivings. Granted such an
administration on the part of the Germans, Bohemia and Moravia could look forward even to
complete incorporation in the Reich…and a tolerable economic future.”40
Initially, during the earliest stage of the occupation, before the Czech autonomous
government had been established and before Neurath had assumed his position, Kennan was
quite optimistic. He considered German behavior mild and often conciliatory. Though the
Gestapo and SS had followed the invasion by making thousands of arrests, most were released
after a day’s detention. Furthermore, by the end of the month, still not one prominent Czech had
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been molested, although many had lost jobs.41 The attitude of the Wehrmacht toward the Czech
lands also signaled potential for a good occupation. Prior to the March 15 invasion, Nazi leaders
had long been telling the Wehrmacht soldiers sent to occupy Bohemia and Moravia lies about
what they would find—they had been “filled up with tales of disorder and misery.” Thus, when
they at last moved into the Protectorate territory, the reality of the situation could not have been
more different, and for the Germans, could not have been more pleasant. Kennan, after a day of
walking Prague’s streets, noted “the obvious enjoyment and astonishment with which the
German officers and men set about to consume Bohemian food and to purchase Bohemian goods
has created a deep impression on everyone who has witnessed it…Prague shops and restaurants
have done a thriving business…people vie in the repetition of tales of the gargantuan exploits of
German officers and men in the local restaurants and beer halls.”42
Kennan’s conviction that Bohemia and Moravia were experiencing a relatively tame
occupation was not uniformly held, but it was certainly proving less intense than the brutality
that followed the Anschluss.43 Always the realist, Kennan also sought to counteract press reports
which he felt were “inclined to exaggerate the horrors of these first two weeks of Germany
occupation.”44
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It did not take long, however, for Kennan to lose all confidence in Germany’s ability to
integrate the Czech lands into the Reich. Early decisions by German officials made Kennan
question the soundness of Berlin’s judgment in the way it administered the Protectorate. For
instance, one of its first moves was to appoint Konrad Henlein, the former leader of the Sudeten
Germans during the Munich crisis, as civil minister of Bohemia. In the minds of Czechs, few
individuals were more culpable for the tragedies that befell Czechoslovakia in 1938 than
Henlein, and they despised him for it. The idea that he was now to lord over them in a position of
leadership was downright acidic. Moffat called it the “cruelest cut of all,” while the American
papers dubbed it a premeditated humiliation.45 Kennan agreed, informing the department that
Berlin could not have chosen a better leader to harden Czech hostility and suspicion. While
Henlein’s appointment may have brought satisfaction to Sudeten Nazis, Reich officials did not
want a hostile Czech population, but rather peace, quiet, and as few bad feelings as possible. The
move made no sense, and for an answer Kennan could only point to “the obscure depths of
internal Nazi party politics.”46 German leadership seemed to realize its mistake soon enough, for
by the end of March, Kennan could report that Henlein had seemed to reach his “eclipse,” no
longer appearing in public or having his signature on published decrees.47 He was transferred out
of the Protectorate later that spring. The clumsy move was not a good start.
Worse than Henlein, though, were the efforts of fringe Nazis to wrest control from the
proper chain-of-command, foremost of whom was Karl Frank. Czech officials greeted Neurath’s
appointment to the position of Reichsprotektor with leery caution. While they may have been
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relieved by Neurath’s statesmanlike character and the knowledge that he would offer a fairer
shake to the Protectorate, they had very little confidence in Neurath’s ability to impose his way,
especially in the face of fanatics such as Frank, as well as the endless slew of Sudeten and
Austrian Nazis, who had descended upon the Protectorate in the name of opportunism and
cronyism.48 Such radicals had already entrenched themselves in local positions of power.49 Thus,
it did not take long for Kennan to see that, on the whole, German occupiers were indecisive,
immoral, and plagued by relentless internal rivalries. Quickly, then, the outworking of the
German occupation became none too enticing to Czech observers, and Kennan concluded that
“one can predict no successful future for the German attempt to rule the Historic Provinces.”50
Kennan confirmed the Czechs’ concern that Neurth would not effectively hold sway, for when
Neurath left Prague soon after assuming office to attend to prolonged business in Berlin, Kennan
did not consider it significant, for through Frank and his ilk, “German domination [was]
complete.”51
Frank and the radical Nazis notwithstanding, the gap between Kennan’s views of the
Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate widened as the occupation took shape. Already an
admirer of the Czech people, Kennan came to appreciate the ways in which they resisted German
occupation, the likes of which were on full display during the day of Neurath’s official arrival in
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Prague on April 5.52 The Germans made a big deal of it, declaring it a public holiday and
transporting trainloads of Sudeten Germans to thicken the crowds. The Czechs responded to
compulsory participation with “real resentment,” said Kennan, and they found little ways to
rebel. For instance, since Czech school children were to be gathered by their teachers and placed
along the route of Neurath’s procession, many parents kept their children home for the day.
Other homes, not wanting to comply with the authorities’ orders to fly the Nazi or Czech flag,
simply paid the six-hundred-crown fine.53 The culmination of the day’s lackluster feel came
when only four or five hundred Germans, no Czechs, showed up for the evening’s torchlight
parade. The failed attempt at pomp left a strong impression on Kennan. It seemed that the
Germans, for all their references to ancient shared history and the Holy Roman Empire, were
utterly ignorant of the very real differences between Germans and Czechs, and especially
psychological differences. What worked on the German people might not work so easily on
Czechs: “the success which flags and drums and torchlights have had in stirring enthusiasm
among their own people may…have misled them into the hope that the same effect could easily
be achieved among the Czechs.”54
Kennan, though extremely doubtful that such “fan fares” would bridge the psychological
and linguistic gaps, was not primarily concerned with the attempts in-and-of themselves, but
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with how they suggested Germany’s bankrupt approach to occupation and Germanization.55 Its
inability to offer a legitimate method for pulling Germans and Czechs together “is an omen of
equal sadness for Czechs and Germans alike.”56 The ceremony was also meant to reinforce the
fiction that “Baron von Neurath was arriving in response to the spontaneous request of a Czech
nation thirsty for order and protection after years of insecurity and misgovernment.”57 Czechs
and German soldiers alike knew this to be false, adding a measure of self-delusion to the
German occupation.
Kennan, already unimpressed with Germany’s approach to the occupation, found little
encouragement in other aspects of Berlin’s methods, such as its control of the Protectorate’s
press. Strict censorship was put in place immediately, but that was to be expected. Czech papers
could only run the most mundane and colorless stories so as to spare German feelings, and the
bulk of their front-page coverage they received from the “busy minions of Dr. Goebbels.”58 The
intermixing of Czech ambivalence and Reich propaganda led to some amusing setups in news
coverage. For instance, Kennan noted one paper which ran two front-page stories. The headline
on the bottom of the page claimed to share “fourteen lies of the democratic press,” with no. 11
being the supposed invasion of Memel. This was not true, the paper argued. The only problem
was that the story right above it, one with a “screaming” headline, boasted the exciting news that
the Germans had successfully occupied Memel.59 Czech citizens enjoyed these failures for how
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they made the Germans appear sloppy. Censorship demoralized the Czech populace in other
ways, though. For instance, in the spring, Czech theaters could no longer show American films, a
cultural blow to a region where 54% of its foreign film intake came from American
productions.60
At times, Kennan found the incompetence of the German occupiers to be downright
funny. In one report, he recalled a recent trip he had taken to a Prague beer garden. It was a
“warm summer evening,” and some Czech students, after having had too much to drink, began
venting their frustrations with the German occupation by sarcastically shouting “we want
colonies” and “colonies for the Czechs.” Other Czech patrons, appreciating the humor, joined in,
and according to Kennan, for some time the entire beer garden echoed with defiant demands for
Czech lebensraum.61 Already an amusing night, then, the perfect capper came when two
Germans, who had been sitting alone at a table as the scene unfolded, became very excited at
what they were witnessing. Thinking they had discovered real Czech sympathy for Berlin’s
foreign policies, the two quickly left the garden to share the important news with a German paper
editor, who then rattled off a “serious and significant” article which, by citing the beer garden
incident, claimed that reasonable Czechs did in fact understand the benefits that would come
from Germany restoring its colonial empire.62
The beer garden scene touched on an important issue for both Kennan and Washington:
Germany’s foreign policy. The Germans were eager to not only subdue the Czech people, but to
also garner the populace’s approval and momentum for an expansionist policy—to make
Germans out of the Czechs, and to use the transformation as a springboard to the east. The notion
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that Hitler was only warming up in regard to lebensraum worried the department and
administration greatly. In mid-April, Roosevelt sent personal messages to Hitler and Mussolini,
asking them to make a ten-year pledge of non-aggression applicable to Europe and the Near
East.63 Hitler and Mussolini ignored the plea, and their respective presses hailed it ‘dumb,’ while
most European countries, though unofficially supportive, chose to make no official response
because Germany was angry and unfortunately nearby.64 The message meant the world to the
Czechs, though.65 Hurban telephoned Moffat and extolled the president’s “terrific” effort to
which Berlin and Rome “had no answer.”66 Hurban was worried, though, as Roosevelt’s message
made no reference to Czechoslovakia. He and Benes, who had been in close contact with the
minister, wanted to be sure that the United States had not experienced a change-of-heart in
regard to the extinguished nation. Moffat assured him that nothing of the sort had occurred.67
The new Czech government did not come into existence until early May. Contrary to
Kennan’s expectations, it was filled with holdovers from the Beran government.68 The major
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changes resulted from the fact that two prominent positions, Defense and Foreign Affairs, were
outright abolished, as was expected. Chvalkovsky, the man most responsible for the gradual
capitulation that marked the Second Republic, went to Berlin to serve as the Czech Minister.69
Apart from Chvalkovsky’s transfer, the only other prominent change came in Rudolf Beran, the
former prime minister, being replaced by Alois Elias. Along with Kennan, the public was
shocked at the lack of turnover, and most concluded it meant that the Protectorate government
would be a temporary one. Kennan considered such to be the most logical answer, and he felt
that if the continent’s hostilities were set loose, a possibility that was looking more likely, then
Germany would ditch the idea of a Protectorate and establish full political control.70
That time had not yet come, though, and in his reporting, Kennan went to great pains to
flesh out the Protectorate’s complex power dynamics. On the one hand, Kennan claimed that
German domination over the region was complete. However, at the same time, he also attached
major value to the Czech Protectorate government: “the moral effect of the Protectorate should
not be dismissed too lightly…it is equivalent, furthermore, to a promissory note from the
Germans for the preservation of Czech culture and national pride, a symbol of at least the
professed intention of the Germans to treat the Czech nation with respect.”71 Furthermore, it had
only been twenty years since a time when the Czechs were still under Austrian rule, argued
Kennan, a time when they could hardly have dreamed of possessing a ‘Protectorate’
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government.72 A functioning protectorate, then, might be sufficient for most Czechs, thought
Kennan. If the Germans were to completely abolish the Protectorate system, Kennan argued that
the “rift between Czechs and Germans, already tragically wide, becomes irreparable.”
One of the Protectorate government’s first goals was to consolidate the Czech people
under the banner of a single solidarity movement, the National Community. The Beran cabinet
had attempted this during the Second Republic, but the political cliques and old party clubs
remained entrenched. To Kennan, this was the natural inclination for the Czechs. “The Czechs
take to political parties like ducks to water,” he said in a March message to the department.
Later, at summer’s end, he would write confidently that the people of Bohemia and Moravia,
beyond seeing democracy as a thoroughly discredited model, would also refuse a return to
“squabbling political parties,” but this shift in thinking had not yet fully manifested. 73 Kennan
seemed to believe that the dissolution of factions and a general ‘coming together’ of the Czech
people were crucial to the region’s survival. To his liking, the National Community gained
traction throughout the spring, thanks to various political machines joining its ranks after
“prolonged heart-searching,” as well as the efforts of “intelligent people” to persuade the public
at large that Czech morale and unity could only weather months or years of German domination
if the Czech people pulled together.74
Kennan closely followed the efforts of the Czech populace, in addition to the National
Community, to preserve its own culture and national feeling. Czech demonstrations, which
doubled as ways of venting disapproval of the German occupation, were both spontaneous and
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carefully executed. Kennan considered these methods ingenious.75 A favorite demonstration of
the Czechs was to place bouquets of flowers at prominent graves and statues. In early May, for
example, Kennan reported that thousands of citizens in Prague had left flowers at monuments
commemorating John Hus, the fifteenth-century reformer, and Woodrow Wilson, who in the
minds of many Czechs had helped realize the movement Hus had started. The Germans, of
course, did not like these outward displays of Czech solidarity, but as Kennan noted, it was
difficult to arrest individuals for visiting public monuments.76
Other demonstrations recorded by Kennan were more overt. While the monuments of
Hus and Wilson were receiving newfound love and attention, a group of Czechs moved the
remains of Karel Macha, a beloved Czech poet, from the Sudetenland to the Hrad’s cemetery
where many of the country’s greatest figures were buried. The spontaneous event garnered
thousands of participators, and for occasions such as this, Czechs around the country proved
much more willing to display the red, white, and blue tricolors than when the German
specifically asked them to, which Reich officials found extremely annoying.77 Even in
Moravska-Ostrava, a frontier city exposed to stronger attempts of Germanization, Reich officials
had to officially forbid anyone from wearing badges with the inscriptions “we will not surrender”
and “Benes is not asleep.”78
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Interestingly, the Czech officials in charge observed these demonstrations of national
solidarity with extreme uneasiness. The Czechs were already on thin ice due to the fruits of
Hacha’s labors to enlist the populace into support of the Protectorate’s single party, the National
Community. At first, the Germans liked the idea and pushed Hacha forward and in a spirit of
National Socialism. However, when 97% of eligible Czech males voted in favor of the party,
with the National Community securing 120% support in some districts, the Germans determined
that Hacha’s party was too effective and that the Protectorate government ought to use its
apparent control of national feeling to increase the populace’s love and appreciation for all things
German.79 Kennan also assumed that Germany, always looking for a minority to incite and
embolden, feared that the National Community’s popularity left no room for agitated outsiders,
thus eliminating potential pretext for abolishing the Protectorate altogether.80
Kennan saw the psychology of Czech resistance as one of realism, patience, and
bitterness intermixed with ambivalence. He also drew parallels to when the Czechs resisted
Austrian rule in the twilight years of the Habsburg Empire. While they demonstrated a “baffling
willingness to comply with any and all demands,” said Kennan, they boasted an “equally baffling
ability to execute them in such a way that the effect is quite different” from what the German
expected or hoped.81 Still, no Czech seriously expected to shake off German political control in
the immediate future. Like what happened in 1918, the Czechs settled to wait for another world
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war, which alone could restore their freedoms and independence. “There is probably no country
in Europe,” wrote Kennan, “where war…is so universally desired as in the Protectorate.”82
While Kennan appreciated the subtle but effective resistance exhibited by the Czechs, he
also observed in them a sober recognition of their difficult situation, or what Kennan called
Prague’s “universal sense of impending disaster.”83 Being in touch with well-informed circles,
Kennan reported that few Czechs believed that they would be able to consolidate any salvageable
identity in the near future. Interestingly, though, the disaster that Czech citizens feared was not
most of all war. Rather, they feared that war would not come soon enough, opening the door for
the Germans to “cope in peace” and undertake its Germanization project in Bohemia and
Moravia with ample time and space. What the Czechs really feared, then, was the systematic
“disintegration of public life.”84
Amid the fear and apathy that typified portions of the Czech population, there were other
aspects of the Czech’s passive resistance that Kennan appreciated. One was their sense of humor.
“Among themselves and with their friends,” recorded Kennan, “they treat the whole situation
with that dry, ironic humor to which their language so easily lends itself.”85 Later in the summer,
when Czech resistance gained greater confidence, Kennan reported the myriad ways in which the
Protectorate’s citizens sought to use small, humorous acts to undermine German authority. Under
the cover of a theater’s darkness, people blurted out wisecracks during the German newsreels
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that played before movies. Restaurant waiters took joy in infuriating German patrons by handing
them their German newspapers upside down. Bolder still was their tendency to place hammer
and sickle stickers on the parked cars of German citizens.86
The Czechs’ ability to passively resist German efforts seemed applicable to almost any
sphere, at least from Kennan’s vantage point. Often however, it was pettiness, opportunism, and
ambivalence that marked both Czech and German behavior, resulting in a half-amusing, half-sad
game of tug-of-war. That is exactly what Kennan witnessed when the “Bayrischer Hilfszug,” or
‘Bavarian Aid-Train,’ came to Prague for humanitarian relief. The purpose of the outfit, or at
least what Kennan surmised, was to demonstrate well-being for the starving elements of the
Czech population until the new regime and its systems could begin providing bread and work for
everyone, as German officials assured it would.87 Czech welfare authorities, noticing an
opportunity, proceeded to sell to the Hilfszug the very supplies which they would have given to
needy peoples themselves. As the Czechs made a bit of profit, the Bavarians lost no time in
capturing their wondrous deeds for the press. They asked Czech children to demonstrate their
prayers, snapping photos of them on their knees and arms held high. With the morning papers
came the photos of the children and the obvious conclusion that they were, in fact, begging their
deliverers for food. Within a week, though, the juxtaposition of the Hilfszug’s efforts with
German soldiers “stuffing themselves” was too much for locals to handle, and the Bavarian AidTrain packed up and returned home.88
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While the Czechs and Germans tried to outdo one another in exploiting the refugee
problem in Bohemia and Moravia, back in Washington the U.S. government’s attempts to
alleviate the refugee crisis in the Czech lands failed outright. Since the Anschluss, the United
States, along with Britain and other League nations, perpetually sponsored the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees, which had since its inception been trying to resettle displaced persons
from Germany. Unfortunately, the committee was constantly bogged down by Berlin’s utter
uncooperativeness. Unable to make much headway in Germany, it could do less for the Czech
lands.89 Then, in April, Congress deliberated over the Wagner-Rogers bill, which aimed to
increase immigration quotas to allow twenty-thousand German children, mostly Jews, to come to
the United States. Madame Hurban, the minister’s wife, wanted to go before Congress herself in
order to sway her listeners that children from Bohemia and Moravia ought to be included in the
bill as well.90 The department, though sympathetic, worried that by allowing a diplomat’s wife to
testify in Congress, they would be setting a dangerous precedent. She never did appear before the
committees, and the bill died in Congress anyway.91
The Czechs’ unseemly willingness to exploit humanitarian aid for profit was not the only
example of resistance through opportunism. Kennan also noted such cases in Bohemia’s
financial sphere. Upon their arrival, the Germans, desiring to extract as much juice from the
Czech economy as possible, imposed a dangerously generous exchange rate on Czech crowns
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and printed Czech moneys with abandon. The Czechs, rather than attempting to stave off these
measures, dove headlong into economic recklessness and began printing crowns without
restraint, hoping to get their fair shake before leaving a mess that the Germans, not the Czechs,
would have to mop up. “The ship has been taken by pirates, and the crew are quietly opening the
pet-cocks,” explained one Czech official to Kennan.92 This mentality spread rapidly among
Czech officials, and by spring Kennan reported that
the Czechs are entering with complete abandon into the spirit of what they consider to be
a desperate situation. Even Czech officials who have heretofore been relatively honest
now take bribes with complete unconcern, and their superiors look on with approval,
feeling that the greater the disintegration of the integrity of the administration, the more
difficult things will be for the Germans. Sloppiness, irresponsibility, passive resistance
are becoming universal. The result is an atmosphere of outward submission and inner
demoralization which defies description and the inevitable consequences of which are not
pleasant to contemplate.93
The Protectorate’s economics became a battleground for earning the populace’s favor. As
the Germans tightened their grip on Czech finances, they hoped that inflationary prices, which
resulted in expedient monetary benefits for the average Czech, would win over families to the
German side. Czech officials were split, with some arguing that the National Community would
in fact receive credit for the short-term benefits of inflation, while others pressed that it should
do its best to adhere to orthodox economic practices. The only thing Kennan was sure of was that
Germany would maintain the status quo until external events forced them to do otherwise.94
By the end of May and continuing until the start of the war, Kennan reported the
deterioration of Czech-German relations in Bohemia and Moravia. Much of this, argued Kennan,
was the result of the ongoing internal battle between the Reich’s top two officials in the
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Protectorate, Neurath and Frank, and the latter’s ability to continually come out on top. Under
Frank, the German commissars who had assumed local leadership in the immediate aftermath of
the occupation that wielded “all the real power” in the Protectorate, and Berlin made no attempt
to alter this fact.95 In many instances, the Sudeten and Austrian Nazis abandoned all pretense of
Czech autonomy, kicking out Czech officials and securing all posts for themselves. This was a
serious problem for Czechs, said Kennan, as most of the Sudeten Nazis had “personal axes to
grind” and unleashed their worst instincts on local Czech populaces. 96 The SS and Gestapo
maintained a presence in most sizable Czech communities despite not having any legal
justification for doing so. Prisons filled and overflowed, and Kennan, leaving behind the
optimism he held at the start of the occupation, informed the department that “it would scarcely
be an exaggeration to say that “terror,” in the accepted totalitarian sense, had now begun, and
that the Czech authorities are quite powerless to oppose it.”97 The behavior of the Sudeten and
Austrian Nazis drew Kennan’s serious ire, who claimed that, like they had ruined CzechAustrian relations, the radical elements of the Nazi party were now poisoning Czech-German
relations beyond repair, and with them, any chance for a healthy solution in the Protectorate.
Not only were Czech officials powerless, but Kennan also felt that Neurath could do little
to curb Frank and his cronies. In early June, Neurath, to Czech officials’ delight, visited with
Hitler to protest the manner in which the Protectorate was being run, and specifically Frank’s
constant overreach. For Neurath, Frank only frustrated Germany’s goal and desire for the
Protectorate—that it would become a place of effective Czech-German relations allowing for
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organic Germanization to take place. Though in sympathy with Neurath, Kennan was doubtful
that the visit would lead to any positive change: “It will be easy…for Herr Frank to convince
[Hitler] that Baron von Neurath’s views are only the products of an old-fashioned liberalism as
little in keeping with the principles of National Socialism as with the stern necessities of the
moment.”98
As Frank’s methods of terror became more commonplace in the Protectorate, Kennan
began hearing whispers from Czech officials and National Community leaders about when the
benefits of long-view cooperation with the Germans would be no longer worth the price. Their
greatest fear was that, by working with the Germans in an effort to keep national unity, they
would lose the good graces of the Czech populace, who, in bearing the brunt of Nazi terror, was
looking on the Protectorate government’s complicity less and less favorably.99 Kennan learned
from his contacts that many Czech officials wanted to become “wholehearted protagonists” and
martyrs in the name of Czech separatism. What kept them from crossing this line and breaking
away from cooperation was the hope that Britain and the United States would soon take a harder
stance against Hitler. If such were to happen, Czech officials felt that their chances of
successfully opposing Nazi occupation would increase dramatically.100
Benes, who at the time of the occupation was still lecturing at the University of Chicago,
had only bitter words for Hacha and Chvalkovsky, who in his mind had, through a spirit of
“narrow-mindedness and ignorance,” sacrificed the Czechoslovak state without authorization.101
In light of the consternation he felt toward those who oversaw Czechoslovakia’s erasure, Benes
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wholeheartedly approved of Hurban’s refusal to turn over the Washington legation to the
Germans. For those envoys and ministers who did succumb to pressure and hand the keys to
Reich officials, Benes offered no excuse and stated his belief that once the war passed, those
diplomats would need be held accountable for their lack of backbone.102 From both Prague and
Washington, it was difficult for Americans to pinpoint who exactly represented the
Czechoslovaks in ‘U.S.-Czechoslovak relations.’ However, in late-March, Hurban visited Moffat
with a bright smile on his face, happy to share that he had received some funds from Prague,
which he took to mean that the Protectorate, in its “heart of hearts,” approved of the stand he was
taking against the Germans in Washington.103 Just as the Czechs inside the Protectorate worried
over the possibility of war not coming for years, Benes harbored similar concerns in Chicago.
Not only did he fear German consolidation in the Protectorate, but he also feared that over time
Czech opposition might falter or give in: “would they remain strong in their resistance and
morally untouched?”104
The desire of Czech officials to turn from compromisers into martyrs grew as the efforts
of Frank’s contingent intensified. Kennan offered the department a few notable examples. In one,
he described a speech Frank delivered in the town of Budweis of southern Bohemia. The town,
which possessed a clear Czech majority, played host to some 40,000 Nazi officials, and it
received a rude awakening when Frank proclaimed that Budweis would soon become a German
town again.105 In another example, Kennan recounted the story of a Czech high school class,
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which while on a field trip saw one of its students shot in the arm and the rest detained in prison
for mildly rebellious behavior. It was another case in which German officials could do little to
restrain the more volatile behavior of local Sudeten administrators. Naturally, said Kennan,
Czech officials were indignant, and were only waiting for Chamberlain’s ouster and to see some
backbone in the Western powers before ending their compromising approach to the German
occupation.106
Kennan deplored the fanatical hostility exemplified by many Sudeten and Austrian Nazis,
or those Germans who had fully bought into the extremist excess. He despised it most of all
because of how it prevented any purposeful or positive coexistence between Czechs and
Germans, something which Kennan genuinely believed the region needed. Kennan did not just
want German and Czech states to live well side-by-side, but he felt that the two peoples needed
to live under the same banner—that reemergence of a strong Central European state. The
arrogance and fanaticism demonstrated by so many Nazis toward the Czechs, and the resulting
Czech hostility, rendered such a notion impossible.107
By July, the Protectorate system of Czech governance existed in name only. Neurath’s
office had progressed to the point of possessing “dictatorial powers,” which unfortunately
trickled down to local Nazi authorities, too.108 In terms of practical governance, German
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authorities stopped bothering to put up a charade of deference, and they began passing laws, such
as appropriating a half billion dollars worth of Jewish property, without so much as informing
relevant Czech officials. Members of the National Community and Protectorate government
considered resigning over the issue but decided to wait for a more favorable “political
constellation.”109 Kennan was doubtful that it would actually happen: “being Czechs, they have a
remarkable capacity of delay, and in all probability they will keep putting things off until they
find themselves thrown out by the Germans.” Hacha himself was known to have wanted to
resign, or even commit suicide, but he continued on in his post, feeling that it might still be of
some good to the Czech people. Kennan had sympathy for Hacha, recognizing that he had
“borne much of the tragedy of his people” for six months.
Despite the proliferation of German excess, Kennan still saw value in the Protectorate
government and National Community:
They are still the symbol of Czech nationhood. They are the only remaining link between
the past and the present political systems. They are the only group which could pretend to
speak for the nation as a whole and which is permitted—however futilely—to do so. As
long as they remain, the Czechs feel that they have some sort of open national leadership
and are recognized as a nation rather than a mere minority or—as one Czech put it—a
picturesque costume group.110
By mid-summer, Kennan retained little hope for German-Czech coexistence as bad
feelings spiraled out of control. Incidents in the towns of Kladno and Nachod resulted in German
authorities levying more punitive measures on the Czech populace.111 “Repression breeds
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bitterness, and bitterness breeds more repression. In this way, a vicious circle is created from
which, at the moment, there seems to be no escape,” wrote Kennan.112 For things to get better,
argued Kennan, both sides would need to show good will. No signs pointed toward that
happening. Rather, as the Nazi approach to occupation turned sour, Kennan anticipated that the
Reich would soon attempt to crush by sheer force Czech nationalism. If this were to happen,
argued Kennan, the Germans would probably have the upper hand at first, but if the tide were to
ever turn, “Czech retaliation will be fearful to contemplate.”113
If Slovakia initially hoped to command respect from nearby governments and observers
with its newfound autonomy, it did not take long for this goal to be thoroughly disappointed.
Kennan, for one, never placed stock in the Slovakian experiment. Though it had received
guaranteed protection from Germany, Berlin was perfectly content to pursue its ‘big brother’ role
flakily. Throughout March, when Hungary and Slovakia pitted their weak, hodgepodge soldiers
against one another in the name of border delimitation, Hitler kept tabs passively, happy to make
use of his “divide and rule” policy.114 Eventually, the Hungarians pushed some twenty miles past
Ruthenia’s border, causing the Slovaks to seek diplomatic help from Vienna and Berlin. To their
chagrin, Reich officials had little interest in the Slovak-Ruthene border and advised the Slovaks
to take up the matter in Budapest. The Slovaks did just that, but without German support, they
were forced to accept Hungary’s terms.115 In interpreting the geopolitical drama, Kennan saw a
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self-delusional Slovakia, a temporarily victorious Hungary, and a Germany focused on bigger
issues.
While Kennan discovered the unsavory developments taking place in Slovakia firsthand,
the department in Washington, aided by Kennan’s reports, gave Bratislava cold-shoulder
treatment. The department had received a communique from Slovakia on April 8 in which the
Slovak foreign minister requested that Washington recognize the province’s independence.116
The department did not reply. When talking to the Argentine ambassador, whose government
was unsure of how to handle its own Slovak communique, Moffat explained that, as far as the
department was concerned, Slovakia was nothing but a “puppet government under the orders of
Berlin.”117 Naturally, then, the department felt it right to revoke its most-favored-nation trade
agreement with Slovakia, as it had done for Bohemia and Moravia, and it had no intention of
recognizing the province’s attempt to be its own master. This was a serious blow to Slovakia,
which, already wallowing in its “utter penury,” struggled to salvage international trade during the
spring and summer. In addition to their communiqués to specific governments, Bratislava
announced after the occupation that all Czechoslovak trade treaties would remain in force for
Slovakia until new treaties were worked out. Kennan’s remark that the attempt by Bratislava to
continue its foreign trade contracts had “not proved very successful” was an understatement.
Sensing the territory’s “disorganization and lack of confidence,” no foreign government wanted
to attach itself to the Slovakian experiment. The only country to make a commercial deal with
Slovakia was Poland, but as Kennan pointed out, since both countries were agricultural, they had
very little to offer one another.
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As the government in the Protectorate took shape throughout the spring, so too did
Slovakia’s, and Kennan concluded that only one main point differentiated the two: while the
Reichsprotektor had offices in Bohemia and Moravia, none existed in Slovakia. That, as well as
the fact that Slovakia’s independence had been recognized by Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Italy, may have seemed promising for Bratislava, but Kennan found such facts misleading. The
true nature of Slovakia’s position was little better than the Czech lands, and the “servitudes”
which Bratislava had accepted in its submission to Berlin were just as far-reaching as those
imposed on Bohemia and Moravia.118 The Slovaks, though, were simply unable or unwilling to
recognize such to be the case.
Among the many problems facing the Slovaks, Kennan was keenly interested in their
currency and financial difficulties. Before Czechoslovakia’s dissolution, Bratislava faced a
deficit of roughly 300,000,000, to which Kennan estimated that another 200,000,000 should be
added to account for new expenses. Some stopgap measures, such as the minting of new
coinage—its factory was conveniently located in Slovakia—helped a little, but Slovakia’s fiscal
intelligentsia left one wanting. Word of their efforts and mishaps found its way to Prague’s
business circles, bringing “considerable amusement” to Czech bankers and financiers.119 As
Kennan documented parallel circumstances in Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, there was no
shortage of examples from which he concluded that on one hand, there was the capable realism
of the Czechs, and on the other, the unaware fantasies of the Slovaks.
Toward the end of April, Kennan conceded that things had quieted down in Slovakia, but
that it was a long way away from actual stability. The peace and quiet Kennan attributed to both
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the German military occupation and German influence in the Slovak government, which though
less direct than its influence in the Protectorate, was just as effective. All the major issues
confronting Slovakia—the deficit, trade, land redistribution—were settled by German-Slovak
commissions in which the Slovaks attended as “experts” rather than “partners,” and Germany
exercised the right to make all final decisions.120 Since the new Slovak government was already
inclined to mimic National Socialism, the Reich felt comfortable in allowing Bratislava to
“struggle along” in smaller, internal matters. Foremost of which were matters of legislation
against the Jews. Though the average Slovak held its new government in low-esteem, one
characteristic which brought the province together was a “rousing” anti-Semitism, and it was not
long before the population demanded of its government a Slovak Nuremberg Law.121 Without
the influence of the Czechs, who Kennan argued had always prevented harsh anti-Semitic
legislation from being passed, Kennan he that sooner or later Slovakia would model Germany’s
approach. For the time being, though, the Catholic Church and barrenness of the Slovak
economy infused a touch of caution in Bratislava’s anti-Jew policy.
When the Slovaks did finally publish their law on limiting the rights of Jews in the
spring, it was very much a mixed bag, being in some ways harsher than the Nuremburg Laws,
but in other ways more lenient. Kennan and Linnell attributed this to the fact that there were so
many competing voices with stake in the formation of Slovakia’s anti-Jew policy, namely the
legislators, the Catholic church, and the far-right Hlinka People’s Party.122 For all the conflicting
viewpoints, though, the new law did bear striking clarity: “In Slovakia,” reported Kennan, “a
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person is either a Jew or he is not.”123 Unlike the laws developed in Nazi Germany, there were to
be no ambiguous cases, no mixed persons, but simply 100% Jew or 100% not. Furthermore, the
day-to-day treatment of Jews was generally left to local authorities, and Kennan was quite
confident that these “irresponsible elements” of the population would make life for Jews plenty
difficult.124
At times, Kennan argued that the Slovaks did show some real courage in bucking
German expectations for its own self-interest. He noted how the Slovak government awarded
almost all available jobs to Slovaks, willfully passing over the German and Hungarian
minorities. They even went as far as to demand that German minority leaders submit to Slovak
party authorities. Kennan seemed to express admiration laced with the pity of one who knows
better, saying that the situation was “indicative of the extent to which the Slovaks have been
encouraged to think they are going to be permitted to run their own show.”125 For Kennan, then,
even Slovak courage was rooted in things less admirable: unawareness and self-delusion. This
would lead to unpredictable behavior on Slovakia’s part, which could potentially cause trouble
for Germany, something they had little patience for. In a biting twist of irony, Berlin harkened
back to its rhetoric of 1938 when it accused the Slovakia of treating its German minority in an
“intolerable” manner, demanding assurances that such behavior would not continue.126
As the spring and summer wore on, Germany’s options for what to do with Central
Europe grew in an endless number of directions. The implications for Slovakia, where German
decision-making remained “paramount,” were grim. According to Kennan, “well-informed
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opinion” in Bratislava felt that, as long as the status quo remained, Slovakia could count on a
continuation of its position vis-à-vis Germany.127 Problems would arise, however, if the situation
changed in any significant way. Kennan believed that war would immediately result in Berlin’s
clamping down on Slovakia, unmasking Bratislava’s charade of autonomy once and for all.
Things could be equally bad, though, if Germany worked out its issues with Poland and
Hungary. If such were to happen, thought Kennan, Germany would likely partition Slovakia,
throwing the bulk of it to Budapest and keeping some strategic scraps for herself. The goal,
simply put, was to play Hungary and Slovakia against one another, fanning the flames of their
grievances and propaganda machines.128
Thus, Slovakia was left with no real friends or partners. Things became worse when
Hitler, in listing the concessions that Germany could grant to Poland in relation to the Danzig
issue, stated that Berlin would be willing to guarantee Slovakia’s independence through a joint
understanding with Budapest and Warsaw. Since Germany had already guaranteed Slovakia’s
existence unilaterally, Hitler’s statement wrought confusion and concern in the minds of Slovaks.
Kennan, for one, had little confidence in the state’s future, commenting that Slovakia was “ripe
for partition,” and that Germany was toying with the region for its own purposes, and therefore
policy toward Slovakia changed day by day.129
Slovakia, hampered by debt and new expenditures, embarked on expensive public works
projects, though they were necessarily financed by Germany and to Berlin’s benefit. When
Kennan spent a day in Bratislava in mid-July, the Slovaks he encountered did not possess the
undue confidence of those in charge; rather, they admitted that Berlin would continue to fund
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Slovakia’s public works and infrastructure so long as it proved helpful to Hitler’s future plans.130
Once the benefits dried up, then Berlin would dispose of Slovakia in whatever manner was most
convenient, whether it be partition, full annexation, or something else.
Even as late as July Kennan, when visiting Bratislava, could not procure specific details
of Slovakia’s foreign investments and trade. Though he inquired about them to different
officials, the only answers he received were dismissive claims that the numbers had not yet been
compiled, or that no corresponding office had yet been established. Kennan had different reasons
for this lack of information: “Slovak exports…have been just about negligible.”131 It was not just
finances which remained obscure in Slovakia, but entire apparatuses of government. Skirmishes
between Hlinka Guards and Germans and Hungarians, as well as confused leadership in
Bratislava, prevented the province from achieving stability. One American correspondent
informed readers that “Slovakia is lapsing into a condition in which every village and township
is a separate republic.” Similar to Kennan’s reports, the correspondent could not help but
reinforce the distinction between Czechs and Slovaks, noting that Slovakia’s administrative
chaos encouraged “banditry and disorder,” the likes of which had “never existed in the CzechoSlovak Republic.”132
While Slovak officials enjoyed what amounted to illusory prestige by attaching
themselves to Germans, the Slovak people only grew more resentful to their German overlords.
Not only was anti-German sentiment spreading throughout the province, though, but Slovaks
also started exhibiting greater friendliness toward the Czechs. A bon mot made its way through
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the region that “it took the Germans to make the Slovaks like the Czechs.”133 Still, little actions
here and there to placate Slovak desires, along with the startling complicity of Slovak leaders,
led Kennan to conclude that the anti-German opposition in Slovakia posed no immediate danger
to Reich authorities.134
While Slovak leaders still profess the utmost confidence in the Fuhrer’s guarantee of
Slovak independence…no one else in Bratislava seems to feel that the Germans will keep
this regime in power one day longer than they consider it to their own advantage to do
so…[the Slovak regime] is completely subservient to German wishes and can hold the
territory conveniently at Germany’s disposal until it becomes possible to make plans of a
more long-term nature.135
Kennan’s lack of enthusiasm for Slovak independence reached its crescendo in late-July
when the province published its new constitution. The new law of the land relegated the
government to being “completely an organ of the Hlinka People’s Party.” Freedom of
confession, speech, art, science, and other activities were guaranteed so long as they did not
conflict with legislation, public order, or Christian customs. “In other words,” wrote Kennan,
“they are not guaranteed at all.” Because Slovakia had essentially become a one-party state,
Kennan believed it would soon become a “vortex of the foulest sorts of deceit, sycophancy, and
intrigue.”136 Like the view he had developed during the Second Republic, Kennan had little
confidence in Bratislava’s leading political figures. He saw Tiso (now president) and Tuka (the
leading radical voice) and Mach (secretary of interior) as jealous “minor prophets,” none able to
offer a coherent political platform for the state. From Kennan’s point-of-view, the Slovaks were
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politically inept and thus easier pray for the Germans.137 The entire situation served as an
“eloquent testimonial to the decline in respect for individual dignity in Central Europe.”138
In regard to the constitution, Kennan made sure to point out that Germany had retained
tight control over the province. The German papers in Bratislava, which had become the most
authoritative papers in Slovakia, warned after the constitution’s passing that the document would
only be a “scrap of paper” if it was not backed up by the “proper spirit.” Kennan doubted
whether the Slovaks would understand the importance of those types of statements from the
Germans. The seasoned Czechs had learned to “take warnings more seriously than promises,”
but the Slovaks, especially Slovak officials, had not yet emerged from the excitement of
autonomy. “[They] will…doubtless accustom themselves to it in the course of time,” said
Kennan.139
As July turned to August, Kennan produced one more report of the conditions in
Bohemia and Moravia prior to the outbreak of war in September. According to Kennan, it had
been the unhappiest summer for the region since World War I. Between electrical storms and
crop failures, there was enough bad news before one even counted the German occupation. The
nature of Germany’s occupation appeared inconsistent to Kennan. Frank, “the real leader,”
continued to approach his task with “ruthless zeal,” and as a result, the “underworld figures of
the Gestapo” continued to terrorize the public.140 At the same time, though, Kennan noticed a
sense of nervousness among the German occupiers and a desire to court Czech favor. To this, the
Czech citizenry showed no receptive signs. There was a lethargy, “almost a paralysis,” to
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everything the Czechs did. Utterly fed up with the Germans, the Czechs put up a wall of apathy
and disdain. The Germans searched for pockets of the populace where Germanization might take
root, but fertile ground for increasing the pro-Nazi camp among Czechs was hard to come by. “In
this respect the Czechs may be said to have won a skirmish,” wrote Kennan.141
The National Community remained passive, cautious, pathetic, but not completely devoid
of purpose. Czech officials felt they had succeeded in maintaining the nation’s identity, and they
had even reached an understanding with Benes and the Czech emigres. The Germans, upset with
the National Community’s passive and lethargic approach, assumed more dictatorial powers in
the Protectorate, hastening anti-Semitic measures and inciting Bohemia and Moravia’s fascist
fringes. Still, the majority of the people remained detached: “Everything is in suspense. No one
takes initiative; no one plans for the future. Cultural life and amusements continue in halfhearted, mechanical spirit…People prefer to sit through evenings in beer gardens…to wait with
involuntary patience for the approach of something which none of them could quite describe but
which they are all convinced must come and must affect all their lives profoundly.”142
The profound change the Czechs sensed they were waiting for came on September 1.
Hitler’s armies blitzed into Poland, and world war had come. As a result of the war, the
department moved Kennan to Berlin to support America’s overwhelmed legation there. Germany
clamped down on the Protectorate completely, and Czech officials and citizens hunkered down
for the difficulties of wartime occupation. Overall, the time between the occupation and the war
proved transformative in U.S.-Czech and U.S.-Slovak relations. During those five months,
Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia inevitably went their separate ways, and as a result, the United
States began to more definitively distinguish between the two regions. While retaining sympathy
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and support—where possible—for the Czechs, Slovakia became nothing but a puppet of Nazi
Germany in the eyes of department officials. Thus, even though Washington still regarded
Prague on good terms, the concept of Czechoslovakia—a unified Czech and Slovak state—faded
from American points-of-view.
Lastly, Kennan’s documentation, though not widely read by the department at the time,
would prove significant going forward. After the war, Kennan would become a prominent voice
in American foreign policy, and his experiences and analyses from summer 1939 would color his
interpretations of the postwar world, including the merit of a resurgent Czechoslovakia. At the
time, though, Kennan’s reports, if nothing else, served as a final prewar representation of the
impotence underlying U.S.-Czech relations. For five months after Germany’s occupation of the
Czech lands, Kennan watched and recorded the varying miseries the Czech people faced, and the
varying delusions the Slovak leaders accepted, at the hands of the German menace. Washington,
unable to intervene, dispatched Kennan for purely reportorial reasons—to observe, to gain
information, and to study Berlin’s tactics. In October 1938, Germany butchered Czechoslovakia.
In March 1939, Germany butchered Czecho-Slovakia. Finally, during the spring and summer of
1939, Germany butchered Bohemia-Moravia and played with Slovakia, and Kennan, America’s
representative, could only watch it all happen.
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Conclusion
Here is the building we lived in, and the cool, vaulted passageway to the courtyard with
the baroque fountain…Up those stairs, two flights of stairs, was our door…I am no
longer the same person who used to go up and down these stairs. The ghost of that person
is somewhere up there still…It was only two years ago; but it was another time, another
life. And now, we are all a little lonely. So much has died…1
Such were Kennan’s thoughts during a return visit to Prague in late-1940. His poetic
wordsmithing notwithstanding, the heart of his reflection is clear: the war heaved profound
change on not only the region, nor the continent, but the entire world. It was thus a peculiar,
almost mystical, experience for Kennan to once again find himself pacing in the Schonborn’s
garden and ascending the staircase to the familiar rooms and salons. The efforts of that time, two
years earlier, the reporting, the telegramming, the travelling, were now buried underneath the
rubble of Hitler’s invading armies. Buried with those efforts were the traits that had defined
U.S.-Czechoslovak diplomacy before the war, irreparably weakened in the year leading up to it.
From the old palace, Kennan understood quite well just how impotent the sympathetic wire
running from Washington to Prague had proven:
[The Czechs] are aware of the sympathy of the West; but they will always appraise this
sympathy at precisely the value which it had for them on the day of Munich…they must
not be encumbered with too much advice and solicitude from the West. The heroics of
irredentism are all very well from a distance. But the problems of these Czechs who must
today take responsibility for their people before the Germans are already too burdensome,
too pressing, and too delicate to permit them to assume additional strain. Their tasks
leave no room for the glories of martyrdom; and those who wish their people well will
think twice before embarrassing them with their censure of their sympathy.2
When Kennan revisited the memoires stored inside the Schonborn, the war was over a
year old. Germany was dominating on all fronts. In the former Czechoslovakia, Czech Jews were
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being sent to the Theresienstadt concentration camp, and Slovak Jews were experiencing
persecution at the hands of their own leaders.3 Ruthenia had not existed for eighteen months. The
Czech government-in-exile was struggling to garner recognition and concessions from the
Western powers, and the Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia was scoring few victories
against their German occupiers, whose harshness, Kennan thought, was only matched by their
stupidity.4 The future looked grim, and the past belonged to ghosts.
The Second World War and its aftermath signaled a new epoch for U.S.-Czechoslovak
relations. Of course, the Allies eventually defeated the Axis powers, and a new world order
emerged. In addition to a resurgent, reunited Czechoslovakia, the United States and the Soviet
Union came out of the war as the world’s two superpowers. It was a new conflict in its nascence,
and one that would set the course not only for U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, but
Czechoslovakia’s future altogether.
Eduard Benes returned to the presidency after the war, and he once again found himself
in a difficult position. Prague, perennially at the center of things, was caught between the two
superpowers—Washington and Moscow—and each expected Benes’ allegiance at the expense of
the other. Similar to the conundrum faced by the Second Republic, Benes, backed into a corner,
promised liberalism to the United States and loyalty to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the zerosum atmosphere of the early Cold War did not allow Prague to play both camps for long.
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The State Department considered a pro-West Czechoslovakia crucial to American
success in any postwar conflict with the USSR. In April and May 1945, when both American and
Soviet forces were in position to liberate Prague, the department urged Washington to act
decisively, citing the inherent friendliness and historical connections between the United States
and Czechoslovakia, further noting the “traditional sympathy that the Americans felt for the
democratic country in the heart of Europe.”5 Around the same time, the Office of Strategic
Services, forerunner to the CIA, called Czechoslovakia the “master key to Europe.”6 Ultimately,
however, Harry Truman, who assumed the presidency upon Roosevelt’s passing in April, along
with General Dwight Eisenhower, allowed the Red Army to liberate the capital city.7 In
conjunction with liberation, Moscow also orchestrated the reestablishment of Benes’ government
in Prague, and U.S. officials were kept in the dark. It was at this time that Kennan, then serving
as a chargé in Moscow, and who probably understood the complexities of Czechoslovakia’s
situation better than any American, considered Czechoslovakia lost to the West.
In the years that followed, Czechoslovakia struggled to balance its East-West
schizophrenia, and internal political matters caused it to gravitate toward Moscow.8 Its proximity
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to the USSR necessitated that it rely on Moscow for security. Czechoslovakia’s new coalition
government included a wide-array of parties, including a strong communist presence.
Consequently, Prague transformed its economic and political framework with broad socialist
policy. A major issue of contention emerged between Washington and Prague over the issue of
Czechoslovakia’s German minority. Sending the Germans packing was one point that nearly all
Czechs and Slovaks agreed upon, but the United States, in the midst of rebuilding its relations
with Germany and wanting to uphold humanitarian values, remained cool toward the idea of an
immediate, wholesale expulsion. Moscow, on the other hand, got on board.9
The Marshall Plan proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. By mid-1947, the
Truman Administration and State Department increasingly saw things through an East-West
prism, and they remained laser-focused on securing U.S. influence in the West, particularly in
West Germany. Though the United States made U.S. aid available to all of Europe, U.S.
officials, Kennan among them, expected, and even hoped, that Moscow would reject the
Marshall Plan and force its geopolitical sphere—including Czechoslovakia—to reject American
aid, too.10 That is exactly what happened, and soon after, in February 1948, the Czech
Communist Party staged a successful coup in Prague, and Czechoslovakia became a communist
state in Stalin’s image. It remained one of Moscow’s most faithful satellite throughout the
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duration of the Cold War.11 Thus, the consequences of the postwar disconnect between
Washington and Prague were serious, generally speaking, but for U.S.-Czech relations, they
were detrimental. From 1945 until 1989, when Czechoslovakia broke from the USSR, Prague’s
status as a Soviet-satellite—something which Washington could not look past—swallowed
whole any notion of ‘shared bonds’ or ‘special connections.’
During the three years between World War II and Prague’s 1948 coup, U.S. officials,
both in Washington and in Prague, tried to win the Czechoslovaks over to the West. Their
efforts, however, were inconsistent and ultimately marked by failure. Walter Ullmann, a
historian of central and eastern Europe, chronicled these failures.12 Ullmann’s portrait, though
understanding of the difficult position U.S. officials were in, stresses how their reporting was
often inaccurate and their strategies ineffective. The consequences were, of course, the February
1948 coup d’état, which discarded Prague’s lingering crumbs of democracy.13
Ullmann’s conclusions received hearty and reputable support from Igor Lukes—an
eminent Czech-American scholar.14 Making use of Czech and Soviet materials that had not been
available to Ullmann, Lukes paints a similar, albeit more complete, picture of the
Czechoslovakia and America’s inability to resurrect the special bond—both real and perceived—
that coated U.S.-Czech relations in the 1920s and 1930s. However, it was not for a lack of
understanding, argues Lukes, that U.S.-Czech relations teetered. In fact, officials in the State
Department recognized with great resolution that Prague and Washington’s historical friendship,
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this special bond, primed the pump for continuing a sincere and strategic relationship in the
postwar world. Despite this knowledge, American efforts to rekindle or exploit the U.S.-Czech
connection failed.
It is difficult to call the culminating failure of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations in 1948 the
direct legacy of the two countries’ prewar relationship, particularly their strained, impotent
relationship of 1938-1939. So much happened during the war that fundamentally altered world
diplomacy to its core. It can be said, though, that Washington’s inability to build constructive
relations with Prague after the war mirrors what happened after Munich and the March
occupation. However, most studies of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations stop at Munich, it would be
tempting to conclude from such an approach that U.S.-Czechoslovak relations were fine and
happy until the war—which altered the paradigm completely—and that it was not until the
postwar period that external forces, in this case the Soviet Union, rendered U.S.-Czechoslovak
diplomacy ineffectual.
The nature of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations in 1938-1939 dispels this line of thinking.
During the eleven months between Munich and World War II, the United States proved
incapable of providing meaningful support to Czechoslovakia, crisis after crisis. The sheer
complexity of external factors coupled with the neutrality demanded by the American people at
home prevented the Roosevelt Administration and State Department, and by extension the
Schonborn, from intervening on Prague’s behalf. This remained true, on the whole, even after
Hitler’s march into Bohemia and the subsequent shedding of legal pretense. September 1938 to
September 1939 proved time and again America’s inability to overcome external forces, such as
central Europe’s dense jealousies, particularly those of Poland and Hungary, and Hitler’s
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aggressive foreign policy, in order to stand with Czechoslovakia in potent solidarity.15 Thus,
maybe it should be of no surprise that America was wary of trying to establish influence in
central Europe after the war—which was once again a confluence of independent and unstable
Polish and Hungarian states—and incapable of overcoming an even greater external force—the
Soviet superpower and the establishment of global East-West dichotomy—to rebuild its old,
simple, and friendly bond with Czechoslovakia.
A further wrench in prewar U.S.-Czech relations, which likely impacted postwar
relations, was the seeming unviability of the reunited Czechoslovak state. During each stage of
the year leading up to the war—from “Realization” to “Consolidation” to “Occupation” to
“Documentation”—the original Czechoslovak state frayed and fell apart. Before a week had
passed after Munich, Slovakia and Ruthenia secured significant autonomy, and by early 1939,
each had succumbed to significant German influence. One of the roots of the March occupation
was Slovakia’s declared independence (at Germany’s demand), and one of the fruits of the
occupation was Ruthenia’s erasure from the map, courtesy of Hungary. Throughout spring and
summer 1939, Kennan’s writings from the Czech and Slovak lands hinted at two distinct
provinces with distinct peoples and distinct futures. Sympathy, however constrained, was
reserved for the Czechs alone.
Interestingly, U.S.-Czechoslovak relations between Munich and the war simultaneously
proved both the inherent impotence of the two countries’ bond and the endurance of the two
countries’ unique friendship. This first became apparent in the aftermath of Munich. It was a
time of realization, and the United States, among other observers, quickly learned how
devastating the Munich Agreement was to the Czech, Slovak, and Ruthene lands, and the

15
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Schonborn soon realized that the Prague government had little hope of avoiding becoming a
German vassal. While the United States could do nothing for Prague, it never betrayed her,
either, and Prague and Washington remained on officially good terms, even when the State
Department had to categorically reject Prague’s requests for support.
During the five months following Munich, Prague attempted to consolidate within its
rump borders, and the Schonborn served as nothing more than a passive observer. From the
Schonborn’s point-of-view, Prague was a pitiful site at times, and Carr, Kennan, and the others
could only report the unfortunate position of Hacha, Beran, and Chvalkovsky, miserably caught
between Hitler and the European democracies. Again, the United States could lend no help, but
again, there was a measure of warmth that remained between the two countries, especially
evident in America, where Moffat worked with Hurban on issues big and small, and where
Benes sought refuge from the trials of 1938.
With March came occupation. Like at Munich, American observers could only watch
Germany plunder the Czech lands, but this time Hitler could make no claim of self-determination
or minority rights. The ruse was up. Thus, the continued passivity of the United States stands as
the most crystallized picture of how ineffectual U.S.-Czechoslovak relations were. America
could do nothing to prevent its unjustifiable destruction. Still, the occupation afforded the State
Department and Roosevelt Administration the opportunity to unequivocally affirm
Czechoslovakia’s right to existence, as well as tangible opportunities to extend solidarity.
Finally, during spring and summer 1939, Kennan alone remained to document the
German occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and German ‘protection’ of Slovakia. Kennan’s
voluminous reportage suggests that in his mind, and thus in many respects the mind of the
department, the Czech and Slovak peoples had gone their separate ways. The Prague government
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hunkered down under the competing interests of the German occupiers, Neurath and Frank,
waiting and hoping for a worldwide conflict to provide an opportunity to restart. Meanwhile, in
Bratislava, Slovak leaders deluded themselves into thinking that they were indeed in charge,
those from Kennan’s vantage point Berlin pulled each and every string. The five-month period of
“documentation” serves as an ample indicator of how amorphous and nondescript U.S.Czechoslovak relations had become since the previous fall, for only one American was there to
traverse the Republic’s former lands, powerless and waiting, like the Czechs, for Hitler to make
his move.
Lastly, as a final thought, it ought to be restated that American policy toward
Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia, the Protectorate, and Slovakia during the time between
Munich and the war did not have failure at its core. Diplomacy, at the end of the day, is the vast
sum if individuals’ efforts, and broadly speaking, U.S. officials dealing with U.S.-Czechoslovak
relations in 1938-1939 handled the difficult period well. For starters, in Washington, Hull,
Welles, Messersmith, and others at the State Department worked tirelessly to navigate neutrality
in the face of European conflict as best they could. It was a mostly thankless situation, and in the
words of Moffat, the United States in large part emerged without a knock against it. On a more
personal level, Moffat—ever cool, calm, and collected—dealt with Hurban for the entirety of
time that passed between Munich and the war, a wonderful example of how friendly relations
between countries often occurs at entirely human and seemingly small levels.
Yet it was in Prague that the nitty-gritty details of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations took
place. On the whole, the American legation in Prague—the hardworking staff at the
Schonborn—performed its responsibilities admirably. Carr, in the very twilight of his career,
served as a dedicated minister in a region and city overcome by crises of historical proportions.
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Apart from being “caught napping” in March 1939, both the State Department and Schonborn
staff had only glowing things to say of Carr.16 Furthermore, his eleventh-hour plea for the United
States to intervene on behalf of the suffering Czechs was, though ineffectual, a good indicator of
both his dedication to his post and concern for the people. Carr’s own reports speak to the
exquisite staff serving at the Schonborn, as Carr spoke highly of everyone from the secretaries to
the interpreters in his telegrams to Hull. The indomitable Kennan produced volumes of reports
that constitute nothing short of impressive, and on numerous occasions the State Department
officially stamped his work “excellent.”17
The Schonborn was a uniquely difficult place to serve in 1938 and 1939, as the American
diplomats and secretaries there were essentially tasked with passively watching a friendly,
likeminded nation be kicked around by international menaces (Germany), shortsighted minor
powers (Poland and Hungary), and mutinous provinces (Slovakia and Ruthenia). For eleven
months, then, the Schonborn watched, sympathized, and kept its distance. “We all felt small and
helpless in the face of what was happening around us,” recalled Kennan. “But,” he continued,
“one of the first prerequisites of usefulness in the diplomatic profession is the ability to recognize
the limits of one’s possibilities.”18 And that was just what U.S. officials did—recognize the
limits. Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, that meant acknowledging that the bond between the
American and Czechoslovak nations—forged from history and myth, centered on values and
democracy—was only as strong as the context of the times. Once the going got rough, then
reality set in, and the special bond proved nothing more than futile friendliness and impotent
sympathy.
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